' The dispute involved in this civil revision relates to a shop owned by the first respondent. Mst. Rani, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, Acting as her Special Attorney, Muhammad Yaqub. Who is respondent No, 2 in the present petition, sold the said shop in favour of the petitioner, Haji Muhammad Shafi, by means of a registered sale deed. The sale was challenged by the first respondent by filing a declaratory suit. It was alleged by her that she had not appointed (Muhammad Yaqub as her Attorney and, therefore, he was not authorised to sell the shop. In the suit, the petitioner as well as the said Muhammad Yabub were impleaded as defendants.
Alongwith the suit, the respondent made an application, under Order XL, rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure for appointment of a Receiver for the disputed shop. The application was accepted by the Civil Judge, who was seized of the suit, and a Receiver was appointed by him. The order of the learned trial Court in this behalf was assailed by the petitioner by means of an appeal. An Additional District Judge who decided the appeal set aside the order relating to appointment of the Receiver and directed the petitioner to deposit rent of the disputed shop during the pendency of the suit. Relevant portion of the order of the learned Appellate Court reads as follows :- "The next question that would arise would be the fixation of the rent of the shop. It was stated in the plaint that in the year 1969 the shop had been leased out for a monthly rental of Rs, 50 and in the application she had stated that the shop had been rented out at a monthly rental of Rs, 100.
Keeping these circumstances in view the fair rent that can reasonably be assessed at this time would be Rs, 150 per month. The rent at this rate shall be deposited by the defendant-appellant Haji Muhammad Shafi from the date of appointment of Receiver and be shall continue depositing this rent each month before 15th of each month. The arrears shall be deposited within two months.
This amount, as already stated, shall not be withdrawn by any of the parties. The deposit shall remain intact for the benefit of the successful party. The order of the trial Court is modified accordingly."
' Being dissatisfied with the order of the learned Additional District Judge, the petitioner has come up in revision to this Court.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the dispute before the learned Additional District Judge related to appointment of Receiver he could not while determining that dispute gave direction for deposit of rent especially when the respondent had not prayed for any such direction.
He placed reliance on Secretary to Government West Pakistan (Now N.-W. F. P. Department of Agricultural and Forests, Peshawar) and 4 others v. Kazi Abdul Kafil (1), Marghub Siddiqi v. Hamid Ahmad Khan and 2 others (2) and Muhammad Yakoob v. Muhammad Ishaque (3) to support his argument.
3. In the case of Secretary to Government West Pakistan (Now N.-W. F. P. Department of Agricultural and Forests, Peshawar) and {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1978 SC 242 (2) 1974 SCM R 519
(3) 1980 CLC 2056 {{FOOT NOTE}} 4 others, it was ruled by the Supreme Court that a plaintiff claiming larger relief than the one to which he was entitled could not seek larger relief without first amending his plaint. The relief allowed by the learned Appellate Court in the present case was not larger than the one asked. For by the respondent in the suit and. Therefore, the dictum in the said case is not attracted to the case in hand. In Marghuh Siddiqi's case it was observed by the Supreme Court that where perpetual injunction is not claimed in a suit, the question of granting ad interim injunction does not arise. In the case before me neither a permanent injunction nor act temporary injunction was prayed for or granted and. Therefore, the case? Of Murghub Siddiqui has no bearing on the point in issue The observation made in the case of Muhammad Yakoob, on which reliance was also placed by the learned counsel, was to the effect that the Court will not grant relief to the plaintiff on a different cause of action and on a plea for which no foundation is laid in the pleadings. In the instant case the respondent, who was plaintiff in the suit, did not claim an) relief on the basis of a cause of action not spelt out in the plaint or on a plea not raise therein. Therefore, the aforesaid observation is of no help to th petitioner. On the other hand, the following remarks made by Zaffar Hussain Mirza, J. In Muhammad Yakoab's case approve of the approach of the learned Additional District Judge in the matter of disposal of the appeal taken before him :- "In fact Order VII, rule 7, C. P. C. Expressly provides that Court may always give general or other relief which it considers just to the same extent as if it had been asked for."
' It would, therefore, follow that the authorities cited by learned counsel at the Bar do not advance the plea raised by him.
4. The provisions of rule '7, of Order VII of the Code o Civil Procedure to which reference has been made just above read as follows :- "7. Relief to be specifically stated.-Every plaint shall stat specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or I the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think jus to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rut shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement."
' What can be done by a trial Court in view of these provisions of law, can be done by the Appellate Court also on the strength of section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this view of the matter, the learned Additional District Judge could give direction relating t. The deposit of rent even though none of the parties had asked for such direction.
5. To my mind, the order made by the learned Additional Distric' Judge is just and proper and cannot be taken exception to especially when it is of a provisional nature.
6. There is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed in limine.