' These 2 appeals are directed against 2 separate but similar decisions, both given on 3rd August, 1980 dismissing the grievance petitions filed by the appellants, on the ground that they were barred by res judicata.
2. The circumstances in which these 2 appeals have been filed, briefly stated are that the appellants, Iqbal Mujeeb and Jacashed Farooq were respectively employed as a Clerk and a Cashier in the NawabShah Branch of the respondent-Bank. Both of them were dismissed from service on 12th August, 1978 on the charges, of misconduct. Both the appellants preferred separate grievance petitions to the learned VIlth Labour Court at Sukkur. These 2 petitions were dismissed by the learned Labour Court mainly on the ground of non-maintainability of the petitions and for want of jurisdiction. The appellants preferred appeals to this Tribunal against the dismissal of their grievance petitions. This Tribunal, by its order, dated 9th January, 1980 disposed of the 2 appeals on the offer made by the respondent-Bank, which was accepted by the appellants, that the appeals preferred by the appellants against the orders of their dismissal would be duly considered by the competent authority in the respondent-Bank. It appears that no less an authority than the President of the Bank himself has considered and examined the appeals of the 2 appellants but has dismissed the same by his 2 separate orders, dated 12th February, 1980. Against the rejection of their appeals by the President of the respondent-Bank, the appellants filed second grievance petitions before the learned Labour Court at Sukkur. These have been dismissed by the learned Labour Court by the impugned decisions on the ground that the petitions were barred by res judicata, As common issues are involved in both these appeals they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this order.
1 I have heard Mr. Wasitillah Qureshi, who appeared for the appellants, and Mr. Sultan Altana, the learned counsel for the respondent Bank. The main contention of Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi was that the learned Labour Court, in dismissing the grievance petitions of the 2 appellants on the ground of res judicata, has misconceived the legal position in that the appellants were not agitating against the original orders of dismissal passed on 12th August, 1978 but the rejection of their appeals by the President of the respondent-Bank, by his order, dated 12th February, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. Sultan Allana submitted that the grievance of the appellants in fact was against their dismissal from service and since this was effected by the order, dated 12th August, 1978 the present grievance petitions were not only barred by res judicata, but also by limitation. In my view, no question of res judicata arises in the instant case, What the appellants are challenging in these proceedings are not the original orders of their dismissal passed on 12th August, 1978 but the orders passed by the President of the respondent-Bank in appeal on 12th February, 1980. The withdrawal of the previous appeal preferred by the appellants before this Tribunal was expressly on the understanding given by the respondent-Bank that the departmental appeals by the appellants would be duly considered by the competent authority in the Bank. No doubt, this has been done, but since the appellants are aggrieved by the decision of the President of the Bank, they are entitled to challenge the same by means of a grievance petition under section 25-A, I. R.
0. The order of this Tribunal passed on the previous appeals filed by the appellants is to be deemed to be an award for the purposes of the I. R.
0., and since it gave a right to the appellants for a decision on the appeals preferred by them to respondent-Bank, though they may have been time barred, the appellants could prefer grievance petitions against the decision given by the respondent-Bank on their departmental appeals. It is a well-settled principle that an original order stands merged with the order of the appellate authority. As such the original orders of dismissal passed in respect of the appellants on 12th August, 1978 stood merged with the orders passed on appeals by the President of the respondent- Bank on 12th February, 1980. I am, therefore, of the view that the passing of the latter order gave a fresh cause of grievance to the appellants who were entitled to initiate Individual grievance proceedings in respect of the same. The fresh grievance petitions, therefore, are not hit by the bar of res judicata, assuming that the provisions contained in section 11, C. P. C are applicable to proceedings before the Labour Courts under section 25-A, I. R. O.
4. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would set aside the 2 impugned decisions of the learned Labour Courts and remand the 2 cases to it for decision on the merits of the cases. Cases remanded, 1981 PLC 878 [Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind] Persent : Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal MUHAMMAD SAEED versus KARACHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER Appeal No, KAR-592 of 1980, heard on 17th February, 1981.
Industrial dispute - ---Resignation not withdrawn-Acceptance within competence of Management-Resignation tendered accepted by Management-Grievance petition for re-instatement, in eircurngances, held, rightly rejected-Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S. 25-A. [p. 878]A Mazhar All Chohan for Appellant. Sirajul Hag Qureshi for Respondents. Date of hearing : 17th February, 1981.
DECISION ' The appellant was employed as a bus Conductor in the respondent-Corporation. According to the said Corporation, the appellant had tendered his resignation on 25th February, 1980 as a protest against the transfer of some bus Conductors from Malir to other stations. This resignation was accepted by the respondent-Corporation on 28th February, 1980. The appellant challenged the acceptance of his resignation by way of a grievance petition filed before the learned Fourth Labour Court which has dismissed the same by the impugned decision, given on 28th July, 1980. The appellant has, accordingly, come up in appeal to this Tribunal.
2. Mr. Mazhar Ali Chohan, the learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court on the grounds-
(i) that the appellant had never submitted his resignation ; and
(it) that in any case the appellant had withdrawn his resignation on 25th February, 1980 much before its acceptance, and, therefore, there was no resignation application which could have been accepted by the respondent-Corporation.
3. Now as regards the first contention of Mr. Chohan, although the appellant had alleged that at no time he had tendered his resignation and has tried to show that his signatures were taken on a blank piece of paper by sotne disgruntled employees of the respondent-Corporation, the District Manager, Mr. M. A. Qureshi, has categorically stated that the appellant had tendered his resignation in person to him. The District Manager's version stands corroborated by the resignation application, Although it is not in the hand of the appellant, but it clearly bears the signatures of the appellant. I have compared the signatures on the resignation application with the admitted signatures of the appellant and am satisfied that they tally, I am, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by the learned Labour Court that the appellant had tendered his resignation from service.
4. In support of his second contention the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Abdul Rashid v. Karachi Transport Corporation, decided on 12th February, 1981. In that case the resignation tendered by the bus Conductor was withdrawn by him before it was accepted by the authority and consequently this Tribunal took the view that the resignation having been withdrawn there was no resignation which could be accepted. In the instant case, the resignation has not been withdrawn by the appellant, All that he has written on the back of his resignation application is as follows- {{URDU TEXT}} ' The above endorsement may be considered as an admission of his guilt on the part of the appellant and requesting for forgiveness and cannot be construed as withdrawal of the resignation. The respondent-Corporation was, therefore, entitled to accept the appellant's resignation, as it has done, and not take any further proceedings against him.
5. For the reasons discussed by in above, I would concur in the view taken by the learned Labour Court and dismiss the appeal.