' SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J.--- Brief facts giving rise to this constitutional petition are that Shop No.44 K.D.A. Market, Gulshan-eIqbal, Karachi is property of respondents Nos.1 and 2, and petitioner was tenant in that shop. Ejectment application was filed in the month of April 2006 by landlord stating therein that he has no place of business and was mentally shuttered to have his own business and was a running bangles business in Shop No.6. However, business of bangles was not giving him sufficient profit. Therefore, he needed shop in question for personal bona fide use of his son Syed Mubashir Tahir who at the time of filing ejectment application completed his matriculation and wanted to run his business at the shop-in-question. Ejectment application was allowed by Rent Controller vide order dated 1-4-2008. Appeal was filed and the appellate Court vide its order dated 11-3-2009 maintained order of Rent Controller.
2. Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that he filed application under section 20 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 for summoning of three witnesses. That application was disallowed by the Rent Controller vide order dated 15-8-2007 and he has been seriously prejudiced on account of disallowing of such application. Learned counsel further submitted that personal need was not established through evidence by the landlord.
3. On the other hand learned counsel for respondent No.2 fully supported both concurrent findings of two Courts below and further submitted that in writ jurisdiction High Court is normally most reluctant to disturb concurrent findings of Courts below and even if different view is possible by looking at the evidence High Court would not substitute its view for views of the two Courts below.
Learned counsel for petitioner relied upon Muhammad Hafeez and another v. District Judge, Karachi East and another 2008 SCMR 398, Javed Khalique v. Muhammad Irfan 2008 SCMR 28, Abdul Ghani v. Muhammad Bashir and another 2005 SCJ 41, Abde Ali v. Sheikh Hatim Bhaxi 2003 SCMR 730, Muzaffar Aleem v. Iqbal Ahmad 1999 MLD 3178, Adeel Ahmed Sajid v. Shafqat Hussain and 2 others 2009 CLC 34, Muhammad Ghazi Qureshi v. Muhammad Mudasir 2008 CLC 1629, Abdul Haneef Khan v. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karathi Central and 2 others 2008 CLC 1271, Malik Muhammad Zakria Kansi v. Dr. Bashir Ahmed PLD 2001 Quetta 40, Muhammad Shafi v.
Shahid Nadeem and 5 others 1999 CLC 1273, Syed Fazilatul Hoda v. Bashir Muhammad 1997 CLC 992 and Shah Zareen v. Sada Gul 1998 MLD 903.
4. On the other hand learned counsel for respondent No.2 relied upon Muhammad Atique v.
Muhammad Hanif Khan 1996 SCMR 1260, Murad Ali v. Sultan Aziz and others 1988 CLC 2281, Mrs. Rafiqa Begum through her legal heirs v. Mrs. Mahmooda Wahidina PLD 1987 Karachi 287, Mrs. Shahnoor Fazal v. Ghulam Akbar Mangi 1987 SCMR 2051, E.M. Cordeiro (Cedaro) v. Juzer Fakhruddin and another 1992 MLD 1155, Mst. Shirin Bai v. Famous Art Printers (Pvt.) Limited and others 2006 SCMR 117, Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others PLD 1974 SC 139 and Muhammad Arif v. Mrs. Anwar Jehan 2000 SCMR 1960.
5. I have considered submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused case law and the material placed on record.
6. First ground taken by the learned counsel for petitioner was that petitioner filed application under section 20 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 for summoning three witnesses and it was disallowed. I have gone through the said application which is accompanied by an affidavit. I have also gone through the order of the trial Court passed on 15-8-2007. In the application only names of witnesses are mentioned and no reasons are stated. In the affidavit, it is stated that persons to be called as witnesses because their names are mentioned in written statement and they shall depose on oath in respect of averments made in written statement. It was claimed in written statement amount of Rs.4,00,000 was paid by petitioner to landlord as security deposit.
Learned trial Court in its order observed that present petitioner had not been able to bring on record any cogent ground as to why the said witnesses to whom he wanted to be called are not in touch with him or have not agreed to file their affidavit-in-evidence in the case or any other circumstances showing that said witnesses are beyond the control of petitioner to put them in witness box. It was further observed by the trial Court that there is no reason stated in the application and supporting affidavit to clarify with regard nature of testimony of which witnesses are likely to be called by Court. Learned counsel for petitioner has not urged any ground in this regard even in the memo of petition. Therefore, I do not think any interference is called for with order of Rent Controller on this score.
7. On the question of personal need first major hurdle to be crossed by the petitioner is that there are two concurrent findings against him; and secondly he is in this Court in writ jurisdiction where law needs no authority that in writ petition High Court normally does not interfere within concurrent findings of two Courts below except. In rare and exceptional circumstances when there is non- reading or misreading of evidence or when a provision of law has been misapplied or when a principle of law laid down by superior Courts has not been correctly applied with. Concurrent findings on which ejectment has been allowed is personal bona fide need. Landlord in ejectment application stated that he is facing financial problems and wants to expand his sources of income and he, required premises for use by his son who has completed his matriculation. He was extensively cross-examined in this aspect. Relevant part of cross-examination is as under:- "My son who is elder in age who is 18 years old and afterwards my daughter aged about 16 years and then my son who is aged about 9 years. The house wherein presently I am residing is in the name of my wife. My wife is a house wife. My monthly expenditure is about Rs.15,000 per month. I own one house and two shops, has my whole property. Voluntarily says that shop which is in my possession which is the property of my father. It is a fact that I have stated in my rent case that Shop No.6 situated in K.D.A. Market Block-3, Gulshan-e-Iqbal,' is my own property. It is a fact that my father has expired. The Shop No.44 situated in the same K.D.A. Market is my property which is in the tenant of the opponent. It is a fact that Shop No.6 wherein I am doing my business is road facing and the shop with the opponent is inside the market. Both the shops are having same measurement within the same area to be 11 x 18 feet. It is a fact that since finding excess area in my Shop No.6 I let out one of its inside portion/wall to Girdari Lal on rent. The said Girdari C Lal used to pay me Rs.18,000 per month Shop No.6 is having only one shutter. I used to keep the keys of Shop No.6 with me. The said Girdari Lal deposited Rs.2 lacs with me as security deposit. About 6/7 years ago I had lout the portion of wall to Girdari Lal. It is a fact that I am using the wall of Shop No.6 to run my business of bangles. It is incorrect to suggest that my son used to sell the scarfs and Dupatas in the portion of Shop No.6. My son is not doing any business in Shop No.6. My son does not come to help me in my business. It is a fact that I have let out the front space to the Patheridar to be called as stall to the persons for doing business which are two in all. The other person in the market have also let out, therefore I have done so----The demised shop is required for my son who will do the business of children garment. "
8. Perusal of above would show that it has been clearly established;
(i) Landlord has son who is 18 years of age.
(ii) Landlord needs shop for use of his son.
(iii) In the memo of petition landlord stated regarding his income and his expenditure but they need not be adverted to because it is for landlord to decide that he needs to expand his sources of income and needed shop for his son who had turned 18. No Court can assume to itself right to decide whether a landlord should be allowed to expand his resources of income or not.
9. In Muhammad Hafeez's case for personal bona fide need it was held that statement of landlord, if consistent with pleadings, must be given due weight and absence of material facts from pleading would be fatal to cause of land. Learned counsel failed to point out as to which material facts qua a bona fide need had not been pleaded in the present case. In Javed Khalique's case it was held that normally landlord must be allowed benefit of use of his premises, unless any circumstance was brought on record indicating his stated requirement to be mala fide. In Abdul Ghani's case it was a leave granting order where Honourable Supreme Court had granted leave to consider whether landlord failed to establish his bona fides.
10. In this case landlord has clearly stated that he needed property for his son who had turned 18 and such finding has not been dislodged in evidence and two Courts below have rightly recorded concurrent findings in this regard. Writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own cost.