'RAJA MUHAMMAD SHAFQAT KHAN ABBASI, J.---The petitioners, namely, Rana Muhammad Boota and Barkat Ali son of Jalal Din, by filing this civil revision under section 115, C.P.C. Have called in question the judgment and decree dated 23-12-2008 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ferozewala, District Sheikhupura, whereby he dismissed their appeal confirming the order dated 19-5-2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge 1st Class, Jhang, whereby he while accepting the application under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. Moved by Muhammad Amir, respondent/defendant dismissed the civil suit for possession through preemption filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs.
2. Precisely the facts giving rise to this revision petition are that a parcel of land measuring 1 kanal, 18 marlas falling in Khewat No,67, Khatoni No,456, square No,66, Killa No,18, situate at village Budhane, Tehsil Muridke, district Sheikhpura had been purchased by Muhammad Younas son of Muhammad Shafi for a consideration of Rs,8,00,000 vide mutation No,925, dated 27-1-2004, who later on sold the said piece of land to the respondent/defendant through oral mutation No,1123, dated 28-4-2006 for a consideration of Rs,8,00,000 the petitioners/plaintiffs on coming to know of the said sale on 12-8-2006 at 4/5 p.m. Through Syed Nazir Shah son of Syed Ulfat Shah, Irshad son of Inayat and Inayat Ali son of Muhammad Din, immediately pronounced' their right of pre-emption on the ground that they are co-owners; the respondent/defendant while contesting the suit filed an application under Order VII, rule 11 C.P.C. Seeking dismissal of the suit on the ground they by concealing the facts A with mala fide intention about valuation of the property only deposited Zar- e-Soem Rs,2,66,667 in the Bank instead of Rs,5,00,000 because actually price of disputed land was Rs,15,00,000; that the Zar-e-Soem was to be deposited within 30 days of the institution of the suit and no Court can extend the time, as prescribed in B section 24(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and that the suit is barred by limitation, as such, merits dismissal; the petitioners/plaintiffs contested the said application by filing a reply thereto; the learned Civil Judge 1st Class, Ferozewala, vide order dated 19-5-2008 proceeded to accept the said application and rejected the plaint of the petitioners/plaintiffs under Order VII rule 11 C.P.C.; being aggrieved c of the said order, the petitioners/plaintiffs preferred appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Ferozewala, which was also dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 23-12-2008. Hence, the instant revision petition.
3. This petition came up for hearing on 6-4-2009, when pre-admission notice was issued to the respondent for today.
' Service upon him was ordered to be effected through ordinary course as well as T.C.S. At the expense of the petitioners, but they failed to deposit the expenses, due to which notice could not be issued to the respondent. In this situation, I proceed to decide this revision petition today on merits.
4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Courts below were not justified to reject the plaint of the petitioners under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C.; that both the Courts below were wrong in holding that the petitioners have given the price of land as Rs,8,00,000 malafidely, whereas the actual price thereof was Rs,15,00,000 that the controversy involved relates to questions of facts, which cannot be resolved without recording of evidence, therefore, the Courts below have erred in law in ousting the petitioners on the preliminary objections.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at considerable length and have also gone through the order passed by the learned Civil Judge as well as the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge.
6. The Courts below have non-suited the petitioners solely on the ground that they had not deposited the Zar-e-Soem as required under section 24(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The question involved herein is that whether provisions of section 24 (ibid) are directory or mandatory in nature. This issue came into discussion in the case of Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Raqib (PLD 1974 SC 134), wherein the Honourable Apex Court proceeded to observe as under:- "As a general rule, however, a statute is understood to be directory when it contains matter merely of direction, but not when those directions are followed up by an express provision that, in default of following them, the facts shall be null and void. To put it differently, if the Act is directory, its disobedience does not entail any invalidity; if the Act is mandatory disobedience entails serious legal consequences amount to the invalidity of the act done in disobedience to the provision.
Viewed in this light, and keeping in mind the fact that the provisions in question are embodied in a statute dealing with a right which has been described as predatory or practical in nature, it would appear that the requirement enjoined by subsections (1) and (4) of section 23 of the Act is mandatory in nature as failure to comply with the same is to be visited by the penal consequence of the rejection of the plaint once it came to the conclusion that the directions of the trial Court in regard to the furnishing of security had not been complied with within the period specified."
'Similar was the position in the case of Haji Abdul Qadir v. Zafar Shaheen (PLD 1997 Lah. 549), wherein it was held that "a statute is a directory when its provisions need not to be complied with meticulousness and their substantial compliance is enough while mandatory statute or its provisions is whose noncompliance renders the act invalid. This distinction was highlighted in early case of Hurford v. Omaha 4 Neb.
336. It is instructive to quote the relevant provisions of this judgment:-- "If the provisions involved relates to some immaterial matter, where compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or directs certain actions with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of public business, the provisions may be regarded as directory, but where it directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way and indicates that a compliance with such provisions is essential to the validity of the act or proceedings, or requires some antecedent and prerequisite conditions to exist prior to the exercise of the power, or be performed before certain other powers can be exercised, the statute may be regarded as mandatory."
Deposit of 1/3rd of sale price of the property has to be deposited upto 30 days of the filing of the suit and not beyond that and the amount has to be determined through a process of approximation resulting in the probable value if there is nothing mentioned in the sale-deed or the mutation. In this view of the matter, the period has been prescribed by the statute, which was mandatory. Trial Court would have no jurisdiction to extend the time. Reliance can profitably be made to the cases of Awal Noor v. District Judge, Karak and 8 others (1992 SCMR 746), Ata Muhammad Qureshi v. The Statement Commissioner, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1971 SC 61), Jamshed Ali and 2 others v. Ghulam Hassan (1995 CLC 957), and Mst. Wafa Jan v. Mehram Zad (1995 CLC 2202).
7. It is settled principle of law that when law required a particular thing is to be done in a manner, it has to be done in that manner. In the present case, the petitioner moved an application through D.D.O.(R) on 15-8-2006, wherein it was requested that sale of the disputed land has been effected for Rs,15,00,000 but the concerned Patwari has not provided them a certified copy of the mutation.
The petitioners filed another application before the revenue authorities on 18-8-2006, in which sale consideration was mentioned as Rs,8,00,000 but the price of the land has been shown as Rs,15,00,000 fictitiously. These applications indicate that it was in the knowledge of the petitioners that price of the land has been fixed as Rs,15,00,000. In this view of the matter, the Courts below have rightly held that the petitioners had misled the trial Court with a mala fide intention fixed lesser Zar-e-Soem considering the price of land as Rs,8,00,000. In view of this situation, the plea of the petitioners that they were not inI the knowledge of the price of sale does not carry any weight.
They were aware of the date and number of mutation as mentioned in the plaint. They themselves undervalued the plaint. The trial Court was not authorized to extend the limit of 30 days of deposit of Zar-e-Some. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any illegality or perversity of reasoning or jurisdictional error in the impugned order/judgment and decree of the Courts below calling for interference this Court in its revisional jurisdiction.
8. Resultantly, this revision petition being meritless is dismissed in limine.