MAMOON RASHID SHEIKH, J.---At the outset the attention of the learned counsel for the appellant has been drawn to the fact that the instant appeal is barred by time. The learned counsel in reply submits that the appeal is within time, however, by way of abundant caution, an application (C.M.
No,1 of 2010) under section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, for condonation of delay has been filed. In support of his contention states that the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge in Chambers on 1-7-2010, thereafter, w,e,f, 12-7-2009 to 10-9-2010 the long vacation of this Court ensued and upon reopening of the Court the appeal was filed on 20-9-2010 within the stipulated 20 days minus the period of the summer vacation. Seeks to invoke the provisions of section 4 of the Act, ibid. In support of his contention he has drawn our attention to para-3 of the application for condonation of delay wherein the above reason has been given. The said para is being reproduced hereunder for ease of reference: "That summer vacation have been started w,e,f, 12-7-2010 and to be ended on 12-9-2010, this impugned decision has been passed on 1-7-2010, 20 days will be expired on 21-9-2010, due to this reason, the appeal is being filed."
2. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant and have also gone through the record with his assistance. We are, however, afraid that we cannot agree with his contentions. Article 151 of the Schedule to the Act, ibid, provides twenty (20) days time for filing of an Intra Court Appeal. The said Article reads as under:-- Second Division Appeals Description of suitPeriod of limitation Time for which period beings to run 1 2 151 From a decree or order of a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdictionTwenty days The date of the decree or order.
3. In the instant case the impugned order is dated 6-7-2010 and the stipulated 20 days were to expire on 26-7-2010. However, on 26-7-2010 this Court's registry for non-urgent cases was closed due to summer vacation which was due to last till 10-9-2010. As per the Office Order No,20057/AR(J), dated 15-7-2010, benefit of Section 4 of the Act, ibid, was made available in such like cases. Section 4 of the Act, ibid, provides as under:-- "(4) Where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that Court re-opens."
' Consequently, the appellant was required to file the appeal on 11-9-2010. The appeal was, however, filed on 20-9-2010 which is clearly beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 151, ibid, even after giving the benefit to the appellant of Section 4 of the Act, ibid.
4. There is, therefore, a delay of 9 days in filing of the appeal. The appellant has tried to make out a case that the appeal could have been filed till 21-9-2010 and was filed one day prior thereto i,e, on 20-9-2010, therefore, the appeal is within time. As has been discussed above, there is a delay of 9 days in filing of the appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant has been provided an opportunity for explaining the delay of 9 days. The learned counsel in reply has only reiterated the contents of para. 3 of the C.M. And has provided no plausible or cogent reason for the delay.
5. It is settled law that normally even a single day's delay in filing of an appeal can be fatal unless a plausible explanation as to the cause of delay can be given for condonation of the same. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgments reported as Qaisar Mushtaq Ahmad v. Controller of Examinations and others (PLD 2011 Supreme Court 174) and Food Department, Gujranwala through its Deputy Director and others v. Ghulam Farid Awan (2010 SCM R 1899).
6. As has been mentioned above, the learned counsel for the appellant in trying to explain the delay has only reiterated the contents of para 3 of the C.M. The said para unfortunately does not come to his aid. No plausible reason for explaining the delay has been forthcoming, despite an opportunity having been provided.
7. Under the circumstances we hold that the appeal is barred by time and is, therefore, dismissed accordingly.