' The petitioner is a tenant whose defence was struck out by the Rent Controller on 15-5-1979 upon his non-compliance of an order passed under section 13(6) of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. His appeal before the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, failed on 21-10-1979.
2. The property in dispute had been transferred by a Transfer Order dated 27-2-1976 in favour of Faiz Ahmad, who sold it to Muhammad Amjad, etc., the present landlords, on 16-11-1977. They brought the ejectment petition on 27-7-1978 on grounds of default and personal use. The petition having been contested on various grounds, the following preliminary issues were framed :- "(1) Whether the respondent was entitled for notice under section 30 of Act XXVIII of 1958? 0. P. R.
(2) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction? 0. P. R.
(3) Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant does exist between the parties? 0. P. P.
(4) Whether the respondent was entitled for notice under section 13-A of Ordinance VI of 1959? O. P.
R."
' The issues were found against the tenant, where after the order requiring him to deposit rent was passed on 1-4-1979, which order was defaulted. The tenant in the appeal disputed the finding on the issue of relationship upon the assertion that a notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was still required to be served in spite of the repeal of that Act, which notice had not been served and as such the Rent Controller had had no jurisdiction.
It was nobody's case that such notice had been served but the arguments centered round the question whether such notice was necessary. The Appellate Court came to the view that: "This property was transferred, as such when the evacuee laws stood repealed and the provisions of section 30 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act were no more applicable. Even otherwise, the ejectment proceedings will be governed only by the law which is prevalent at the time of their initiation. To these proceedings, section 30 was not applicable and a notice under that section was not a pre-requisite in the present case."
3. Mr. S. M, Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that the repealed Act, i,e, the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958) had provided a protection to the tenant from ejectment for a period of six years and that protection was available in spite of repeal of the Act. For this he relied on section 6 of the General Clauses Act, Rafiuddin v.
Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (1), Fakhro v. Settlement Commissioner (Land), Hyderabad (2) and Nawab Din v. Member, Board of Revenue (3). Under section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, the repeal of an Act shall not "affect any right, privilege obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed". Under this section, therefore, it is necessary to establish that the right had accrued under the Act, that is, before its repeal. In the first cited case, the Supreme Court held that "the substantive rights vesting in any one under the repealed enactment are not lost or affected in the least by the repealing enactment. This is clearly provided in clause 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Even the proceedings pending on the date of repeal stand protected by the said Act". In the second cited case, the Sind High Court held that the change in law by omission of section 18 relating to appeals, will not there- {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1971 SC 252 (2) PLD 1979 Kar. 486
(3) PLD 1979 SC 846 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' after affect the pending appeals, unless there is an express provision to the contrary. In the last cited case, the Supreme Court held that subsections (2) and (3) of section 2 of the repealing Act XIV of 1975 leave no room for doubt regarding Legislature's intention being to allow cases of old applicants for allotment of land, pending on the relevant dale of repeal, to continue so as to be disposed of according to the provisions of the relevant repealed Act.
4. I am afraid none of these authorities is of any help to the petitioner because the Transfer Order having issued on 27-2-1976 and in consequence the relationship of landlord and tenant having been brought into existence from that date, the rights of the parties are to be construed as accruing on that date. The Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1958 having been repealed with effect from 1-7-1974, no right under the repealed Act could be said to have accrued on a date subsequent to its repeal i,e,, on the date the Transfer Order was issued. The petitioner, therefore, could look for his rights only under the law as in force on 27-2-1976. There was no requirement of a notice to the tenant or a provision for protection of the tenant in the new Act, i,e,, Act X1V of 1975.
5. Even otherwise, the protection of six years available under the repealed Act was neither absolute nor one-sided but was contingent upon the tenant fulfilling certain conditions on receipt of the notice from the landlord under section 30. For example, if he defaulted in payment of rent within three months of the receipt of the notice, he would have lost the protection. In Amino Begum etc. v.
Mehar Ghulam Dastgir (1), it had been held that an application for ejectment filed within six years was competent because the statutory protection of six years was not absolute but was dependent upon conditions to be fulfilled by the tenant. In another case, reported as Ghulam Qadir v. Nazir Ahmad (2), it was held that the protection afforded by the repealed Act was only co-extensive with that Act and did not survive its repeal. It is, therefore, extremely doubtful if the petitioner could have invoked the protection, even if that protection had accrued to him on the relevant date of the repeal. However, on the facts, as they are the relationship having commenced on 27-2-1976, when the repealed Act had already stood repealed, there was no question of accrual of any right under that Act. The landlord was, therefore, not bound to issue any notice nor the tenant entitled to any protection except as under the Rent Restriction Ordinance.
6. In this view of the matter, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed, There shall, however, be no order as to costs. {{FOOT NOTE}} D 1978 SC 220 (2) PLD 1980 B J 15 , {{FOOT NOTE}}