Sayed Zahid Hussain, J.--Mumtaz Sultana and others had filed Petition (C.P. No, D-969 of 2005) under Articles 199 & 187 read with Articles 2-A, 4, 25, 37 & 38 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 for extending the retirement/pensionary benefits to them as per the judgment of this Court dated 29.4.2004. The petition was decided by the learned Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi on 14.11.2006 issuing direction that the expansionary benefits of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners would be calculated as of 15.12.1997 and consequently the petitioners given the same in accordance with the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the various CPLAs referred to above." This judgment has been assailed through CPLA No, 123-K/07 seeking leave to appeal there against. Likewise, Jamil Akhtar Siddiqui and others filed a petition (C.P. No, D1683/06) for almost a similar relief. The said petition was thereafter decided by the learned Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh on 26.1.2007 with reference to the decision in C.P.No, D-969/05. C.P. No, 179-K/07 has been filed there against for leave to appeal.
2. The respondents in these petitions, who were petitioners before the High Court, were either the employees or widows of deceased employees. The petitioner bank will be hereafter referred to as the "Bank" and the respondents as the "Employees". Due to the identity of the subject-matter and the controversy involved, the petitions have been fixed together and heard as such, which will stand disposed of through this judgment.
3. On 23.10.1997, Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme (VGHS) was floated by the Bank through Circular No, 9 of 1997. Hundreds of employees exercised the option there-under within the prescribed period and were informed that they would be relieved from their duties w,e,f, 15.12.1997.
Disputes started cropping up leading to the litigation about the efficacy, applicability and implementation of the scheme. According to Mr. Khalid Anwar, the learned Sr. ASC, the first judgment on the issue by this Court was of 2.4.2001 in C.P.No, 12 of 2001 to 63 of 2001 etc. Abdul Qadir Ismail and others u. State Bank of Pakistan (2001. SCMR 884) under which the pensionary benefits were to be calculated by taking into account the period between 01.12.1997 to 15.12.1997. The second judgment brought to our notice is dated 19.11.2002, wherein the Bank was directed to calculate the pensionary benefits of the "petitioners and other employees", who had opted for Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme on the basis of last pay drawn. The third judgment on the subject was of 29.4.2004, Khyber Zaman & others v. Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi & others (2005 SCMR 235), whereby pensionary benefits/retirement benefits were ordered to be paid to the petitioners by calculating all the retirement/financial benefits on the basis of last pay drawn after treating the date of retirement as 15.12.1997. The fourth judgment in the matter was dated 3.2.2005, when they were directed to approach the bank for relief and in case of denial, to approach the proper forum.
The fifth judgment cited by the learned counsel is of 3.2.2005, which is order of withdrawal of the petitions, with a view to first approach the Bank for relief and then to approach the proper forum if they were dissatisfied with the ensuing order of the Bank. The object of the learned counsel to state these developments and point out these successive judgments by this. Court was to show that the scope of relief and benefit continued successively varying; and that such a benefit could only be given to the petitioners before the Court and non-parties were not entitled to such a benefit. The representations filed by the Employees did not prove fruitful and appeals filed by them before Federal Service Tribunal were hit by the judgment in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam & others v.
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence & others (PLD 2006 SC 602). They then filed the above mentioned petitions before the High Court of Sindh.
4. After stating the object and purpose of floating Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme that it was; "In order to survive as the leading policy making institution of the country it had to restructure and modernize as an institution and customize its policies to cater to its own workforce. The SBP introduced several initiatives one of whom was to offer an honorable exit to its redundant employees vide its Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme 1997 ("the Scheme) which was introduced by way of Circular No, 9 of 1997 dated the 23rd day of October 1997." He informs us that the employees, who had voluntarily opted for retirement have continuously engaged the Bank in litigation by making unwarranted belated claims, having enormous financial implications.
According to the learned counsel the "Employees" herein were not entitled to such benefits as they were not party before this Court in the judgments referred to above. He invoked the bar of limitation that stood in their way in filing the- petitions before the High Court, which suffered from laches but the High Court has by disregarding these aspects granted relief to them. It is contended that through the second judgment, the scope of benefit was extended to the "petitioners and other employees" but in the later judgments there is no mention of "other employees" which means that only the petitioners were entitled to such benefits. Distinction between a judgment in-rem and judgment inpersonam is being highlighted to contend that since the employees were not parties in the earlier round of litigation before this Court, the benefit of the judgment could not be extended to them. Reference in this context is being made to Article 55 of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.
He has cited Muhammad Sohail and 2 others v. Government of N.W.F.P. and others (1996 SCMR 218), [which highlighted the distinction in judgment in-rem and judgment in-personam with reference to an earlier judgment in Pir Bakhsh & others v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee & others (PLD 1987 Supreme Court 145)], Hameed Akhtar Niazi v. The Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and others [1996 SCMR 1185), [in this case it was held that the benefit of the judgment of Service Tribunal/Supreme Court could be extended to those civil servants who were not party to the litigation, the judgment in Muhammad Sohail's case, supra, was given on 31.10.1995 by Ajmal Mian, J (as his lordship then was) whereas in Hameed Akhtar Niazi's case which was decided on 24.04.1996, the author of the judgment was the same Hon'ble Judge], Chairman Pakistan Railways, Lahore v. Muhammad Latif & others (1984 SCMR 286), [Shafi-ur-Rehman, J., (as he then was) had held that the benefit of determination made by the Court could not be denied to a non-party to the litigation], Tara Chand & others v. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board, Karachi & others (2005 PLC (CS) 368), [the same principle reiterated as in Hameed Akhtar Niazi's case), Zulfiqar-ul-Husnain and 19 others v. Oil and Gas Development Corporation (2003 SCMR 1115), The Chairman, District Screening Committee, Lahore & another v. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi (PLD 1976 SC 258), The Chairman, P.I.AC. and others v. Nasim Malik (PLD 1990 SC 951), Fazal Elahi Siddiqi v.
Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and 2 others (PLD 1990 SC 692), Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan & others (PLD 1984 SC 194), [in this case and the case of The Principal, Cadet College, Kohat & another v. Muhammad Shoab Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170), the status of the employees of non-statutory organizations qua writ jurisdiction was examined]. His contention is that the petitions also deserved to be dismissed as the same were not maintainable in view of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The delayed pronouncement of judgment by the learned High Court has also been brought to our notice with reference to the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 20 CPC and Juma Khan & others v. Mst. Bibi Zenaba & others (PLD 2002 SC 823), Sheikh Mahmud Ahmed v. Azad Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad (PLD 1987 SC (AJ&K) 21).
5. Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim, the learned Sr. ASC for the Employees has pleaded for the dismissal of the petition emphasizing that jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is discretionary and since the equity is against the Bank, it is not a fit case for grant of leave. According to him, the judgment of the High Court is just and fair, which redressed the grievance of the Employees, by giving them the benefits about which this Court had already given its verdict. It is contended that a public institution like State Bank of Pakistan, should not have denied the benefit to its employees; and that in the judgment dated 29.4.2004, the use of the word ."petitioners" did not necessarily mean the exclusion of "other employees". He also invokes the provisions of Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to contend that the State Bank of Pakistan should not have made discrimination inter-se the Employees. According to the learned Counsel though the Employees were not party before this Court in the earlier rounds yet they have rightly been given relief by the High Court and that this Court has also got the power of doing complete justice under Article 187 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
He has cited Muhammad Baran & others v. Member (Settlement and Rehabilitation), Board of Revenue, Punjab, & others (PLD 1991 SC 691), [in this case the leave already granted was withdrawn], Haji Behram Khan v. Abdul Hameed Khan Achakzai & others (PLD 1990 SC 353), Muhammad Yaqoob v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore & others (1988 SCMR 563), and an unreported judgment dated 11 & 12.6.2008 passed in Civil Appeal No, 558/2008.
6. Mr. Abdul Raheem Bhatti, the learned ASC, contends that earlier judgments were implemented by the Bank irrespective of the fact whether Employees were party before the Court or not and that it was only the later judgment, which was not being implemented on the plea of their being non- party. He has cited Khyber Zaman & others v. Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi & others (2005 SCMR 235), Abdul Qadir Ismail & others v. State Bank of Pakistan & others (2001 SCMR 884), Khawaja Abdul Hameed Nasir & others v. National Bank of Pakistan & others (2003 SCMR. 1030), [following Hameed Akhtar Niazi's case the benefit was extended to all the persons falling in the same category and covered by the circular], Hameed Akhtar Niazi v. The Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan & others (1996 SCMR 1185), Chief Executive, Progressive Paper Limited/The Chairman, National Press Trust, Islamabad v. Syed Asad Abbas, etc. (2006 SCJ 160) & Aamir Ikram & 10 others v. District Health Officer, Vehari & others (2003 PLC (CS) 488), [in this case it was observed that similar relief had been granted by the Court earlier to other employees, the employees approaching the Court later on could not be denied the same relief].
7. There is no denial of the fact that the 'employees' had been in the service of the Bank, who opted for retirement under the Golden Hand Shake Scheme; and also that disputes started cropping up about the import, effectiveness and implementation of the said Scheme. In the first judgment ibid the matter was decided about the relevant period i,e, 01.12.1997 to 15.12.1997 in the year 2001. In the second judgment, the direction made by this Court was to calculate the pensionary benefits of the petitioners and other employees who had opted for Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme and the payments already made shall be adjusted." It was in the year 2002. In the third judgment, the decision was made in the year 2004 that "pensionary benefits/retirement benefits shall be paid to the petitioners by calculating all the retirement/financial benefits on the basis of last pay drawn" as on 15.12.1997. The fourth and fifth judgments ibid were of year 2005. Non implementation in stricto senso by the Bank gave rise to contempt proceedings and the employees were directed to approach the Bank in the first instance and then to seek remedy before the proper forum, if not satisfied. They did approach the Bank but were not given the benefit ensuing from the judgment.
Their grievance thus remained un-redressed and thus had to file Constitution petitions in the High Court of Sindh.
8. Undoubtedly, the State Bank of Pakistan is the Central Bank of the country vested with multiple responsibilities and functions as per the statute. It is indeed a statutory public body. It was, its own duty and obligation to have redressed the grievances of the employees instead of relegating them to seek remedy from the Courts. Had it, itself given them what was due, as per the legal position declared by this Court, necessity of approaching the Court would not' have arisen. Juristic ally, there is distinction between judgment in-rem and judgment inpersonam, as adumbrated and highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Though such a proposition cannot be disputed yet the applicability of such a doctrine to the instant case is out of question. Undoubtedly and undisputed the State Bank of Pakistan was party before this Court in all the above referred judgments. The legal position stated and declared by this Court about the scheme was not for one segment of employees. It was for one and all, falling within the purview of the Scheme. The ambit of Articles 189 and 190 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 would get attracted with all force. There is no dearth, of precedents where as a result of the legal position stated by the Court benefits accruing, were given even to those who were not party before this Court. Reference in this context may be made to Hameed Akhtar Niazi's case supra, Chairman Pakistan Railways case supra, Khawaja Abdul Hameed Nasir's case supra, and Aamir Ikram's case supra.
9. Even in India where by virtue of Article 141 of their Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is considered to be binding on all Courts the Supreme Court took the view, as per page 5958 of Volume-V of Constitution of India by Dr. Durga Das Basu, Eighth Edition "the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on the State, and, therefore, its officers are bound to follow it, whether they are parties or not in the litigation". It may be mentioned that the issue about the employees not being party to the litigation before this Court looses significance as the Bank itself was party, who was obliged to follow and implement the judgment in letter and spirit, to one and all. The - effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be whittled clown or washed away on such premises a are being canvassed by the Bank.
10.Indeed it does not behove that a statutory institution like State Bank of Pakistan should rest its defence on such flimsy grounds to deny the benefit to those, who had been working for it. In M/s. Pfizer Laboratories Limited v. Federation of Pakistan & others (PLD 1998 SC 64) Ajmal Mian, J, (as his lordship then was) referred to the observations made in M/s. Shiv Shanker Dal Mills etc. v. State of Haryana and others, etc. (AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1037), that the public bodies should not take the plea of limitation in returning the money to the public nor "a negative plea of alternate remedy" should be taken; and that in writ jurisdiction "it is perfectly open for the Court, exercising this flexible power, to pass such order such as public interest dictates and equity projects". What the High Court has done in the instant case by accepting the petitions of the employees, is simply to give effect to the judgment of the Court and redress the grievance of the employees as they were not being treated justly and fairly and in consonance with the judgment of this Court. The High Court rather felt bound by the judgment of the Court and instead of demeaning the same, acted in compliance of dictates of Article 189 of the. Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
11.Justice (Retd) Fazal Karim in his work "Judicial Review of Public Actions" has dealt with this subject in Volume-II at pages 512, 521 and 533 and observed :-- "The matter can be looked at as follows. The superior Courts serve, while deciding cases, two purposes; one, the private purpose of deciding disputes between the parties and two, the public purpose of making law to ensure uniformity and thereby to ensure confidence in the administration of justice and in appropriate cases to clarify the law, the practice and procedures and thereby to help maintain the standards of first instance Courts and tribunals. As Lord Diplock observed in Hoffmann-La Roche v. Secretary of State "Although such a decision is directly binding only as between the parties to the proceedings in which it was made, the application of the doctrine of precedent has the consequence of enabling the benefit of it to accrue to all other persons whose legal rights have been interfered with in relying on the law which the statutory instrument purported to declare". The classic example of such a decision being binding upon third parties is Cooper v. Aaron.
Although the State of Arkansas was not a party in the historical Brown case, yet the governor and the legislature of that state were held bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown." The use of precedent also promotes equality, namely, the ideal that like cases should be treated alike, which is one of the most important ingredients of justice. "Like cases must be decided alike, not only to achieve distributive justice but primarily to maintain the certainty". (underlining by me for relevance and emphasis)
12.It may be kept in view that while maintaining and observing the distinction between a judgment in--rem and a judgment in-personam, as highlighted in the premier judgment of this Court in Pir Bakhsh & others v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee & others (PLD 1987 Supreme Court 145); the benefit can still not be denied to the employees in this case, as the petitioner bank had been a party before this Court, who not only was bound by the judgment but also was under a legal duty to apply equally to all those falling within the scheme.
13.A distinction between a benefit and liability under a legislative instrument or judgment cannot also be overlooked. For instance in Messers Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. & others v. Federation of Pakistan & others (1992 SCMR 1652), while construing a notification it was observed that "there is a marked distinction between a notification which purports to impair existing/vested rights or imposes new liabilities or obligations retrospectively and a notification which purports to confer benefit retrospectively". Thus the principle governing the issues of liabilities and benefits are not the same. Analogically the employees herein became entitled to the benefits the moment this Court interpreted the scheme and laid-down principles as to its import and efficacy. 14.There is yet another aspect spelt out from the latter judgment dated 03.02.2005 numbered as 4th and 5th. Had the intention of the Court been to restrict the benefit only to the parties to those cases, the employees (non-parties) would have been non-suited by dismissing their petitions instead of directing them to approach the Bank for relief and to approach the proper forum, in case the need so arises. The intention is manifestly clear.
15. According to the learned counsel the judgment was rendered by the learned Judges of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, after long time of hearing the matter, but this itself does not have the effect of impairing the correctness, legality and efficacy thereof as all essential aspects of the matter have been given due care and is reflective of application of mind to the real controversy.
16. It cannot be ignored that all the employees have now been granted relief by the High Court through the impugned judgment, Undoubtedly, the judgment of this Court has the binding force unless it is reviewed. It has remained intact so far. It has got to be enforced and complied with.
There is no use, rather it will be unjust, if the employees were to be knocked out on the principle of laches in approaching the High Court or for availing some other remedy as just and fair order has been made by the High Court. It will advance the cherished goal of justice for all, similarly situated.
The equity and the justice of the case demands that leave may not be granted in such a case.
17. In view of the above, we find no justification for grant of leave. Leave to appeal is accordingly declined. The Petitions are dismissed.