' FAISAL ARAB, J.---The disputed questions which need to be decided in this appeal are whether the appellant is to be treated as permanent workman of respondent No, 1 Bank or as work charge employee and whether in 2006 the appellant ceased to be employee of respondent No, 1-Bank and became workman of its subsidiary I e. "Kissaan Support Services (Pvt.) Limited".
2. The case of the appellant is that on 2.9.1996 respondent No, 1 employed him as a peon and after 89 days' his services were dismissed. He was again employed on the same job and again after 89 days his services were terminated. This practice for employing for 89 days and then terminating the service continued for years together on the ground that appellant was a work charge employee. Finally, on 18.4.2006 after about eight (8) years of his service as peon the respondent No, 1 issued an order that the service of the appellant would not be extended further. Then in August, 2006 a letter was issued by "Kissan Support Services (Pvt.) Ltd." which is a subsidiary of the respondent No 1 taking the appellant in its employment but assigning him the same duties at the respondent No, 1-Bank as was the case earlier. Thus, in this manner the appellant continued to work as peon under the management of respondent No, 1 as was the practice since his employment in 1996. The appellant avers that as he continued to work beyond his initial 90 days employment, he by efflux of time become permanent workman of respondent No, 1- Bank, as provided by Orders Nos. 1 and 2(i) of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance No, VI of 1968 and should be treated as such.
3. On the other hand, the case of the respondent No, 1-Bank. Is that as the appellant was employed 'on work charge basis his services were terminated after 89 days and subsequent extension in his job from time to time were also for 89 days hence the appellant cannot claim to be a permanent workman. It is, also the case of respondent No, 1 that in 2006 the appellant took up the employment with Kissan Support Services (Pvt.) Limited and, therefore, he cannot claim to be an employee of respondent No, 1-Bank.
4. In the cross-examination that was held before the Labour Court respondent No l's witness admitted that service of the appellant after expiry of every 89 days were extended for further similar period and this practice continued for several terms of 89 days. It has also come on record that Kissan Support Services (Pvt.) Limited as subsidiary of respondent No, 1-Bank was paying salary of the appellant but the appellant was in fact working under the managerial and administrative control of respondent No, 1-Bank. It was also admitted that the nature of appellant job was of permanent nature. It was also admitted by respondent No, l's witness that Kissan Support Services (Pvt.). Limited has no separate balance sheet , and was being managed and funded by respondent No, 1-Bank.
5. From the above admissions of respondent No, l's witness it is clear that the appellant was initially appointed as peon by respondent No, 1-Bank and then on paper his services ere entrusted to Kissan Support Services (Pvt.) Limited, which is a subsidiary of the respondent No, I Bank. The appellant however, continued to work on his assignment as peon as before under the management and control of respondent No, 1 Bank. Therefore, by efflux of time, the appellant became permanent employee of respondent Na. 1 and continued to, serve respondent No, 1 even after the sham entrustment of his services to Kissan Support Services (Pvt.) Limited which was merely a paper arrangement. All this can neither change the status of the appellant as a permanent workman nor he could be declared to be an employee of Kissan Support Services (Pvt.)
Limited. In this regard reliance was placed by appellant's counsel on the decision of the Supreme Court delivered in the case of Executive Engineer Pak P. W.D. Quetta v. Abdul Aziz and others reported in 1996 SC 610, which is applicable to the facts of this case.
6. Standing Order No, 1(a) to the Industrial and. Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1968 classify workmen as (.i) permanent, (ii) Probationer's,, (iii)- Badlis ( iv) temporary,.
(v) apprentices and (vi) contract worker. Standing Order Nd. 1(b) 'defines' a "permanent workman" to mean a workman. Employed in an industrial or commercial establishment on ajob assignment which is likely to continue beyond nine months and on such job assignment the worker has worked satisfactorily for a period of three months: Thus, where a job assignment in an industrial or commercial establishment is of a nature likely to last beyond nine months and a worker has satisfactorily discharged his duties on such a job for ninety days then he acquires the status of a permanent worker in that establishment. On the other hand the Standing Order No,. 1(e) defines a "temporary workman" to mean such workman who is employed in -an ' industrial dr commercial establishment on a job assignment which is likely to finish within nine months.
7. In the present case it is not the case of the respondent No, 1-Bank that the job which was assigned to the appellant was of temporary nature and lasted for less than nine months only. In fact-in the evidence it has undisputedly come on-record that for years together the appellant worked on his job as peon on monthly salary basis. Hence the job that was assigned to the appellant admittedly, continued for years together i.e, well beyond the requisite minimum nine months as provided in Standing Order No 1(b) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. In such circumstances it matters not if the appellant at the time of his employment and thereafter was being continuously described as a "work charge employee". He upon completion of initial 90 days on the Job that was assigned: to him continued to work on monthly salary basis on an assignment which was of a permanent nature i.e, continued for more than nine months and in terms of the definition of "permanent workman" he became a permanent workman' of the respondent No, 1- Bank. Therefore, labelling the appellant as a "work charge employee" is Of no legal consequence.
He became entitled to all the protection to which a permanent workman of an industrial or commercial establishment is entitled under the law. The Labour Appellate Court clearly erred on this aspect of the legal position.
8. Thus, the Labour Court was completely in error in holding that the appellant's service was absorbed in Kissan Support Services (Pvt.) Ltd. When admittedly this Kissan Support Services did not had a, separate identity from the respondent No, 1's Bank. In fact Kissan Support Services was launched by the bank itself, and the entrustment of the appellant's services to the said company was merely a Raper arrangement. The appellant for all intents and purposes continued to work under the Management and Control of respondent No, I even after August, 2006 when purportedly the services of the appellant were entrusted to Kissan Support Services Ltd. Therefore, it cannot be said that the services of the appellant were lawfully terminated upon his absorption in Kissan issan Support Services. For all intents and purposes the appellant is to be treated in continuous employment of respondent No, 1-bank. The impugned order dated 28.11.2007 - passed by the Labour Court No, 6 Hyderabad, in Appeal No, 251 of 2006 is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
' Vide 'short order, dated 5.12.2Q08 this labour appeal was allowed. The above are the reasons for the same.