1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal is sought from judgment dated 10-7-1975 of the Lahore High Court, whereby a writ petition arising out of a consolidation case was dismissed.
2. The grievance made before the High Court was that the land belonging to one Taj vin was given to the petitioners and their land was included in the block of Taj Din. The following arguments were raised in the High Court: "------.Firstly, since the previous land of the petitioners or any part thereof was given to TaJ Din, no exchange with Taj Din could have been arranged. Secondly, Taj Din had only mortgagee rights and could, therefore, be settled only on the khata of Central Government and, thirdly, he should hove been settled at the place where he already bad bulk of his area."
3. The learned Single Judge who dismissed the writ petition, observed that the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners (in the High Court) "has not been able to show any instructions in support of the second point", namely that Taj Din had only mortgagee rights and for that reason could be settled only on the khata of the Central Government. With regard to the other two points, it was held that the petitioners were not entitled to any -relief in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court on account of the ruling of this Court in Ghulam Qadir v. Member Board of Revenue (1973 SC. M R 292).
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has reiterated the argument with regard to the mortgagee rights, which in seriatim was the second contention raised before the High Court, and leas argued that it being the main conten- -tion, it was the duty of the High Court to look for the instructions, discover the same and grant the relief if it could be made available to the petitioners. According to him, the mere circumstance that the counsel appearing for the petitioners was unable- to substantiate a point by citing the instructions was no ground for dismissing the wilt petition.
5. We do not agree-with the learned counsel. It is not denied that the jurisdiction of the High Court which was invoked by the petitioners, was discretionary. If the learned counsel either failed to support a point raise by him, or did not want to support it by citing the instructions, it was no mandatory for the High Court to have granted the relief. After hearing the learned counsel on this paint, we are of the view that leave cannot be grante to the petitioners merely on the ground that the learned Judge in the High Court should have himself discovered the: instructions if there was any, in support of a contention which the learned counsel for the petitioners raise before him.
6. Learned counsel conceded that the above-noted point was the main point in this case. The other two points were dealt with by the High Court. There is no infirmity, legal or otherwise, in the-impugned judgment. This petition therefore, is dismissed. .