Pakistan Case Law← Search
2010 MLD 1267

Sayyid YOUSAF HUSAIN SHIRAZI vs PAKISTAN DEFENCE OFFICERS' HOUSING

Citation2010 MLD 1267
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Suit No, 1610 of 2009
Date2010-06-04
Judge(s)Muhammad Ali Mazhar
ResultInjunction refused

ORDER

1. ' MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J.---By this order, I will dispose of C.M.A. No, 10349 of 2009 filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., and C.M.A. No, 524 of 2010 filed by the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 under Order XXXIX, Rule 4, C.P.C.

2. ' In C.M.A. No,10349 of 2009, the plaintiff has prayed for restraining orders against the defendants, from carrying out and/or attempting to carry out any construction of any nature on the subject property or using the subject property for any purpose other than a green plot, pending final disposal of the main Suit. In the supporting affidavit, the plaintiff has stated that the defendant No,1 has prepared number of schemes for development of residential use, commercial use, uses for amenity, use for roads, streets, lanes, parks, shoulders and general easements. The plaintiff on 6-3- 1978 acquired a Plot No,2 at Khayaban e-Ghazi (Survey Sheet No,26) in the layout plan of the entire Phase-V. The defendant No,1 executed a lease in respect of the said plot in favour of the plaintiff. At the time of execution of the said lease, all plots of land generally in Phase-V and particularly in the areas adjoining the plaintiffs property were competently allotted, residential houses were constructed, roads, streets, shoulders, parks, amenity plots were fully defined. Plot No,35/1 was leased out to the defendant No,2 which is located 90 feet away towards the North-East of the plaintiffs property and was bounded on the North-West by 5th Gizri Street, on the South by 80' wide road known as Khayaban-e-Jabal, on the East by plot No,37 and on the West by an open triangular land being part of a road and meant to be used as a road/shoulder/amenities for the public in general and the residents of the neighbouring area in particular. In the year, 1980, the subject property was tried to be encroached upon by the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 by constructing a wall but on the protest of the neighbouring residents, the defendant No,1 demolished the unauthorized construction of the said walls. On 3-9-1990, the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 once again commenced construction of compound walls on the subject property and the plaintiff immediately objected to the unauthorized construction and reported the matter to the defendant No,1 which objection was also followed by the other residents. On 20-9-1990, the Administrator of the defendant No,1 visited and inspected the subject property and after considerable discussion on various occasions with the plaintiff, the defendants and the neighbouring residents, an agreement, was arrived at between the parties whereby part of the subject property at both sides of the corner measuring 60/70 feet (against 100 feet demand) off Khayaban-e-Jabal and the road on the South side of the plot No,35/1 was to be left open and, the subject property was to be beautified by landscaping/plantation and low level metallic grill. In breach of the said terms of the agreement, the defendants with connivance and collusion attempted to construct a wall on the Khayaban-e- Jabal side and as such the plaintiff filed a Suit No,611/91 in this Court for Declaration, Injunction and Damages. The said suit was subsequently transferred to IVth Senior Civil Judge, Karachi, South and thereafter, it was dismissed for non-prosecution on 5-8-2000, where after, the defendants confirmed and agreed that the subject property would remain as a park/green land as such the plaintiff did not pursue the restoration of the said Suit. It has been further alleged that the plaintiff has been addressing letters to the defendant No,1. The defendant No,1 by its letter dated 27-11-2006 confirmed that the concerns of the plaintiff were genuine and it was reiterated by the defendant No,1 in the letter dated 27-11-2006 that the subject property was given to the defendant No,2 on her request for developing it into a green plot. In spite of several letters calling upon the defendant No,1 to ensure that the subject property cannot be used for any purpose other than as a green plot, no response was given, however a letter dated 13-4-2009 was sent by the defendant No,1 in which the defendant took a complete somersault and completely ignored the previous undertakings and assurances given by the defendant No,1 and stated that the subject property was not for a green plot and that the same had been given to the defendant No,2 on her request as extra land. The defendant No,1 at the behest of defendant No,2 is illegally attempting to convert the subject property, which was reserved for a green plot. The defendants in disregard of their obligation to maintain the subject property as a green plot, started construction in November, 2009 and raised a boundary wall covering the subject property and heavy machinery brought to start illegal construction on the subject property hence this Suit has been filed along with injunction application.

3. ' The attorney of the defendant No,2 has filed counter affidavit and has denied the claim of the plaintiff. Preliminary legal objections have also been raised that the instant application is not maintainable in law and/or otherwise has been filed in gross abuse of the process of this Court.

4. The suit is barred under section 11, C.P.C., the plaintiff had filed earlier Suit No,611/1991 along with an application for stay against the defendants before this Court in relation to the same subject property, however plaintiff's stay application was dismissed, after recording of evidence vide order dated 7-4-1993. The plaintiff thereafter preferred a High Court Appeal No,85 of 1993 which was subsequently disposed of vide order, dated 29-9-1993 without modifying the order passed in the stay application, hence the order of the dismissal of stay application attained finality. The said suit was subsequently dismissed for want of evidence vide order dated 21-12-1995, thereafter, it was restored and transferred to civil Court but again it was dismissed for non-prosecution, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to re-agitate, a matter which has been conclusively decided by the Court earlier. The plaintiff has approached this Court with unclean hands inasmuch as he has suppressed/concealed material facts, which is evident from the very fact that he has deliberately suppressed the filing and dismissal of the earlier stay application, hence plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. No cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff in relation to the subject property which is owned by the defendant No,2 and the instant application along with the suit is liable to be dismissed.

5. ' On 20-1-2010, the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 filed C.M.A. No,524/2010 under Order XXXIX, Rule 4, C.P.C.

6. In which they have prayed that the order dated 18-1-2010 may be vacated and the defendants Nos.

7. 2 and 3 may be allowed to carry on the construction on the subject plot. In the supporting affidavit, the defendant No,3 has stated that the plaintiff obtained an order, on. 18-1-2010 without disclosing correct facts. This Court had refused to grant the plaintiff, an ad interim injunction on the previous date of hearing, thus there was no violation of whatsoever of any Court order. On 16-11-2009 the Court had made an observation that the construction carried out by the defendants Nos.2 and 3 would be subject to the final orders of this Court. Since no further order in this regard had been passed by this Court, question of its violation does not arise. The instant suit is merely a replica of earlier suit filed by the plaintiff in relation to the same property in which the plaintiff's stay application was dismissed. Although the fact of earlier suit is mentioned in the plaint of the present suit, however the fact of dismissal of the stay application has been wilfully suppressed with mala fide intentions.

8. ' Counter affidavit was filed by the plaintiff in which the plaintiff reiterated the contents of the application filed under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. The plaintiff stated that the allegation of obtaining an order on 18-1-2010 by not apprising this Court the correct fact is completely false and unwarranted. The order dated 16-11-2009 is self explanatory. The plaintiff has mentioned the fact of filing of the earlier suit in the present Suit. The present suit is not barred by section 11, C.P.C. In the earlier suit the plaintiff had challenged allotment in favour of the defendants Nos.3 and 4 whereas in the present suit the plaintiff has not challenged the allotment but has sought a declaration and injunction to the effect that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 should maintain the subject property as a green plot. After dismissal of the earlier suit, the officials of the defendant No,1 confirmed time and again the concern of the plaintiff that the subject property would be, kept as a green plot.

9. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material available on record. No case law was cited by the learned counsel in support of their arguments.

10. ' The record shows that first time, the matter was fixed in this Court on 16-11-2009. Learned Single Judge instead of granting any ad interim orders, clarified that in case the subject plot is established as green belt or meant for green area, the construction, if any will be subject to the order of this Court. It is clear from the aforesaid order that there was no restraining order. In fact, it was made clear that in future if plot is found to be green plot/green belt, the construction, if any on the said plot will be subject to the order of this Court. On 18-1-2010, the matter was again fixed in the Court on which date the learned counsel for the plaintiff produced photographs to show that the Court's order dated 16-11-2009 is being wilfully defied.

11. ' The learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued in chronological order that on 17-5-1975 form "A" for the Plot No,35/1, Khayaban-e-Jabal was executed for the land admeasuring 1712-28 sq. Yds. On 31-1-1981, 578 sq.Yds as extra land was allotted to MRs, Nafees Yasin Malik. After allotment of this extra land, Form "B" Lease was executed in the name of Lessee for a total area of land measuring 2290.28 sq. Yds. The learned counsel argued that no Form "A" was executed for extra land. The learned counsel for the plaintiff further argued that vide amending deed dated 29-9-1990, further land measuring about 623 sq. Yds. Was allotted to the defendant No,2 and the revised site plan was also issued on 13-9-1990. The learned counsel states that the lastly allotted land measuring 623 sq. Yds. Was in fact a green plot and this cannot be utilized for any other purpose. In paragraph 15 of this suit, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has categorically stated that the same plaintiff earlier filed Suit No,611 -1 in this Court for declaration, injunction and damages against the Pakistan Defence Housing Authority, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation and the present defendants Nos. 2 and 3. He further added that subsequently, the suit was transferred to the lower court and on 5-8- 2000 it was dismissed for non-prosecution. Subsequent to the dismissal of the suit, the defendants confirmed and agreed that the subject property would remain as green plot as such the plaintiff did not pursue the restoration of the earlier suit. In order to distinguish and to show that the second suit is not hit by the principle of res judicata, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued that the cause of action of this suit arose on 13-4-2009 when the defendant No,1 informed the plaintiff that the subject property was not to be used as green plot and has been given to the defendant No,2 on her request as extra land. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has also attached a letter issued by the Secretary, Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing Authority to the plaintiff on 27-11-2006 in which it has been informed by the Secretary to the plaintiff that the area adjacent to plot No,35 Khayabane-Jabal, which had been lying barren in the past, was given to MRs, Yasin Malik on her request for developing it into a green plot. The same has not yet been accomplished, however she is being urged to develop the same on priority basis. According to learned counsel for the plaintiff, the letter dated 27-11-2006 is binding on the defendant No, 1 keeping in view the doctrine of "Indoor Management". In the letter dated 13-4-2009, Director TP & BC of the defendant No,1 informed the plaintiff that the area adjacent to plot No,35 Khayaban-e-Jabal was not a park and has been given to MRs, Yasin Malik on her request as extra land. It was further submitted that although the case was resolved by the then Administrator Major General (R) Hidayatullah Niazi in 1990 in the presence of plaintiff however, the plaintiff twice chosen to go to the Court as well. On both occasions, the cases have been dismissed by the Courts. It was further stated that any interference in the subject matter will amount to contempt of Court. The plaintiff has also attached few letters written in the year, 2006 and onwards to the defendant No,1 for the alleged unlawful allotment of land reserved for green plot. Finally, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has prayed that the defendants Nos.2 and 3 may be restrained from raising any construction on the alleged green plot till the final decision of this suit.

12. ' In nutshell, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued that though the earlier suit was dismissed but his second suit is based on altogether different cause of action and, in fact, for this Suit cause of action arose to the plaintiff on the basis of letter dated 13-4-2009. The learned counsel has also argued that green plot cannot be allotted to the defendants Nos.2 and 3 as it was reserved for amenity purpose, therefore the defendants Nos.2 and 3 should be restrained from raising any construction on the subject piece of land.

13. ' In rebuttal, the learned counsel for the defendants Nos.2 and 3 Mr. Khalid Anwer has invited my attention to R & P of Suit No,611/91, which was transferred to the civil Court. The learned counsel has referred to an order dated' 7-4-1993 passed by this Court in suit No,611/91, by which injunction application was dismissed. The plea of the same plaintiff in that suit was also same that the land in question was earmarked as an amenity plot. In order to ascertain whether the subject land was an amenity plot or not, the learned Judge of this Court recorded the evidence of S. Hamid Ali, Assistant Engineer of defendant No,!, who had also produced the relevant plans in Court. The said Assistant Engineer deposed in the Court that the disputed land was never reserved and used as amenity plot. The learned counsel for the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 further added that Master Plan was also submitted in that case and it was never proved that the land involved in this suit or in that suit, which is more or less same, was ever declared or reserved for any amenity purpose. The witness in that case also stated in Court that in case of amenity plots, the Master Plan indicates the purpose for which plots are reserved. The learned Single Judge of this Court finally observed that there is nothing in the evidence or in the maps to show even prima facie that the areas in the map marked with dots were reserved as amenity areas, therefore, the injunction application was dismissed. The learned counsel for the defendants Nos.2 and 3 has also attached the deposition of S. Hamid Ali recorded in Suit No,611/91. He further argued that the same plaintiff had preferred High Court Appeal No,85/93, however vide order dated 29-9-1993, the appeal was disposed of with the direction that office shall take necessary steps to place the suit before the learned Single Judge at original side expeditiously so as to ensure that Suit No,611/91 is disposed of within a year's time, but no restraining order was passed in High Court Appeal except allowing an early hearing of the suit.

14. The learned counsel further added that matter was fixed on 21-12-1995 before the learned Single Judge for evidence but neither any witness was present nor single witness was examined, therefore the learned single judge of this Court observed that after dismissal of injunction application, the plaintiff has lost interest in the suit, hence the suit was dismissed for want of evidence. Again on an application of the plaintiff, the suit was restored to its original position, but it was again dismissed by the transferee court on 5-8-2000 for non-prosecution. The learned counsel further added that the plaintiff has completely failed to produce any document to show that the said area was ever declared as amenity plot or green plot. In fact, there is no category of amenity plot reserved as green plot. The learned counsel further argued that letter dated 27-11-2006 has no legal sanctity as the Secretary of defendant No,1 has no lawful authority to declare any piece of land as amenity or green plot. The learned counsel further relied upon a letter dated 22-10-1990, which was issued by the Administrator of the defendant No,1 to the plaintiff. This letter says that on the request of plaintiff, the Administrator visited the site on 28-9-1990, some of the residents of Khayaban-e- Jabal were also present and participated in the discussion. Onsite inspection, it revealed that there was no encroachment. The area brought under occupation by construction of wall in no way exceeds the plot boundaries including the area regularized by the Authority. The extra land available was allotted after due consideration for the requirements of road width, traffic flow and alignment of boundary walls of the neighbouring houses. The Administrator further observed in his letter that discussion on the site was quite healthy and in detail and his suggestions or recommendations were agreed by the defendant No,3, most of the residents and the plaintiff. The Administrator further stated in his letter that he firmly pointed out that shifting of wall was unjustified as no encroachment is involved, however as suggested and agreed by Mr. Yasin Malik, the triangular part of the plot at the corner measuring about 40 feet on Khayaban-e-Jabal may be left open and beautified by landscaping, plantation and low level metallic grill to provide good visibility to the pedestrians etc. In the concluding paragraph, the Administrator informed the plaintiff that when he left the site, he was under the impression that the matter stood resolved not knowing that the plaintiff would start afresh agitating the same point. The learned counsel for the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 states that as observed by the Administrator, 40 feet area has already been left for beautification purposes as agreed in presence of the Administrator. He further argued that the plaintiff has suppressed and concealed the material facts from this Court. The contents of the present suit and Suit No,611/91 are more or less same and, in fact, the plaintiff has tried to reopen the past and closed transaction and has made an attempt to resurrect the controversy, which has already been set at rest in the earlier round of litigation. Finally, the learned counsel for the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 has argued that the injunction application is liable to be dismissed with cost as the plaintiff has failed to make out any prima facie case, balance of convenience in fact lies in the favour of defendant No,2, who has been allotted the plot legally by the defendant No,1 and there is no logical justification to restrain the defendant No,2 from raising the construction on her lawfully allotted plot. No irreparable injury would be caused to the plaintiff if injunction application is dismissed. On 16-11-2009, no interim orders were passed in favour of the plaintiff but the matter was again placed before the Court on 18-1-2010 on urgent motion and by distorting the facts, interim orders were obtained on concealment of facts. Since no interim order was passed on 16-11-2009, hence question of its defiance does not arise.

15. ' The learned counsel for the defendant No,1 has relied upon the record and proceedings of the Suit No,611/91 and he has also confirmed that the plot in question was never declared or tar marked as amenity or green plot. He has also negated the letter issued by the Secretary, DHA to the plaintiff on 27-11-2006. He further argued that the power of allotment of plot is vested in the Managing Committee and the Secretary has no role to play. He has no lawful authority to declare any plot as an amenity plot. He also argued that the Secretary had communicated the letter in pursuance of a letter addressed by the Administrator, DHA to the plaintiff on 22-10-1990, whereby 40 feet area was agreed to be left open and beautified by landscaping/plantation. He has also argued that this controversy has already been resolved in the earlier suit in which parties and subject matter both were same. The present suit is completely hit by the principle of res judicata. The plaintiff has no legal character or locus standi to file the present suit after his failure in the earlier round of litigation. In the earlier suit, the injunction application was dismissed, the plaintiff had filed High Court appeal which was also disposed of without any restraining order, then the suit was fixed for evidence but due to want of evidence the suit was dismissed in non-prosecution. After dismissal of the suit in the year, 2000, no further steps were taken by the plaintiff and again in the year, 2009 he has filed this vexatious proceeding with mala fide intention. Not only the injunction application but the whole suit is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost.

16. After hearing the pros and cons of this cause, I have to consider first and foremost, an old age golden rule of granting injunction:--

(i) The prima facie existence of right in the plaintiff and its infringement by the defendants or the existence of a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff;

(ii) An irreparable loss, damages or injuries which may occur to the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted;

(iii) The inconvenience which the plaintiff will undergo from withholding the injunction will be comparatively greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it or in other words the balance of inconvenience should be in favour of the plaintiff.

17. ' All three essential ingredients must be fulfilled. Absence of anyone of such ingredients would not warrant grant of injunction. Court at this stage has to make only a tentatively, assessment of the case for enabling itself to see whether three requisites for grant of injunction exist in favour of plaintiff or not. Relief of injunction is discretionary and is to be granted by Court according to sound legal principles and ex debito justitiae. Existence of prima facie case is to be judged or made out on the basis of material/evidence on record at the time of hearing of injunction application and such evidence or material should be of the nature that by considering the same, Court should or ought to be of the view that plaintiff applying for injunction was in all probability likely to succeed in the suit by having a decision in his favour. The term "prima facie case" is not specifically defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Judgemade-law or the consensus is that in order to satisfy about the existence of prima facie case, the pleadings must contain facts constituting the existence of right of the plaintiff and its infringement at the hands of the opposite party. Balance of convenience means that if an injunction is not granted and the suit is ultimately decided in favour of the plaintiffs, the inconvenience caused to the plaintiff would be greater than that would be caused to the defendants if the injunction is granted. It is for the plaintiffs to show that the inconvenience, caused to them would be greater than that which may be caused to the defendants. Irreparable loss would mean and imply such loss which is incapable of being calculated on the yardstick of money.

18. The learned counsel for the defendants have also argued forcefully that the present suit is also hit by res judicata as in the previous suit entire controversy has already been resolved between the same parties. In order to press provisions of section 11, C.P.C. Following five conditions have to be spelt out:--

(i) the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent Suit must be the same matter, which was directly and substantially in issue actually or constructively in former Suit;

(ii) the former Suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim;

(iii) the parties as aforesaid must have litigated under the same title in the former Suit;

(iv) the Court which decided the former suit must have been a Court competent to try the subsequent Suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; and

(v) the matter directly or substantially in issue in subsequent Suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court.

19. ' In this suit, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has tried to distinguish the cause of action of both the suits. In fact, he has relied upon a letter dated 27-11-2006 in which the Secretary of DHA has informed the plaintiff that the area adjacent to plot No,35, Khayaban-eJabal, which had been lying barren in past, was given to MRs, Yasin Malik on her request for developing it into a green plot, the same has not yet been accomplished, however she is being urged to develop the same on priority basis and further cause of action allegedly accrued to the plaintiff vide letter dated 13-4-2009 in which Director TP & BC of the defendant No,1 informed the plaintiff that the aforesaid plot was not park and has been given to MRs, Yasin Malik on her request as extra land. The same letter further refers to the matter which was resolved by the then Administrator in the year 1990 in the presence of the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has also argued that letter dated 27-11-2006 written by the Secretary, DHA is binding and the doctrine of Indoor Management is fully applicable while the learned counsel for the defendant No,1 has argued that in presence of registered Form "A"

20. Sub-Lease, Form 'B' Lease, registered amending deed dated 29-9-1990 and site plan issued by the defendant No,1, the Secretary has no right and authority to declare any plot as green plot and he has also denied that the doctrine of Indoor Management is applicable in this case. He further argued that in presence of registered Indenture of sub-lease and amending deed, the letter dated 27-11-2006 has no legal sanctity. In my view for all these aspects whether the suit is hit by the principle of res judicata and or whether the letter, dated 27-11-2006 which is a burning question, has binding effect or not or whether the doctrine of Indoor Management applies, proper issues are required to be settled and in order to settle this controversy at rest, evidence is necessary. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has also invited my attention to a letter dated 22-10-1990, which was communicated by the Administrator, DHA to the plaintiff, which shows that he visited the site in presence of parties and by mutual discussion settlement was reached which is also reflecting from the last letter of DHA dated 13-4-2009. Another important aspect has also to be seen at the time of final adjudication of this case that on 21-12-1995, earlier Suit No,611/91 filed by the plaintiff was dismissed for want of evidence, which was restored, subsequently it was again dismissed on 5-8- 2000. After dismissal of this suit, no further steps were taken by the plaintiff in the matter. The learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that since the defendant No,1 was continuously giving assurances, therefore they did not take any action after dismissal of the suit in the year, 2000. It is evident from the documents filed by the plaintiff along with the plaint that annexure F/1 was written by the plaintiff to the DHA on 19-5-2006, which was replied by the Secretary of DHA on 27-11-2006.

21. Except this letter, there is nothing available on the record to prove as to what steps the plaintiff took in the intervening period. The order dated 7-4-1993 passed in Suit No, 611/91 whereby the learned Judge of this Court dismissed the injunction application clearly shows that the Assistant Engineer of DHA was called in the Court who had also produced the Master Plan. The witness categorically stated that the disputed land was never reserved and used as shoulder/road/amenity. He had further stated that in the original plan, the plot in question like several other plots have been dotted and such dotted plots were subsequently allotted to the members of the defendant No,

1. The learned Single Judge finally held that there was nothing in the evidence or in the maps to show even prima facie that the areas in the maps marked with dots were reserved as amenity areas. It was further observed in the same order that the witness also stated that in the case of amenity plots, the plan indicates the purpose for which they are reserved. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has failed to show from any document that the plot in question was ever declared as amenity plot. The normal definition of "amenity plot" means a plot reserved for parks, gardens, playgrounds, graveyards, hospitals, schools, colleges, libraries, community centers, mosques or such other purpose in a scheme.

22. It would be useful to quote Jeremy's Equity Jurisprudence 307 (C.M. Row, Law of Injunction, Seventh Edition 1994) which says that an injunction is a writ framed according to the circumstances of the case commanding an act which the court regards as essential to justice, or restraining an act which it esteems contrary to equity and good conscience. An injunction as is well known is an equitable remedy and accordingly is to conform to the well known maxim of the law of Equity, D that "he who seeks equity must do equity". The law as contained in the Specific Relief Act is governed by the aforesaid principle, therefore, a plaintiff who asks for an injunction must be able to satisfy the court that his own acts and dealings in the matter have been fair, honest and free from any taint or illegality and that if in dealing with the person against whom he seeks the relief, he has acted in an unfair or un-equitable manner he cannot have this relief.

23. According to Pomeroy's. Equity Jurisprudence, section 112, (C.M. Row, Law of Injunction, Seventh Edition 1994), equitable remedies are distinguished by their flexibility, their limitless varieties, their adaptability to the exigencies of case and the natural rules which govern their use. According to their essential nature they may be classified into (1) Declaratory remedies, are those whose main object is to declare, confirm and establish the right, title, property or estate of the suit or (plaintiff) whether it be equitable or legal. (2) Restorative remedies, are those by which the plaintiff is restored to the full enjoyment of the right, title, property or estate to which he is entitled, but which use and enjoyment have been hindered, interfered with, prevented or withheld by the wrong-doer.

24. They are often granted in combination with other kinds of relief such as cancellation of instruments or remove a legal obstacle to the full enjoyment of plaintiff's right and to render them efficient in restoring hilt' to that enjoyment. The mandatory injunction belongs to this class of restoratory remedies. (3) Preventive remedies, are those by which the violation of a primary right is prevented before the apprehended injury is done, or by which further violation is prevented after the partial infliction of injury so that some other relief for the wrong actually done can be granted. The injunction whether final or preliminary belongs to this class. (4) Remedies of specific performance, are those by which the party violating his primary duty is compelled to do the very acts which his duty and the plaintiff's primary right required from him. (5) Remedies of reformation, correction or re-execution are those by means of which a written instrument, contract, deed or other monuments which for some reason or other does not conform to the actual rights and duties of the parties thereto, is. Reformed, corrected or re-executed. (6) Remedies of rescission or cancellation, are those by which an instrument, contract, deed, judgment and even sometimes a legal relation itself subsisting between the parties is, for some cause, set aside, avoided or annulled or rescinded.

(7) Remedies of pecuniary compensation are those in which the relief consists in awarding a sum of money for the damage caused to the plaintiff. (8) The remedy of accounting is analogous to the remedy of compensation, and is generally used in connection with an auxiliary to some forms of it.

25. It has to be a great extent become an equitable remedy though it partakes of the character of a legal remedy.

26. ' The bone of contention or a matter of concern between the parties is related to a simple line of distinction and demarcation between two propositions, one is the conversion of amenity plot into a residential or commercial use or change of use, of an amenity plot to another amenity purpose while another is a claim that an amenity plot has been allotted by an authority to a person as an extra land. In the former, there are number of judgments of the Superior Courts in which the conversion of amenity plot into any other use is held to be unlawful and illegal. In the latter case a clear and convincing evidence is required to be demonstrated that the plot is an amenity plot and this was allotted as an extra land for the personal use of an allottee. Though the plaintiff has claimed that the plot in question is a green plot, but at this stage failed to prove that the plot was ever reserved as green plot. Even the defendant No,1 has taken the same defence not only in the previous round of litigation but in this suit also that the plot was not meant or reserved as green plot or amenity plot. At this stage, it is also not a convincing argument that an extra land was allotted to the defendant No,2 against the payment of consideration for making a green plot with common access to general public. To establish parks, gardens etc. Is the responsibility of the concerned authorities for their members or residents of locality. The plaintiff has failed to prove any violation or infringement of his right. In order to sift grain from the chaff, evidence is necessary where the letter dated 27-11-2006 written by the Secretary of DHA will be weighed vis-a-vis the registered deed of lease, allotment letter of extra land and the registered amending deed dated 29-9-1990.

27. ' Keeping in mind the whys and wherefores, the bottom line of this discussion is that there is nothing on record to show that the plot in question was an amenity/green plot. The plaintiff has failed to make out any prima facie case for injunction. The balance of convenience also does not lie in favour of the plaintiff and at this stage there is also no question of irreparable injury, specially in the circumstances, where the learned Senior Puisne Judge vide his order dated 16-11-2009 has already clarified that in case subject plot is established as green plot, or meant for the green area, the construction if any will be subject to the order of this Court. The anxiety of plaintiff has already been addressed properly and if after acid test of claim through convincing evidence, the plaintiff will be able to prove that the disputed portion of the plot was ever meant for green plot, any construction raised thereon will be subject to the order of this Court. In all conscience, I am not inclined to grant discretionary relief of injunction, the injunction application (C.M.A. No,10349 of 2009) is dismissed with no order as to cost. Since the injunction application has been, dismissed, therefore, the application (C.M.A. No,524 of 2010) filed by the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 has become infructuous and is disposed- of accordingly.

Cited by 27 cases

For educational and research use only — not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.
Disclaimer·Privacy·Terms·Search