DECISION ' This purports to be information under subsection (3-a) of section 38, I.R.O., inviting the attention of this Tribunal towards the orders made by the learned Fourth Labour Court on 5th October, 1980 and 19th October, 1980 respectively. It appears that on 5th October, 1980 the case of Momin Khan v.
Hussain Industries under section 25-A, I. R.
0., was fixed for the cross-examination and the witnesses of the applicant workman. According to Mr. Itrat Puri learned Representative of Hussain Industries, besides the above case, he had to attend to another case which was fixed for hearing before the learned Second Labour Court. As his matter before the latter Court did not conclude till about 10-15 A.M. He was not in a position to attend to the case of Momin Khan v. Hussain Industries, pending before the learned Fourth Labour Court till about 10-30 when he found that the learned Labour Court had passed an order closing the cross- examination of the applicant workmans witness. Mr. Itrat Puri thereupon, submitted an application for withdrawal of the order closing the cross examination of the witness. However, by the order, dated 14th October, 1980 the learned Labour Court dismissed Mr. Pun's application with the observation that no ground for setting aside the order, dated 5th October, 1980 had been made out. In coming to this conclusion the learned Labour Court was influenced by the fact that not only Mr. Puri was absent at the time when the case as called up for hearing on 5th October, 1980 but Mr. Pun had failed to end any intimation about his not being available.
2. I am conscious of the legal position that the law favours the adjudication of disputes on merits and that there are judicial pronouncements to the effect that Court should give weight to the difficulties of counsel who have to appear in more than one case in different Courts on the same day, but at the same time it has to be borne in mind that section 25-A, I.R.O., requires the Labour Courts to dispose of grievance petitions within seven days. This requirement of law obviously cannot be complied with if convenience of the Advocates alone is to be considered. I should, however, not be understood as opining that in such applications the convenience of the Advocates should be ignored. On the other hand, the Courts have to ensure that proceedings in such applications should be concluded as quickly as possible, preferably within the prescribed period of seven days. This can only be possible if the learned counsel appearing in such applications cooperate with the Labour Courts and ensure, their early disposal. In the instant case, although the learned Representative, undoubtedly, was busy before another Court on the same day but he failed to intimate the learned Fourth Labour Court about his being unavailable due to his pre- occupation in the learned Second Labour Court. The learned Representative has frankly conceded that when he appeared before the second Labour Court. The learned counsel for the other side was not present and he was asked to wait. He could, if no one else was available, have taken this opportunity of either going to the Fourth Labour Court or at least of informing it of his difficulty. He, however, failed to do so and in consequence the two impugned orders were passed by the learned Fourth Court.
3. I have given my careful attention to the circumstances of the cases and have come to the conclusion that despite these facts that Mr. Itrat Puri was busy before the learned Second Labour Court the orders passed by the learned Fourth Labour Court do not suffer from any such impropriety, illegality or want of correctness which would call for interference by this Tribunal in the exercise of its suo motu powers of revision. Of course, if the learned representative had intimated the learned Labour Court about his inability to attend the Court the position would have been entirely different. In the circumstances, however, I would not interfere with the two orders in question.