1. ' MRS. YASMIN ABBASEY, J.---This appeal has been preferred by appellant Sheraz Ahmed against the compromise order passed by learned Rent Controller Karachi Cantonment Board on 17-1-2006, whereby, respondent No,3 M/s. Paradise Subscription Agency had been ordered to hand over vacant possession of premises in question to the attorney of the respondent No,1 Mst. Sughra Bai on or before 20-10-2005.
2. ' The case of appellant as placed by learned counsel for appellant is that he was put in possession of the premises by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 as sub-tenant, therefore he too was entitled to have notice of transfer of ownership, by Mst. Sughra to his attorney the respondent No,2. In absence of any such notice there exists no relationship of landlord and tenant in-between the parties, therefore the compromise decree obtained by respondent No,2 is nullity, as the same was passed without considering that after death of Mst. Sughra respondent No,2 was no more her attorney and was not empowered to the that rent application.
3. ' In reply Mr. Hassan Akbar, learned counsel for respondent No,1 has referred section 3 of Power-of- Attorney Act, 1882 which provides that a person acting under any power-of-attorney shall not be liable in respect of any act for the reasons that before doing so the donor of the power had died or had revoked the power, if the fact of death or revocation was not present at the time of doing that act and was not in knowledge of the persons making on doing the same.
4. ' Apart from it is pointed out by learned counsel for respondent No,1 that property in question was long ago sold out by Mst. Sughran in favour of respondent No,2 but as the demised premises is a old grants property, therefore, sale-deed of the same could not be executed, but transfer of property by Mst. Sughra to Ghulam Nabi is an evident fact as has also been affirmed by the statement of respondent No,1, who is now represented by her legal heir Fazal Yousif Sadik, in his statement, dated 7-2-2006 Fazal Sadik son of Mst. Sughra has stated that the property was sold out by his mother to respondent No,2 in pursuance of power-of-attorney executed on 5-9-1979 and sale agreement dated 4-4-1979 and now Ghulam Nabi Qureshi is the lawful owner of the property in question. Respondents Nos.3 & 4 Who were tenants of respondents Nos.1 and 2 have also made a statement on 22-2-2006 that in pursuance of the compromise arrived in between them and the landlords they had already handed over vacant possession of the premises in question to respondent No,2 on 14-2-2005. Hence after vacating the premises by the original tenants, apparently the appellant does not hold any title in premises in question either as a tenant or sub-tenant because as per his own admission that he was inducted, in the premises in question by respondents Nos.2 and 3 and when they themselves have handed over vacant possession of the premises to their landlords and decree of the Court is on record, the same is also binding on the sub-tenant as he had no independent right in the premises in question and are liable to be evicted. Learned counsel for the respondent No,2 has referred 1986 SCMR 734, wherein, it is observed that "tenant inducting another into premises without consent of the landlord, such other person a mere licensee and has to leave along with .Tenant on the latter ejectment from premises.
5. The same observation has been made in AIR 1932 Calcutta 241, that,--- "a decree in ejectment passed against a lessee at the instance of a lessor is not only binding upon the lessee but also upon his sub-tenants provided they have no right independent of the right of the right of their lessor in the demised premises. The learned Munsif, in my opinion, has taken the correct view of the matter.
6. ' The petitioner as under-tenant is moreover, bound by the estoppel against his lessor, under section 116, Evidence Act. He is estopped from denying the title of the opposite party or setting up any title of his own in these proceedings having come into possession under the tenant."
7. ' PLD 1986 Lahore 20, has also been referred by learned counsel for respondent with reference to the status of the appellant in the property in question that after vacating premises in question by the original tenant he had no title in property in question, as it is observed therein that:--- "It is a cardinal principle of law that when a decree is obtained by a decree-holder for possession of immovable property then it can be executed against the defendant (hereinafter called the judgment-debtor) or any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property."
8. ' This principle has a statutory recognition in the form of Order XXI, Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908). It is again well-settled that a sub-lessee or an under tenant is a person bound by a decree for possession obtained by the lessor against the lessee, no matter whether the sub-lease was created before or after the suit, provided the eviction is based on a ground which determines the sub-lease also. If authority be needed reference can be made to Sheikh Yusuf v.
9. Jyotish Chandra Banerjee and others (1) where Suhrawardy, J sitting with Graham, J., held:--- " The words 'any person bound by the decree' in Order XXI, Rule 35 include the judgment-debtor as well as any person who may be held under the law as bound by the decree, " A valid notice to quit not only determines the right of the original demise but any lessee which, the tenant might have made.
10. " A decree in ejectment passed against a lessee at the instance of a lessor is not only binding upon the lessee, but also upon his subtenants provided they have no right independent of the right of their lessor in the demised premises. The sub-tenant is, therefore, liable to be evicted in execution of a decree under Order XXI, Rule 35, and it is not necessary for the decree-holder to proceed under Order XXI, Rule 97.
11. ' Much emphasis has been given by learned counsel for appellant to the point that without considering the legal aspect that respondent No,2 did not hold any title on the property in question either as owner or attorney which stands revoked after death of Mst. Sughra, had accepted the compromise placed by respondents with mala fide intention. Even if for the sake of argument it is taken that a consent decree was obtained by the respondents, inspite of having no legal status of respondent No,2, then the very admission of appellants' father made in Suit No,80/88 filed by him that:-- "The defendant/Liaquat is occupant of flat No,112 Depot Lines, Saddar, Karachi and is in litigation with the genuine person/title holder of the said property." is sufficient proof of fact that respondent No,2 was rightful person to institute ejectment proceeding.
12. Even otherwise an illegal occupant of a premises has the right to dispute the title of owner, in absence of any agreement B in-between the landlord and sub-tenant. My views are fortified with the observation made in 1986 CLC 1378.
13. ' So far the reliance of appellant on the judgment passed in Suit No,80/88 and Civil Appeal No,134/93 is concerned, the perusal of final order in Civil Appeal No,134/93, show that declaration sought by appellant that:- "to declare that the defendant is not entitled to out the plaintiff from his shop/shed situated on plot No,112 Depot lines, Saddar, under the name and style of "Paradise Birds Centre" was dismissed.
14. However prayer made by him that he should not be dispossessed without due course of law, was allowed. So the order passed on 17-1-2006 in R.C. No,7 of 2005 is in accordance to law and no violation of any order passed an Civil Appeal No,143/93 is appearing.
15. ' The observations made in 1986 CLC 110 in the identical situation are very much material wherein it is observed that:- "I am further constrained to hold that the efforts of the appellant throughout the proceedings have been to protract his unauthorized possession over the premises in suit as long as possible by sheer abuse of the process of the Court. I am, therefore, of the clear view that the learned Controller was absolutely justified in striking off the defence of the respondent No,2 when he failed to pay the rent and the arrears in compliance of the order of the deposit of tentative rent. The appellant is clearly bound by the order passed against the tenant being a sub-lettee and is not entitled to any relief. I, therefore, dismiss his appeal and direct that the respondent No,1 shall be put in possession of the premises in dispute forthwith."
16. ' 1986 CLC 1378 Karachi, further supports the version of respondent No,2 with the observations that:- "It was not shown that under the law they were necessary parties to the ejectment application. No privity of contract between the landlord and the applicants was established. In fact this, was not even attempted by the applicants in the proceedings before the executing Court. The application under. Order XXI, Rules 99, 100 and 103, C.P.C., of the applicants were therefore, rightly rejected and no case in law had been made out for setting aside the orders passed in execution. I am conscious of the fact that the applicants have remained in the premises for very long periods but this by itself is not sufficient to make out a case that the applicants have any independent right in the property or there is any privity of contract between them and the landlord."
17. ' Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1, 3 and .4 consented to arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondent No,2.
18. In view of the arguments, advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that after vacating the promises in question, by the original tenant, this appellant, who was put in possession of the premises as sub-tenant, by the tenant i.e, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 has no locus standi in the premises in question because after vacating the premises by the original tenants i.e, Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, he has to go with them and the judgment passed on 20-10-2005 is also binding on him as that on the respondents Nos. 3 and 4, as petitioner does not hold any title in his favour to retain the possession on account of his own admission to be sub-tenant of respondents Nos. 3 and 4, therefore, after vacating the premises by respondents Nos.3 and 4 he stands no where.
19. In view of foregoing reasons appeal of the appellant is hereby dismissed having no merit along with listed applications.