TARIQ JAVAID, J. --- By filing this petition, the grievance has been voiced against violation of Article 207 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred as the Constitution). It is maintained that respondent No. 1 who retired as a Judge of this Court on 16.9.2009, in violation of Article 207 of the Constitution and with flagrant disregard to the National Judicial Policy, 2009, hereinafter to be referred as Judicial Policy entered into service with the respondents Nos. 2 & 3, as Project Director (Law), University Gillani Law College, hereinafter to be referred as the Law College. The appointment was made vide order dated 21.12.2009. The salary was fixed at Rs. 1,20,000/- per month. Subsequently, vide order dated 31.12.2009 an additional charge as Principal of the Law College was also given to the respondent No. 1. It is pertinent to mention here that the College is one of the institutes run and managed by the Baha-ud-Din Zakariya University, a statutory body constituted under Baha-ud-Din Zakariya University Act, 1975, hereinafter to be referred as the University.
2. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, a post of Project Director (Law) on contract basis, with negotiable salary package, was advertised through the print media. The requisite qualifications of the candidates for the post were said to be at least holder of a Law degree, , distinguished lawyer, having 20 years' practice in the Superior Courts including meritorious services in judiciary. The respondent No. 1, indeed, being an outstanding lawyer and a distinguished' Judge of this Court, who had recently retired in anticipation of the proceedings likely to be instituted against him for the contempt of Supreme Court, was found to be the most qualified and suitable candidate. He was selected for the post.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner maintained that though the respondent No. 1 may very well be the most suitable candidate in the estimation of the respondents for the position advertised by them, yet under express prohibition contained in Article 207 of the Constitution he could have not been appointed as Project Director (Law) with an additional charge as a Principal, Law College.
According to the learned counsel, the said appointment is not only violative of the Constitution it also infringes upon the cardinal principles of the Judicial Policy, 2009. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the office of Project Director and/or Principal of Law College, being run by the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, is an "office of profit", as well as an office in "service of Pakistan", as such the respondent No. 1 before expiry of two years from date of , his retirement was debarred from occupying the said office. It is further maintained that under the Judicial Policy, the respondent No. 1 was prevented from accepting any ' appointment below the status or dignity of a High Court Judge. According to the learned counsel, the office of Project Director (Law) was below the status and dignity of a High Court Judge and as such the mandatory provisions of Judicial Policy have been infringed. Reliance has been placed on (PLD 1963 SC 203); (PLD 1972 SC 139); (PLD 1974 SC 228); (PLD 1994 SC 60); (PLD 2002 SC 326); (PLD 1994 SC 123); (PLD 1975 SC 244); (2010 SCM R 253); (PLD 2006 SC 602).
4. On the other hand, learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3. Have vehemently opposed the petition and argued that the petition is not maintainable. It is also suggested that the respondent No. 1 has neither been appointed is an office of profit in the "Service of Pakistan" nor he has accepted an appointment which can be said to be below the status and dignity of a High Court Judge. It was also argued that under Section 21, P.P.C. As well as under Section 2 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 the respondent No. 1, by virtue of his appointment is neither a civil servant nor the office of Project Director (Law) can be said to be an office in "Service of Pakistan". Reliance has been placed on the dictum laid down by the Hon`ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Mubeen-ss-Salam and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2006 SC 602).
According to the learned counsel, the respondent No. 1 is a contract employee of the respondents Nos. 2 & 3, who does not fall within the definition of a "civil servant" as his position is not pensionable. It was also argued that University is an autonomous body and according to the dictum laid down in Mubeen-us-Salam's case the employees of autonomous bodies were not civil servants. Articles 240 and 260 of the Constitution have also been pressed into, service for definition of words "Service of Pakistan". Nominee has also been placed on (P.L.D 2005 Lahore 428); (P.L.D. 1983 SC 457); (P.L.D. 1963 SC 203), and (P.L.D. 1972 SC 139).
5. The learned Deputy Attorney General appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4 forcefully opposed the petition. -According to the learned Deputy Attorney General, the University is an autonomous body and its employees are neither "Civil Servants" nor they are in "Service of Pakistan". It was further maintained. That in absence of a declaration to the effect that employees of the University were civil servants, it cannot be presumed that the. Respondent No. 1 is holding an "office of Profit" in "service of Pakistan". The learned Deputy Attorney General also argued that the status and dignity of a Project Director (Law) was not less than status and dignity of a High Court Judge. However, on a Court question whether the learned D.A.G. Supports the Judicial Policy or not, it was maintained that the National Judicial Policy Making Committee, being statutory body was competent to make and promulgate the Judicial Policy. According to the learned D.A.G., this Court is bound by the provisions of Judicial Policy and the validity thereof cannot be questioned in this Court. According to the learned D.A.G. This Court is to decide this petition in accordance with the Judicial Policy, however, according to him, the University has no statutory rules and in absence of declaration that its employees are in service of Pakistan it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 is holding an office of profit in service of Pakistan. Since the University has no statutory rules the impugned posting is neither violative of Article 207 of the Constitution nor ultra vires of the Judicial Policy.
6. The Judicial Policy is framed by the National Judicial (Policy Making) Committee constituted under the National Judicial (Policy Making)
Committee Ordinance, 2002. The Committee is headed by the Honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan and comprises of Chief Justice, Federal Shariat Court and the Chief Justices of the four Provincial High Courts. According to the Honourable Chief Justice the key features of the National Judicial Policy, as streamlined at the very outset, are strengthening the independence of the Judiciary by its separation from the executive and ridding the Courts of the menace of corruption, thereby presenting a clean and positive image of judiciary. In the Policy, said the Honourable Chief Justice, "we have set high goals for ourselves".
7. Article 207(2) of the Constitution restrains a person who has already held office of a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court, from holding office of profit in "Service of Pakistan" unless two years have lapsed after he has ceased to hold office of a Judge of fife Superior Court. However, exceptions thereto have been created in case of judicial or quasi-judicial office or office of Chief Election Commissioner or Chairman or Member of the Law Commission or of Chairman or. Member of Council of Islamic Ideology. Apart from the above-said Constitutional provisions, a condition has also been attached through the promulgation of Judicial Policy for the year 2009 whereby it has been made mandatory that no retired Judge of the Superior judiciary shall accept an appointment which is below the status or dignity of a Judge of the Superior Court. Various instances like appointments as Presiding Officers of Banking Court, Custom Court, and Administrative Tribunal have been given. However, list of such postings or appointments as given in the Judicial Policy does not appear to be exhaustive. These are only a few illustrations, showing that such postings which are below the status and dignity of High Court Judge should not be accepted by retiring Judges. This is one of the objectives of the Judicial Policy which "casts a primary duty upon a Judge to present before the public a clean image of judiciary. The oath of a Judge implies complete submission to the Constitution and under the Constitution to the law", said the Hon'ble Chief Justice.
8. As stated in the Executive Summery attached to the Judicial Policy "the. Thrust of the Policy is to consolidate and strengthen the independence of judiciary, thereby enabling the judicial organ to exercise institutional and administrative independence and Judges to have decisional independence to decide cases fairly and impartially. In this regard, important decisions have been made including the determination of the Chief Justices of, High Courts to decline appointments as acting Governor of the Province and recall of all Judges working in executive departments of the Federal/Provincial Governments. The Policy also lays stress on proper conduct and judicial propriety, on the part of Judges, to maintain a clean image of the judiciary." Thus the Judicial Policy Making Committee decided to put an embargo on a Judge accepting such office after retirement. Rules enunciated by the Judicial Policy may appear to be harsh but at the same time these rules appear to be justified as it is imperative to restore the dignity of judiciary, it must be seen that the justice is being one without fear and favour as well as without being influenced by any unseen advantage.
9. Both sides have heavily relied on the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein maintainability of the proceedings for writ of quo-warranto was determined. In support of their respective claim whether the impugned posting is an "office of profit" in "service of Pakistan", the provisions of Article 240 and Article 260 of the Constitution require consideration. Article 240 provides for the appointment to service of Pakistan and Conditions of Service. For facility of reference Article 240 is re-produced below:---
240. Appointment to service of Pakistan and conditions of service.-- Subject to the Constitution, the appointments to and the conditions of service of persons in the Service of Pakistan shall be determined:---
(a) in the case of the services of the Federation, posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation and All- Pakistan Services by or under Act of (Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)); and
(b) in the case of the services of a Province and posts in connection with the affairs of a Province, by or under Act of the Provincial Assembly.
For definition of the words "Service of Pakistan" and "all Pakistan services" reference has also been made to Article 260 of the Constitution which defines "Service of Pakistan" as follows:- "service of Pakistan" means any service, post or office in connection with the affairs of the Federation or of a Province, and includes an All-Pakistan Service, Services in the Armed Forces and any other service declared to be a service of Pakistan by or under Act of (Majlls-u-Shoora (Parliament)) or of a Provincial Assembly, but does not include service as Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Prime Minister, Federal Minister, Minister of State, Chief Minister, Provincial Minister, (Attorney General), (Advocate General)" Parliamentary Secretary or, (Chairman or Member of a Law Commission, Chairman or Member of the Council of Islamic Ideology, Special Assistant to the. Prime Minister, Advisor to the Prime Minister, Special Assistant to a Chief Minister, Advisor to a Chief Minister) or Member of a House or a Provincial Assembly;"
10. The University is a statutory body constituted under the Baha-ud-Din Zakariya University Act, 1975 (Punjab Act No. III of 1975), as amended vide Multan University (Amendment Ordinance, 1979) hereinafter to be referred as the Act of 1975.
11. The term "service of Pakistan" as defined in Article 260 of the Constitution, reproduced above has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments. The leading case on the subject being Salah-ud-Din & two others v. Frontier Sugar Mills Limited (PLD 1975 SC 244), has been followed in numerous cases. In the said case Anwar-ul-Haq, J., as his Lordship then was held as follows:- "Now, what Is meant by the phrase "performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province." It is clear that the reference is to governmental or state functions, involving, in one form or another, an element of exercise of public power. The functions may be the traditional policy functions of the State, involving the maintenance of law and order and other regulatory activities; or they may comprise functions pertaining to economic development, social welfare, education, public utility services and other State enterprises of an industrial or commercial nature. Ordinarily, these functions would be performed by persons of agencies directly appointed, controlled and financed by the State i.e. By the Federal Government or a Provincial Government.
However, in recent years, there has been manifest a growing tendency on the part of Governments to create statutory corporations for undertaking many such functions, particularly in the industrial and commercial spheres, in, the belief that free from the inhibiting effect of red-tapism, these semiautonomous bodies may prove more effective, flexible and also profitable. Inevitably, Government retains effective control over their functioning by appointing the heads and other senior officers of these corporations, by regulating their composition and procedures by appropriate statues, and by finding funds for financing their activities. '
Examples of such statutory corporations are the National Bank of Pakistan, the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, the National Shipping Corporation, the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, and the large number of Universities functioning under their respective statutes. On account of their common attributes, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, they have all been regarded as persons performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province."
Jhang-IV and others (PLD 1994 SC 60) the Rost of Ambassador was held to be in connection with the affairs of Federation. Saad Saood Jan, J., held that--- "Learned counsel for the petitioner rightly concedes that the post of an Ambassador is a post in connection with the affairs of the Federation. It will be seen that the definition does not take notice of the manner in which a poet in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province may be filled. Thus, so far as the inclusion of the post in the service of Pakistan is concerned, it is immaterial whether the holder thereof has come to occupy in through a special contract or in accordance with the recruitment rules framed under the Civil Servants Act; consequently, the mere fact that a person is not a civil servant within the meaning of the Civil Servants Act would not put him beyond the pale of the said Constitutional definition. The contention that the case of the petitioner was covered by sub-clause (n), ibid, is entirely misconceived as ex-facie it does not apply to situations where the relationship of master and servant exists between the parties. Here, the petitioner was a whole time employee of the Government and except for matters which were specifically provided in the letter of appointment she was governed by the ordinary rules of service applicable to the civil servants. It may perhaps be of interest to mention here that these rules were framed in pursuance of the provisions of Article 240, ibid. Thus, the assertion on her behalf that while serving as an Ambassador she could not be treated as one in the service of Pakistan merely because her appointment to the post owed its origin to a special contract cannot be accepted. Admittedly, a period of two years has not passed since she relinquished charge of the said post. Therefore, she has been rightly held to be suffering from the disqualification laid down in clause (k), ibid." t2. The learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents relied upon the judgment passed in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam's case supra and have argued that on the basis of the analogy given therein, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 is holding an office of profit in "Service of Pakistan". It was argued that since the employment of the Law College and/or the University cannot be termed as civil service nor the respondent No. 1 is a civil servant as well as in absence of a statutory declaration to the effect that the employees of the University are in service of Pakistan, under the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court he cannot be said to be in service of Pakistan.
13. In Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam case the Hon`ble Supreme Court was called upon to determine the vires of Section 2-A of the Services Tribunal Act, 1973, which provided remedy of appeal before the Service Tribunal against the dismissal from service to the employees of various state owned or state controlled statutory bodies including various organizations wherein the State had controlling share. It was argued that the employees of the University Law College would not be said to be in service of Pakistan as there are no statutory rules governing their services. While determining the said question, his Lordship lftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Chief Justice, in Para No. 82 of the judgment observed: "Argument advanced by him is not acceptable because the ratio decidendi of the judgment is that to determine as to whether a person is holding a post or office in connection with the affairs of the Federation, an element of sovereign authority and exercise of public power is essential to bring an employee or service within the scope of the words "affairs of the Federation". Thus it is concluded that the Parliament cannot enact a law declaring any other service to be the service of Pakistan by or under any Act, without demonstrating that such declared service has nexus with the affairs of the Federation. In fact, the framers of the Constitution have restricted the power of the Parliament to declare any service to be service of Pakistan by placing an embargo that such person should also hold a post or office in connection with the affairs of Federation. Unless this condition is fulfilled, every service cannot be declared by the Parliament to be service of Pakistan. In a number of judgments, this Court, in respect of statutory Corporations and Bodies owned or controlled by the Government, has held that such Corporations or Bodies are distinct and different from the Government and their employees are not ipso facto in the service of Pakistan".
14. Similarly, in Para 85 of the judgment it was observed that "Article 63 of the Constitution creates a disqualification for a candidate for the membership of Parliament if he is in the service of any statutory body or body owned or controlled by the Government or in which the Government has controlling share or interest but status of such person is different, if he is in service of Government controlled Corporation and has been declared to be in the service of Pakistan. The 'service of Pakistan' is a broader expression which itself covers the 'service of any body, owned or controlled by the Government or in which the Government has a controlling share or interest'. This expression would not have been used as it would have been redundant in this Article because it is well-settled that redundancy cannot be attributed to a Constitutional. Provision. Reference in this behalf may be made to the case of Shahid Nabi Malik (ibid) and Reference No. 2 of 2005 (ibid). Therefore, both the expressions are to be considered distinctly with reference to the context, relating to the matters under discussion. It is established rule of interpretation that where the legislature has used two different words in legislation, they must be given different meanings. Even the words appear to be synonymous or akin to one another they should be assigned different meanings to avoid making one or the other legislative expression redundant. Reference may be made to State v. Zia-ur-Rehman (PLD 1973 SC 49) and Raja Maula Dad Khan v. West Pakistan Bar Council (PLD 1975 SC 469). From the principle highlighted hereinabove and as discussed in these two judgments, it is abundantly clear that Legislature, under Article 63 of the Constitution, by using the expressions 'service of Pakistan' and 'service of any statutory body or anybody, owned or controlled by the Government or the Government has controlling share or interest' in it had identified the consequences, which would ultimately result in disqualification of a candidate in terms of clause (k) of Article 63(1) of the Constitution.
15. It appears that the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents have used the words "Service of Pakistan" and "Civil Service" interchangeably. The dicta laid down in cited judgments as well as definition of Service of Pakistan as contained in Article 260 of the Constitution is amply sufficient to show that one may be in Service of Pakistan without being a civil servant. The term "Service of Pakistan" has been used in broader context as compared to the term "Civil Servant". Undoubtedly the University is a statutory body Constituted under the Act of 1975 receiving finances from the public funds, having its own rules and regulations. The University is headed by the Chancellor who is Governor of the Punjab, a pro Vice-Chancellor appointed by the Chancellor, deriving his powers under the Act of 1975 and discharging a state function of providing education to its citizen. The reference can also be made to the case of Aitcheson College, Lahore through Principal v. Muhammad Zubair and another (PLD 2001 BC 326), wherein it was held that the Board of Governors, Aitcheson College, Lahore headed by the Governor of the Province as its President alongwith other officers i.e. Secretaries Education, Finance and General Officer Commanding as well as unofficial Members, therefore, were involved in providing education which was one of the responsibility of the State and by taking over its management and control of the Board, exercised sovereign powers as well as public powers being a statutory functionary of Government was held to be, in the circumstances of that case, a person perforMing functions in connection with the affairs of a Province and squarely fell within the definition of a "person" under Art. 199(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) notwithstanding the fact that Aitcheson College was not receiving any financial assistance from the Provincial Government.
16. However, the interpretation given to Article 260 of the Constitution in Muhammad Mubeen-us- Salam's case has brought a radical change into the test laid down in Salah-ud-Din's case supra to the extent that the scope of test to determine whether a "post" is in "Service of Pakistan" or not, a statutory declaration to this effect is also mandatory. Thus absence of statutory declaration brings the post/position out of the definition of "Service of Pakistan."
17. The next objection of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the writ of quo warrant is not maintainable. The reference may be made to the observations made by A.R. Cornelius, C.J. In Masudul Hassan v. Khadim Hussain and another (PLD 1963 S.C. 203), it was observed that "But that was not the only relief which Masudul Hassan could claim. He could have moved for an order in the nature of a writ of quo warranto with equal efficacy. Referring again to the monograph on Crown Proceedings in Volume II of Halsbury's Law-of England", the now obsolete writ of quo warranto was in its nature an information lying against a person who "claimed or usurped an office, franchise or liberty" and was intended "to enquire by what authority he supported his claim in order that the right to the office may be determined." It was necessary for issue of the writ that the office should be one created by the State, by charter or by statute, and that the duty should be of a public nature. It was necessary also that the respondent should be in possession of the office."
18. Similarly, in M.U.A. Khan v. Rana M. Sultan and another (PLD 1974 SC 228). Anwarul Hach J. As his Lordship then was observed as under:- "It will be seen that for the purpose of applications contemplated under sub-clause (b) the petitioner did not have to be an aggrieved party; he could be "any person". The reason for this distinction between the position of the petitioner under sub-clauses (a) and (c) on the one hand and sub-clause (b) on the other is that the matters contemplated by sub-clause (b) are of public importance and interest, and it is enough that they are brought to the notice of the Court, without the petitioner having any personal interest in the matter. The High Court was, therefore, in error in thinking that the petitioner before them had to be an aggrieved party for the purposes of urging any of the grounds against the validity of the respondent's appointment to a public office. The learned counsel for the respondent frankly conceded that he could not defend the view expressed in this behalf by the High Court.
There can be little doubt that the appointment held by the respondent is in the nature of a public office. As pointed out by this Court in Masudul Hassan v. Khadim Hussain (1), a public office is an office created by the State, by charter or by statute, when the duties attached to the office are of a public nature. In the instant case, the office of the Chief Inspector of Mines is a statutory office created by the State under section of the Mines Act. The duties and functions of this office are also of a public nature, dealing with the regulation of the working of mines in the Province. It is, therefore, clear that the petition instituted by the appellant was maintainable under sub-clause (e)(n) of clause (2) of Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution read with the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969."
19. The dictum laid down in above cases was followed in the case of Capt. (Retd.) Muhammad Naseem Hijazi v. Province of the Punjab (2000 SCM R 1720), lftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, J., as his Lordship then was, observed that "We are clear in our mind that no interest of the General Secretary directly or indirectly was involved to challenge the service status of petitioner nor he was aspirant to be a candidate for the post which petitioner was holding in BPS-19. Inasmuch as petitioner did not place any material before this Court to canvass that legal proceedings were initiated by the General Secretary of the Union to vindicate his personal interest or the interest of any other member of the union or anyone else who is either interested in his appointment against the post which the petitioner is holding or on account of good performance of the petitioner he became interested for his removal from the service to achieve ulterior subject. Under Article 199(2)(b)(ii) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction is competent to enquire from any person, holder of a public office to call upon him to show that under what authority he is holding the said office. In such like cases where a writ in the nature of -quo warranto is instituted the duty of the petitioner is to lay an information before the Court that such and such officer has no legal authority to, retain such office. For a petitioner who acts, in fact, as an informer is not required to establish his locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court."
20. The same principle has been followed in Hafiz Hamdullah v. Saifullah Khan and others (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 52), which is reproduced as under:- "12. With regard to the first objection it may be noted that under Article 199(1)(a) of the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked by an aggrieved person which denotes a person who has suffered a legal grievance, against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him or wrongfully refused him something which he was legally entitled to. It is also the requirement that the person invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution has to establish that any of his legal or fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution has been violated resulting in legal loss. It is, however, to be noted that respondent No. 1 has approached High Court of Baluchistan by way of a Constitutional petition wherein he had prayed for issuance of a writ of quo warranto against the appellant. A writ of the quo warranto is in the nature of laying an information before a Court, against a person who claimed and usurped an office, franchise or liberty, requesting for holding an enquiry to enable him to show the authority under which he supported his claim of right to the office, franchise or liberty.
Its object is to determine the legality of the holder of .a statutory or Constitutional office and decide whether he was holding such office in accordance with law or was unauthorizedly occupying a public office. Where a person prays for a writ of quo warranto the Court would be under an obligation to enquire whether the incumbent is holding the office under the orders of a competent authority and also to examine whether he would be legally qualified to hold the office or to remain in the office. For issuance of a writ of quo warrantor the person invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is not required to fulfill the stringent conditions required for bringing himself within the meaning of an aggrieved person. Any person can move the High Court to challenge the usurpation or unauthorized occupation of a public office by the incumbent of that office and he is not required to establish his locus stand! To invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in a manner as generally required by the said Article."
21.. "The said provisions read with the case-law amply point towards the fact that the employees of the University are holding office in "service of Pakistan". The primary test as laid down in Salah-ud- Din's case supra is that "whether the functions entrusted to the organization or person concerned are indeed functions of the State involving some exercise of sovereign or public power; whether the control of the organization vests in a substantial manner in the hands of Government; and whether the bulk of the funds, is provided by the State. If these conditions are fulfilled, then the person including a body politic or body corporate, may indeed be regarded as a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province; otherwise not". The opening lines or Para 82 of the Mubeenus-Salam case also lend support to this conclusion.
22. The resume of the judgments interpreting the words "Service of Pakistan" shows that the respondent No. 1 cannot be held to be holding office of profit in "Service of Pakistan". No doubt that the University is .a statutory body and the respondent No. 1 is holding an office of profit established under the rules framed under Section 31 of the Act and contained in the Schedule appended to the said Act. Relying upon the dictum laid down in Salah-ud-Din's case and Muhammad Mubeen-us- Salam's case, in absence of statutory declaration to bring the post in to, the pale of "Service of Pakistan" it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 is holding an office of profit in "service of Pakistan".
23. However, it is found that the impugned appointment is violative of the Judicial Policy. The office of Project Director (Law) cannot be said to be equal to the office of a High Court Judge. It is not desirable that a retiring Judge be seen as filing appointments on various posts. The terms and conditions whereof are contained in the regulations framed under the Act of 1975. The actions of the Chancellor Nice-Chancellor as well as Project Director (Law) are amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. The impugned appointment is controlled and regulated under Section 21 of the Act of 1975.
The nature of job includes supervision of construction work and execution of decisions made by the Senate of the University. The very nature of the post implies that it is below the status and dignity of a High Court Judge. National Judicial (Policy Making) Committee being a statutory body comprising of the Chief Justice of Pakistan as its Chairman and Chief Justice of Federal Shariat Court and Chief Justices of all the four Provincial High Courts has formulated a policy which undoubtedly has a force of law. It is binding on all the Courts and thus all of the Judges of the Superior Courts are bound to follow the same even after their retirement from the office of a Judge of a superior Court. Similarly, all organs of State are bound to follow and implement the Judicial Policy in letter and spirit. The impugned appointment is held to be illegal. This writ petition is allowed with no order as to cost. .