' M. JAVED BUTTAR, J.---These appeals, by leave of the Court, are directed against judgment dated 27-9-2006, passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, whereby Writ Petitions Nos.2055 and 2056 of 2006 of the appellants were dismissed.
2. The respondent Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. In order to develop Tando Allahyar Natural Gas Development Project of setting up of surface and gas process facilities in addition to the Kunar L.P.G. Plant invited as many as 9 Companies including the Appellant No,2 to participate in the tender for Design, Engineering, Procurement (Supply), Construction, Installation/Erection, Pre- commissioning startup and Commissioning of Project (hereinafter called as the T.A.Y. Project). By letter dated 21-11-2005, the respondent asked the appellant No,2 i,e, Petrosin Engineering (Pvt.)
Limited to collect the lump sum turnkey tender document for the T.A.Y project. The Petrosin Consortium of the appellants was one of the three consortiums of Companies, bidding for the contract. The other two being Messrs C.P.E.C.C. Consortium and Messrs O.P.D.I.L Consortium. They submitted their technical and commercial bids. After examination and evaluation of the technical bids, the respondent by letter dated 7-3-2006, called upon the appellants to ensure the presence of their representative at the time of opening of commercial bids on 8-3-2006. The Board of Directors of the respondent in its 74th meeting held on 14-4-2006, decided to approve the T.A.Y.
Project as recommended by the management, followed by letter dated 19-4-2005 of intent to award the contract at a cost of $ 38,499,408.00. The appellants were further called upon to submit performance bond in the sum equivalent to 10% of the contract price by way of a Bank guarantee, as required by clause 9.5 of the I.T.B. The performance guarantee dated 19-4-2006 was provided for an amount of Rs.325,000,000 being equivalent to 10% of the contract price. However, by letter dated 16-8-2006, the respondent informed the appellants to withdraw T.A.Y. Project and to re- advertise the tender. The performance guarantee and bid bond were returned to them.
3. A somewhat similar was the position of Sinjhoro Project for which the respondent issued, on 19-4- 2006, a Notification of intent to award under clause 9.3 of I.T.B. For award of Contract on lump sum turnkey basis at a cost of $ 61,023,189 and Pak Rs.1,643,183,892. The appellant furnished performance guarantee dated 19-4-2006 for an amount of Pak Rs.531,000,000 equivalent to 10% of the contract price. The respondent, however, informed the appellants vide letter dated 16-8-2006 to withdraw the Sinjhoro Project tender for its re-advertisement. Consequently, the performance guarantee and bid bond were returned to the appellants.
4. The appellants filed Writ Petitions Nos.2055 and 2056 of 2006 calling in question the validity of withdrawal of T.A.Y and Sinjhoro Projects tenders to re-advertise them, which has already stated, were dismissed, by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, vide impugned judgment dated 27-9-2006. Hence these appeals.
5. Mr. Abdul Hafeez Prizada, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Mian Gul Hassan Aurangzeb, Advocate Supreme Court, for the appellants submitted that "the intent to award a contract" by itself was a complete contract enforceable at law and that the same operated as a promissory estoppel against the respondent. It was further argued that the Bank guarantees furnished by the appellants pursuant to the letters of intent would constitute vested right of the appellants to get the contract carried out. It was further submitted that the withdrawal of the letters of intent in both cases was not sustainable on legal and factual grounds and that such withdrawal would be tantamount to revocation of contract for which the respondent was bound to issue a prior notice to the appellants. He maintained that such like contractual rights and obligations could be enforced by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. In support of his submissions, he relied on the case of Ramna Engineering Pipelines v. Sui Gas Pipelines Limited 2004 SCM R 1274; British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland (1984)1 All.E.R. 504; Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Aziz Qureshi PLD 1965 Kar.202; Maj (R) Ahmed Khan Bhatti v. Mst. Masooda Fatima PLD 1981 Kar.398; AIR 1933 P.V.29, Michael Richards Properties Ltd. v. Corporation of Wardens of St.
Saviour's Parish (1975)3 All.E.R. 416, Messrs Hotel Summer Retreat, Nathiagali v. Government of N.- W.F.P. 1999 M LD 2418; Messrs Dadabhoy Investments (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi through Abdull Dadabhoy v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance PLD 1995 Kar.33; Messrs Poddar Steel Corporation v. Messrs Ganesh Engineering Works AIR 1991 SC 1579; British Steel Corp. v.
Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd. (1984)1 All E.R.504; Dresser Rand S.A. v. Messrs Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. AIR 2006 SC 871; Messrs Bagh Construction Company v. Federation of Pakistan 2001 YLR 2791 and City Schools (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Privatization Commission, Government of Pakistan and others 2002 SCM R 1150. He further submitted that the process of determination of the award of contract was flawed because the evaluator Messrs Enar Engineering Consultants were removed on the application of the appellants and that a distinction was to be made between the essential and nonessential conditions to be fulfilled by the contracting parties. It was lastly submitted that the action of the respondent suffered from lack of procedural proprieties, violation of principles of natural justice, failure in duty to act fairly and violation of doctrine of legitimate expectancy on account of furnishing of performance bonds of the amount equivalent to 10% of the contract consideration and that the High Court did not act in consonance with the settled principles of law while dismissing the writ petitions of the appellants.
6. On the other hand, Mr. Wasim Sajjad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in both the cases, concluded contract had not come into existence between the parties. Therefore, the appellants could not claim to have any vested right for the award of the contract. Moreover, the appellants were not the aggrieved persons within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution for invoking writ jurisdiction. A contract was a solemn commitment for which both the parties should agree on all the terms of contract and no party could be forced to enter into a contract. The appellants had sought specific performance of a contract which did not fall within the scope of Article 199 of the Constitution. He further submitted that no writ of mandamus could be issued against the respondents whose commercial activities were not controlled by the Government. Some disputed questions of fact were involved in both the cases for which remedy of writ was not proper. The respondent by withdrawing their letter of intent to award a contract had acted within its rights under the tendering process. The appellants could not claim any right under the statute as it was a case of normal tendering in which the process could not be treated to be without lawful authority. The withdrawal of tender did not require issue of proper notice with reasons. The Board of Directors in its 76th meeting held on 21-6-2006 had taken into consideration that the proceedings of 75th meeting of the Board of Directors of the respondent had held in abeyance for both the projects. It was further submitted that the Enar Engineering Consultants, who were to evaluate the bid were unjustifiably excluded on the so-called ground of conflict of interest. It was through 77th meeting of the Board of Directors of the respondent held on 15-8-2006 that the bidding process was competently and validly annulled by the respondents. He pointed out that the Managing Director of the respondent had relinquished the charge of his office on 19-4-2006 on acceptance of his resignation. He made a reference to the cases of Lahore Cantonment Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Lahore Cantt. v. Dr. Nusrat Ullah Chaudhry PLD 2002 SC 1068; The Chandpur Mills Ltd. v. The District Magistrate, Tippera PLD 1958 SC 267; Messrs Momin Motor Company v. The Regional Transport Authority, Dacca PLD 1962 SC 108; Messrs Padmavathi Constructions v. The A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. AIR 1997 A.P.1; The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd..v. Sipahi Singh and others AIR 1977 SC 2146; State of Gujarat v. Meghji Pethraj Shah (1994)3 S.C.C. 552; Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. Capital Development Authority PLD 2006 SC 394 and Administrative Law by Wade 9th Edition. He contended that a dispute arising out of a general law of contract was not determinable in writ.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the available record. Although no hard and fast rule can be laid down but ordinarily writ jurisdiction is not to be treated to be a substitute for a suit for specific performance of a general contract not governed by the statutory law. Reference may usefully be made to the case of Messrs Airport Support Services v.
The Airport Manager, Quaide-Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCM R 2268. After going through the voluminous record concerning the tenders in both the cases, we are of the opinion that a final contract had not come into existence although certain steps towards the same had been taken by the respondents. The principles of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectancy were not attached in the facts and circumstances of these cases. The mere letters of intent to award the contract in present cases would not constitute a concluded contract. There may be cases in which a contract may involve a number of documents including exchange of correspondence between the parties in the process of finalization of the award of a contract. The principle of natural justice was not attracted in the absence of infringement of any vested rights of the appellants. Reference may usefully be made to the case of Ittehad Cargo Services v. Syed Tasleem Hussain Naqvi PLD 2001 SC 116. Since the bids of the appellants had not been confirmed finally, therefore, the contract could not be said to have been completed. Reference may be made to the cases of Union of India v. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram AIR 1971 SC 2295 and Babu Parvez v.
Settlement Commissioner 1974 SCM R 337. Even the lowest bid would not confer an absolute title for award of a contract. In such like mega projects host of other considerations become relevant to avoid any unnecessary risk. The general letter of intent merely implies an intention to enter into a contract and authority to the contractor to start the work before completion of the contract in anticipation of the signing of the contract with a right to the contractor for compensation of the work, if any, he already done. Therefore, the letter of intent could not be treated to be synonymous to a completed contract. The present ones are not the cases in which bid of any other bidder had been accepted. Rather the respondent had decided quite justifiably to re-advertise the tenders. We leave the question open for consideration in some other appropriate case whether or not a writ could be issued against the respondent Company under Article, 199 of the Constitution. In our opinion, the impugned judgment of the High Court is plainly correct to which no exception can be taken.
8. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in these appeals which are dismissed but with no order as to costs.