1. ' This order will dispose of Suit No, 307/74 filed by the plaintiffs M/s. Gul Ahmad Textile Mills Limited against the defendants M/s. Starko Limited as well as J. Misc. No, 34/1974 filed by M/s. Starko Limited. For the sake of convenience I will refer the plaintiffs in Suit No, 307/1974 and respondent in J.
2. Misc. No, 34/1974 as "Gul Ahmad" while the defendants in Suit No, 307/1974 and the applicants in J.
3. Misc No, 34/1974 will be described as `-Starko" only. Suit No, 307/1974 is filed by Gul Ahmad for confirmation of an award given by the two arbitrators appointed under Bye-Law 39-1 I of Karachi Cotton Association for the sake of brevity I will hereinafter refer the Karachi Cotton Association as (*"KCA" only) in respect of dispute which had arisen between the parties as a result of alleged non- supply of 2000 bales of cotton full pressed NISG agreed to be sold to Gul Ahmed by Starko at Rs,
270. Per maund on 19th September, 1973. The contract was admittedly a Factory selection contract and the transaction was entered into by the parties through a common broker M/s Seemco. The arbitrators have awarded a sum of Rs, 3,68,000 to Gul Ahmed as damages being the difference between the contract price and the spot rate of the 2000 bales of cotton on the date of breach. The contract which is evidenced by the Sale Note of common broker is dated 19th September, 1973 and at that time only Gul A hmad was the member of KCA and Starko became a member of KCA on 28th February 1974. . On 24th April, 1974 Gul Ahmed invoked the arbitration clause in accordance with the Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA alleging breach on the part of Starko by sending a letter to the Secretary of KCA. It appears that as the subject contract was not registered with the KCA, the Secretary, KCA on 7th May, 1974 wrote back to Gul Ahmed enquiring from it if the contract was registered with KCA. On the same day, Gul Ahmed, applied to KCA by its letter dated 7th May, 1974, for registration of the disputed contract and the endorsement made on the face of the Broker's Sale note dated 19th September 1973 shows that it was registered as a Factory Selection Contract with the KCA on 8th May 1974 under No, F/S 9/73-74, dated 8th May 1974 after realising a sum of Rs, 50 as the fee for its registration. The KCA thereafter appointed two arbitrators in the case on 10th May 1974 in accordance with Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA on 14th May, 1974 the arbitrators sent notices to the parties for appearance before them and fixed that date as 18th May, 1974. On 16th May, 1974 the defendants sent a request for adjournment to the arbitrators whereupon the matter was adjourned to 21st May.
4. 1974. On 21st May 1974 again a joint request was made by the parties to the arbitrators for adjournment on the ground that they were negotiating for a settlement. The arbitrators, therefore, adjourned the hearing to 27th May, 1974. On 27th May, 1974 the parties reported their failure to reach the settlement in the case to the arbitrators whereupon the parties were called upon to state their respective cases. Gul Ahmed filed their claim and copy thereof was given to Starko. The arbitrators considered the claim of Gul Ahmed and asked Starko to file their written reply with supporting evidence on the next date. The arbitrators also decided to call representative of M/s. Seemco who had acted as common broker on the next date which was fixed by the arbitrators as 30th May, 1974. On 30th May, 1974 Starko filed their written statement in reply to the claim of the plaintiffs before the arbitrators and raised number of preliminary objections which related to absence of an agreement of arbitration between the parties : Starko not being a member of KCA on the date of contract ; absence of registration of the contract and execution thereof in the prescribed form in accordance with the Bye-laws of KCA and lack of authority in the arbitrators to adjudicate in the dispute as their appointment was not in accordance with the Bye-Laws of the Society. On merits `Starko' mainly contended that no default was committed by it and it was Gui Ahmed who had defaulted in lifting the bales of cotton with the result Starko suffered losses to the extent of Rs, 3,28,900. The arbitrator did not agree with the preliminary objections raised by Starko and heard the evidence and gave their award on 1st June, 1974. Starko has challenged the above award in J. Misc. No, 34/1974 and Suit No, 307/74 and have filed objections against it under section 30 as well as 33 of the Arbitration Act, praying that the award be Set aside.
2. I have heard Mr. Nizam Ahmed, the learned counsel for Gul Ahmed and Mr. Syed Ishtiaq Ali, the learned counsel for Starko in the above cases. Mr. S. Ishtiaq Ali the learned counsel for Starko has raised the following contentions before me in support of the prayer setting aside the Award :-
(a) That there being no contract executed between the parties as contemplated under the Bye- Laws of KCA, there was no written agreement between the parties to refer the dispute to arbitration and as such the appointment of the arbitrators under Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA was incompetent and illegal.
(h) That the broker's sale note could not be treated as a Factory Selection Contract and as such reference to arbitration under Bye-Law 39-11 was incompetent.
(c) That registration of the contract with the KCA was a condition precedent for making a reference to the arbitration of the dispute under Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA and there being no registration of contract on the date Gul Ahmed invoked the arbitration under Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA, the proceedings before the arbitrators were incompetent.
(d) That Gul Ahmed having alleged a settlement in the dispute, the original contract, if any, stood substituted by the settlement and as such the arbitrators had no jurisdiction in the matter and matter could only proceed on the basis of the alleged settlement and not on the original contract ; and
(e) That the award of damages by the arbitrators is based on no evidence.
3. I propose to deal with the first three contentions of the learned counsel for Starko together as they relate to the interpretation of Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA vis-a-vis the validity of contract and competency of the reference to the arbitrators thereunder and can be conveniently dealt with together. In support of his contentions the learned counsel has referred Bye-Law ,157 of KCA which define the Factory Selection Contract as follows "157. Factory Selection Contract will be a Delivery Contract Transferable/Non-Transferable."
5. ' Delivery Contract is further defined in Bye-Law No. 1 (14) as under: "(14) 'Delivery Contracts' means "Forward Contracts' other than Hedge Contracts, 'Factory Selection Contract' means a contract specified as such."
6. It is contended by the learned counsel that in view of the definition of a Factory Selection Contract, it is required to be drawn up on the official form given in the appendix to the Bye-Law 77. It is accordingly contended by the learned counsel that contract in the present case was admittedly not in the form prescribed in the appendix to the Bye-Laws of KCA but was in the form of a Sale note prepared by the common broker of the parties and therefore, there existed no binding Factory Selection Contract between the parties and as such there was no agreement between the parties to refer the matter to arbitration in accordance with Bye-Law 39-11 in the event of a dispute arising between them. In support of his contention that the contract not being on the prescribed form could not be acted upon and consequently no reference to arbitrators under Bye-Law 39-11 could be made, the learned counsel has relied upon the cases of Varadum Shetty Jamballana v. Mls.
7. Narshi Mulji & Co. (1) and- Babu Bhai Transukhlal v. Madhavji & Co. (2). In the last referred case it was found by the Court on interpretation of Bye-Laws 38 and 81 of East India Cotton Association that the contracts not made in accordance with Bye-Law 81 were void under section 3 of the Bombay Cotton Contract Act XIV of 1922 and as such reference to arbitrators under the Rules of Association was found to be without jurisdiction. It will thus be seen that in the above case the requirement of a contract being in the prescribed form was found to be a statutory requirement and non-compliance thereof made the contract void, under section 5 of the Bombay Cotton Contract Act, 1922 which provided that contracts made in contravention of any Bye-law were void.
8. No such situation prevails here, as requirement of the Factory Selection Contract being in a particular form is neither a statutory requirement nor such a contract is rendered void by force of any statute if it is not made in the prescribed form. Similarly in Varadum Shetty's case the Court found that the transactions were made between the parties by telegram and telephone calls and that. No contracts in connection with these were embodied in any document in accordance with any form prescribed under the Bombay Oil Seed Exchange and accordingly it was held that in cases of a contract made on the prescribed form the reference to arbitrator is implied by conduct of the party namely signing of the particular forms but no such implication could arise where the contract is not made on the prescribed form. This case is also quite distinguishable as in the present case though the Sale note of broker is not on the prescribed form but it specifically made the contract subject to rules., regulations and Bye-laws of KCA. The learned counsel for Starko attempted to draw a parallel between rule 81 of East India Cotton Association referred to in Babu Habil's case and Bye-Law 77 of KCA. No comparison can be drawn between the two. The rules of East India Cotton Association, were found by the Court in Babu Habil's case as statutory rules having reference to Bombay Cotton Contract Act, 1922 and non-compliance of the rules rendered a contract void under the provision of Bombay Cotton Contract Act, 1922 The Bye-Laws of KCA do not bear reference to any statutory provision of law and non-compliance thereof do not render any contract void or unenforceable either under any of its Bye-Laws or any Statute. The relevant part of Bye-Law 77 relied upon by the learned counsel is in the following terms :- "77. Delivery contracts between members shall be made on the official form given in the appendix.
9. Hedge Contracts between members may be verbal or in writing and when in writing shall be in one or other of the forms given in the Appendix. Whether verbal or written, all contracts shall be subject to the Bye-laws provided that, in case of Delivery Contracts, Bye-Laws 142 and 141 inclusive shall not apply. Every Forward Contract in units of 50 bales shall be registered with the Association and every buyer and seller of each unit of 50 bales shall pay to the Association 20 paisas for each unit of 50 .Bales bought or sold. Every buyer and seller shall at the same tithe. Pay 20 ''paisa for each unit of 50 bales bought or sold direct to other Karachi Cotton Association Dispensary as contribution or `Lags'. If any person, whether buyer or seller, fails to pay this
(1) A I F 1956 Boni. 720 (2) AIR 1931 Born- 343 "laga" to the Karachi Cotton Association Dispensary, he shall be liable to be debarred by the Association from making any hedge contract with the members.
10. The above Bye-law in its nature appears, to me only directory and as such its non-compliance could not render any contract as void unless such an effect is produced by the same Bye-Law or by some other Bye-law or rule of KCA or by some provision in any statute. If a contract contains all material terms so as to qualify it to be treated as a contract of a particular class or description under some of the rule or Bye-Law of KCA the mere fact that the contract is required under some other Bye-law of KCA to be made in a particular form will not necessarily make the contract void or unenforceable subject of course to what is stated above that if any rule or Bye-law or a statutory provisions rendered it void for such non-compliance then the position could be different. In the present case the non-compliance of Bye-Law 77 pointed out by the learned counsel for Starko, further losses its significance as Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA also contemplates registration of a Factory Selection Contract which may not be in the prescribed form but contains mutually agreed terms and conditions between the parties. I may additionally mention here that the form prescribed for a Factory Selection Contract under Bye-Law 77, is applicable only where the contract is made between members in terms of the said rule. It is the case of Starko that on the date the contract was made, they were not the member of KCA. For this reason also, the non-execution of the contract in the form prescribed under Bye-Law 77 cannot be objected to by Starko. The relevant part of Bye-Law 39-II of .KCA is as follows :- "All disputes arising out of Factory Selection Contracts and other forward contracts registered with Association shall be referred to the arbitration of two disinterested arbitrators drawn by ballot, one from the seller's panel and the other from the buyer's panel of arbitrators as appointed by the Board, by the Secretary of the Karachi Cotton Association Ltd. In the event of the arbitrators or any of them resigning either before or after taking up the reference for any reason whatsoever, a fresh ballot shall be drawn for the appointment of another arbitrator or arbitrators as the case may be from the remaining members of the Panel in the same manner in which the original arbitrator and/or arbitrators were appointed and the appointment so made shall be as effectual as though originally made. The Association shall also register any factory selection contract entered into between members and/or member and non-members on any mutually agreed terms and conditions between the parties and any dispute arising out of such contracts shall be governed under Bye-Law 39-I."
11. ' Mr. Nizam Ahmad, the learned counsel for Gul Ahmad invited my attention to the case of the 'Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir v. Standard Oil & Ice Mills' (1). In the above-cited case, like the present case, the contract was not drawn in the form prescribed for a factory selection contract under the Bye-law of KCA. The learned Single Judge {{FOOT NOTE}}
(I) PLD 1973 Kar. 409 {{FOOT NOTE}} while dealing with the objection as to the form of contract held at page 411 of the report as follows : ----"5. As regards the second point, Mr. Ramchandani's contention is that the factory selection contract is defined in Bye-Law 2 (14) of the Karachi Cotton Association. Under the Bye-Law the definition is that a factory selection contract is one which is described as factory selection contract. This definition itself does not give any assistance. It is doubtful that it is the intention of the Bye-law that the words 'factory selection contract' should be endorsed in the title of the contract. I think the Bye-law's intention is to see whether the terms of the contract show if it is a factory selection contract or a contract of any other nature contemplated by the Bye-laws by the Karachi Cotton Association. Now, the essential ingredient of a factory selection contract is that selection of the cotton is made by buyer at the seller's factory. This ingredient is present in all the three contracts.
12. ' I am in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in the above case. I will now consider whether the Sale note of common broker `Seemco' dated 19th September 1973 contained essential ingredients of a contract to be treated as factory Selection Contract under Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA, and if so whether resort could be had by any of the party to this contract for arbitration under Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA in event of its breach. The authority of the common broker to record the transaction on behalf of both the parties is not disputed before me. The sale note of the broker is as follows :-- M/s Self. "SEEMCO COTTON BROKER We confirm having this day done by the following transaction through you on behalf of or clients in accordance with the Rules, Regulations as Bye-Laws of KCA Ltd.
13. Quty. Quality Station Rate Delivery Buyer Amount Receiver Gul Ahmed Starke 2000 NTSG Tando Rs, 270 From Tex Mills Ltd.
14. B/C Jam fixed 5th Oct. rate 1973 Ltd.
15. ' Delivery from 5th October, Factory Selection and weighment at Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd. Landhi Karachi. Payment at Karachi.
16. Sd/- (Sd.)
17. Buyers Brokers Signature Sellers Broker/Signature."
18. ' A perusal of the above Sale note of broker will show that it contains all the material and essential ingredients of a factory Selection Contract, It contains the names of buyer and seller and station and above all is described as Factory Selection and shows the place of weighment and payment of price. The transaction recorded in the Sale note is stated to be subject to the rules, regulations and Bye-laws of KCA Ltd. This Sale note was registered by KCA as a Factory Selection Contract. On 8th May, 1974, without raising any objection as to its form. I fail to see bow in these circumstances any exception can be taken to the above Sale note being treated 4s Factory Selection Contract and its registration as such under Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA It now remains to be considered whether this contract amounted to an agreement to refer the future dispute arbitration.
19. ' The learned counsel for Starko contended the parties never signed this contract and therefore, no valid agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration came into existence. The document namely, the Sale note is in writing and makes specific reference to the Bye-Laws of the KCA It is not disputed that under Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA if the contract was a Factory Selection Contract, reference to arbitration in the manner done in the present case was permissible in the event of dispute between the parties with regard to the contract. It is not at all necessary that in order to constitute a valid arbitration agreement it must be signed by the parties. It is sufficient if the agreement is reduced into writing and if such writing contains reference to some other document such as the Bye-laws or rules or regulations of any association under which a reference to arbitration is contemplated in the event of a dispute between the parties, then a valid arbitration agreement comes into existence and resort can be validly made to such arbitration agreement. In my view, therefore, the entry in the Sale note that the transaction was subject to the rules, regulations and Bye-Laws of KCA constituted and arbitration agreement under Bye-Law 39.11 of KCA and in the event of a breach, resort could be had by the parties to arbitration proceeding in accordance with this rule.
4. Coming now to the contention of the learned counsel for Starko that registration of the contract with KCA was a condition precedent for invoking the arbitration clause contained in Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA 1 may say that although application for appointment of arbitrators under Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA was made by Gul Ahmed at the time when the contract was not registered with the KCA but no action was taken on it by KCA until the contract was registered in accordance with provision of Bye-Law 39-11. The application for appointment of arbitrators under Bye-Law 39-11 was made by Gul Ahmed on 7th May.
20. 1974. The Secretary, Karachi Cotton Association, wrote back to Gul Ahmed to confirm if the disputed contract was registered under the Bye-laws of KCA. On the same date, Gul Ahmed approached KCA for registration of the contract which was done on 9th May, 1974. The arbitrators were appointed by the Secretary, KCA, thereafter in accordance with Bye-Law 39-11 on 10th May.
21. 1974. It will thus be seen that on the date the appointment of arbitrators took place under Bye-Law 39-11, the contract was duly registered with KCA. This in my view, was substantial compliance of Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA in so far it related to registration of contract. I, therefore find no substance in the submission of learned counsel that absence of registration of contract on the date of rnaking of application for appointment of arbitrators vitiated the arbitration proceedings. The above discussion disposes the first three contention.. Of Starko and I held that Sale note of Common Broker dated 19th September, 1973 was rightly treated and registered as a Factory Selection Contract under Bye-Law 39-11 of KCA and a valid reference to arbitrators was made under this Bye-law.
5. It is next contended by the learned counsel for Starko that Gul Ahmed had alleged a settlement and therefore, the original contract was substituted by the subsequent settlement. I have gone through the record of correspondence between the parties including the alleged settlement produced before the arbitrators. It appears that when Starko failed to supply cotton, Gul Ahmed closed the contract and a settlement was drawn by the Common Broker 'Seemco' on 17th October, 1973 settling the price at Rs, 310 per maund. A debit note for Rs, 3,68,000 was accordingly invoiced back Gul Ahmed to Starko for difference of the price of 2000 bales of cotton between the contract rate and the spot rate on the date of closing of contract. This appears to be quite in accord with Bye-Law 161 (C) of KCA. The learned counsel for Starko urged that the Sale note did not mention the-last date of delivery of cotton which could be treated as the due date. This may be so, but no objection was taken by Stark when the contract was closed by the common broker on 17th October, 1973 and Starko was invoiced ba.Ck on the basis of spot rate prevailing on the da to of closing of contract and the contract rate. This objection also appears to have not been pressed before the arbitrators. 1, therefore cannot allow it to be raised now. Starko denied the above settlement alleged by Gul Ahmed in the subsequent correspondence which took place between the parties. In these circumstances it is quite obvious that no settlement between the parties came into existence which could replace the original contract between them. It was at best in the nature of a claim made by Gul Ahmed against Starko on the allegation that Starko had agreed to repurchase the contracted quantity of cotton at Rs, 310 per maund which could not amount to a new contract.
22. Even if it be assumed that this demand by Gul Ahmed amounted to assertion of a settlement it was under the original contract and could not be in substitution of it. Therefore, if any breach was.
23. Subsequently alleged in respect of this settlement it could be resolved under the terms of original contract between the parties. The later alleged settlement was undoubtedly in addition to the original contract and both could stand together. Ishtiaq Ali, the learned counsel for Starko relied upon the case of Maganlal Jhanwar v. M. R. Khan & Co. (1), in support of his contention that in case of a settlement the original contract got substituted by the new settlement. The case cited by the learned counsel is not of much assistance in the present case as in that case the parties after entering into the agreement which contained an arbitration clause, agreed to accept settlement of difference which arose under the original agreement on the decision of a third party and the decision given by the third party was accepted and acted upon by them. The Court in these circumstances in that case refused to stay the suit brought by one of the parties on the basis of the settlement. The learned counsel for Starko also relied upon the case of Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works Ltd. v. General Iron & Steel Works (2) in support of his above contention, but this case is of no assistance to the learned counsel. On the contrary the rule laid down in this case is against the proposition canvassed by the learned counsel before me. At page 503 of the report in this case the learned Judge while repelling a similar contention of the counsel held that in spite of modification and novation of contract by the parties, the arbitration clause in original agreement survived Maganal's case was also referred in 'Abe case but was distinguished. The learned counsel for Gul Ahmed on the other hand referred to the case of Uttam Chand Saligram v. Mahmoo4 Jewa
(3) in which in similar circumstances a later settlement was held to be in addition to the original contract and both the original contract and the later settlement was found to stand together. 1 am in agreements {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1968 Dacca 361 (2) PLD 1971 Kar. 501 (3) AIR 1920 Cal. 143 {{FOOT NOTE}} with the view expressed in the above Calcutta case. I accordingly hold that the alleged settlement, pressed by Gul Ahmed before the arbitration was only in the nature of a claim under the original contract and this alleged settlement did not get substituted in place of the original contract C and as such the proceedings for arbitration started under the original contract on the breach of this alleged settlement were competent.
24. ' It was lastly contended by the learned counsel for Starko that the arbitrators in awarding the damages mainly relied upon the settlement alleged by Gui Ahmed and did not hear any other evidence, I have seen the record of proceedings before arbitrators dated 30th May, 1974. The arbitrators heard the evidence practiced by the parties and also examined the Common broker on that date. IL.' proceedings recorded by arbitrators on 30th May, 1974, correctness whereof not challenged before me, is as follows : - "(1) The authorised Representative of Messrs Starko limited submitted to the Arbitrators his written statement. The authorised representative was then cross-examined by Arbitrators in the light of written statement submitted by him.
(2) It was explained to him that Arbitrators were appointed strictly according to the Bye-Laws of Karachi Cotton Association Ltd. And were fully competent to deal with this case. Any allegation about their partiality was unfounded.
(3) It was also explained to the authorised Representative of M/s. Starko Limited that even since the Arbitrators were appointed under Karachi Cotton Association letter dated 10th May, 1974 under Bye-Law 39-11 he has been willingly participating in all its meetings held on 18th May, 1974, 21st May, 1974 and 27th May, 1974 and it was therefore an accepted fact by him too that the Arbitrators were fully competent to conduct this Arbitration.
(4) Referring to para. 10 of written statement of M/s. Starko Limited, Arbitrators enquired from the authorised Representative, how the plaintiffs were informed about taking delivery which was to commence from 5th October 1973. The authorised Representative said that they informed plaintiffs through their brokers, M/s. Simco. The authorised Representative also maintained that plaintiff's man who came to take delivery on 2nd October, 1973 objected to quality. He also maintained that after 517 days, defendants contacted plaintiffs again through their brokers, M/s Simco, asking them to take delivery, but again quality was not approved. It was also stated by the authorised Representative of M/s- Starko Ltd. That on 14th October, 1973 plaintiff's, man visited again, but walked away without saying anything and this information was conveyed to defendants by their own selector.
25. ' The authorised Representative of Messrs Starko Ltd. Also deposed that all contracts that were made with plaintiffs were through their brokers M/s. Simco and not direct and there was nothing in writing too.
(5) Referring to para. 11 of the written statement of Mis. Starko Ltd. Their authorised representative maintained that he did not receive any Settlement Memo from Simco. According to him, there was no settlement. When confronted with Settlement Memo dated 17th October, 1973, taken out by M/s. Simco, he maintained that this has been done by the brokers on their own, without Starko's authority or knowledge.
(6) As directed by the Arbitrators Mr. Abdul Rashid, Accountant, under Abdul Sattar representing M/s. Simco Brokers appeared before the Arbitrators.
26. ' Mr. Abdul Rashid confirmed that their purchase confirmation dated 19th September 1973 was taken out by them and this business was done at the instance of both the plaintiffs and the defendants, and that the Purchase Memo, taken out by M/s. Simco was made out by Mr. Abdul Rashid himself in his own handwriting.
27. ' Mr. Abdul Rashid also confirmed that the Settlement Confirmation dated 17th October, 1973 was also taken out by them after both plaintiffs and defendants mutually agreed to this settlement, and that this settlement Confirmation vizi also made out of Mr. Abdul Rashid himself in his own handwriting. When asked whether they have any documentary evidence that, this memo. Has been delivered both to plaintiffs and Defendants, Mr. Abdul Rashid maintained that their normal practice is that all purchases. Sales, settlement, confirmations etc., are delivered personally by their Representative to the parties concerned and no receipt is taken. He also contract, confirmation dated 19th September 1973 was also not signed by plaintiffs and defendants and at the same time no receipt was taken for the delivery of the said confirmation, but both plaintiffs and defendants are accepting the purchase as per confirmation of 19th September) 1973,"
28. ' Looking to the proceedings of arbitrators held on 30th May, 1974 it cannot be argued that the arbitrators awarded the damages without any evidence. It is quite different thing to say that the evidence was not sufficient before the arbitrators to award the damages or that the basis for awarding damages adopted by the arbitrators was not correct but this cannot make the award as one without evidence. The record of the proceedings clearly shows that the arbitrators based their award after hearing oral evidence as we as after consideration of the material produced before them. Whether the evidence produced before them was sufficient or not or that the basis adopted for awarding the damages was not correct is not open to be questioned in these proceedings, It is not disputed that the arbitrators being the domestic tribunals are not bound by the technical rules of procedure and strict compliance of Evidence Act. The award is non-speaking and no error is discoverable on the face of award. No other point was urged.
29. ' In the result the objections to the award under sections 30 and 33 of Arbitration Act filed by Starko are rejected and the Award is made the rule of the Court. Suit No, 307/74 is accordingly decreed and J. Misc. No, 34/74 is dismissed with costs.