' This appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dated 29-10-2007 rejecting the plaint in the appellant's suit under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C., The appellant filed his suit against the respondent for recovery of damages in the amount of Rs,10.026 million for committing defamation of the appellant/plaintiff. Both the plaintiff and the respondent/defendant are civil servants.
2. The essence of the plaintiff's case is that the respondent was posted as Principal of the Government Degree College, Tandilanwala while the appellant was working there as an Assistant Professor. It is alleged that owing to his personal malice for the appellant, the respondent recorded false and derogatory remarks about the appellant in the latter's Annual Confidential Reports for the years 2003 and 2004. The precise content of the disputed remarks as follows:-- "work and conduct both below average, habitual scandal monger blackmailer, intriguer, agitator"
' The above remarks are said to have been repeated by the respondent in private meetings and in the presence of college faculty, its students and private persons. No particulars of the date, place or content of the alleged slander or the names of persons before whom such remarks were made is given in the plaint.
3. By the impugned order dated 29-10-2007 the learned trial court rejected the plaint on several grounds including, inter alia, that the impugned remarks having been made in an official capacity enjoyed absolute privilege under section 6 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ("Ordinance") as an opinion written under the authority of the provincial government. It was also held that the suit was time barred, was vague in its contents and immune under the defence of fair comment. Learned counsel for the appellant assails the findings on the ground that privilege does not authorize public expression of adverse opinion.
4. For the wrongful act of defamation to be committed it is necessary that the communication of the defamatory material be made to "at least one person other than the person defamed" section 2(e) of the (Ordinance). The particulars of such recipient of communication are necessary to allege that the plaintiff was defamed or ridiculed thereby. The plaint lacks any particulars of "communication". Since the wrong of defamation is incomplete without communication, therefore, the non-mention of its particulars in a plaint leaves the cause of action to remain A unstated, as in the present case. Consequently, the plaint in the suit has been rejected rightfully for nondisclosure of cause of action.
5. Turning to the merits of the appellant's claim it is important to consider the subject matter of the alleged slander. The alleged defamation is claimed to be caused by the disclosure of the respondent's adverse opinion about the appellant as expressed in the latter's Annual Confidential Report ("ACR"). An ACR of a government servant contains the confidential opinion given by a reporting officer about the service credentials, performance and capabilities of his subordinate officer. As the name of the report suggests, such remarks are made in strict confidence under provision of law. These reports form part of the record of the competent authority in the government for determining the service prospects and capabilities of the officer commented upon.
In order for such remarks to be useful it is fundamental that these are candid and forthright. As a report written under legal duty for the Provincial Government's record, the appellant's ACRs contains material that is protected by absolute privilege. Its communication, though involving breach of law, cannot under section 6 of the Ordinance which confers absolute privilege, read with section 5(h) of the Ordinance which makes such privilege a defence to an action for defamation, operates as a complete answer to the claim filed by the appellant.
6. In so far as the oral disclosure by the respondent of the contents of the adverse remarks made in the ACRs is concerned, the plaint is utterly vague regarding relevant particulars about the oral statement for a defamation claim to be sustained. It is essential that an objected communication and the person to whom it is made be stated in the pleadings. And particulars about the slander are given to the extent that the essential ingredients of falsity of the statement, injury to reputation or exposure to a claim in consequence of the false statement, must be evident from the pleadings.
In the present case, the plaint in the appellant's suit is completed devoid of the essential elements that make out a claim for defamation.
7. Hence, in this respect also the plaint in the appellant's suit fails to disclose a cause of action.
Resultantly, the impugned order has reached the right conclusion. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.