1. DORAB PATE, J.-The petitioner No. 2 was allotted 102 kanals and 4 marlas of land (hereinafter called the said land) in Chak No. 14/8BR in Tehsil Khanewal, District Multan, under the Islamabad Oustees Scheme. Mr. Farrukh could not give us the date of this allotment, but he said that on 19-7- 1966, the second petitioner had executed a power of attorney in favour of the -first petitioner and on the same day entered into an agreement to sell to him the land allotted to her for a sum of Rs.
2. 15,000. Further, according to Mr. Farrukh, as the first petitioner had paid the entire sale considera-- tion, the rights and interests of the second petitioner in the said land stood allotted to the first petitioner. However, the said land was within five miles of the outer limit of a Town Committee, therefore, in accord--ance with the instructions issued by the Board of Revenue, the allotment of the said land had to be cancelled. Presumably, because the second petitioner was aware of this situation, she filed an application in January, 1971 for the cancellation of the said land and for the allotment of alternate land in another chak. This application was allowed by the Collector of Multan on 19-1-1971.
3. According to Mr. Farrukh, the allotment of the said land had been cancelled behind the first petitioner's back, therefore, it was illegal and be, therefore, filed an appeal against the Collector's order in which he impleaded the second petitioner as the respondent. This appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner of Multan on 10-5-1971 on two grounds. The first was that the second petitioner, who was present before him, was supporting the plea for the cancellation of the allotment of the said land, and the second was that the first petitioner's claim was hit by section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 (hereinafter called the said Act).
4. The first petitioner, therefore, challenged the Commissioner's order in a revision before the Board of Revenue and in this revision, the second petitioner resiled from the position taken by her before the Collector and the Commissioner and filed an affidavit supporting the first petitioner's claim. She said in this affidavit that "somebody styling himself" as her attorney submitted an application for cancellation of the said land but that this had never been authorised by her. However, the Member Board of Revenue was not impressed by this affidavit, and he agreed with the Commis--sioner's finding that the first petitioner's claim was hit by section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, because he had tried to purchase the said land "without obtaining permission under section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912". As be dismissed the revision by his order dated 3-8-1974, the petitioners filed a joint writ petition in the Lahore High Court against the orders of the Collector, the Commissioner and the Member, Board of Revenue.
5. It would appear that the writ petition was pressed on the ground that the Revenue authorities had erred in holding that the first petitioner's claim was hit by section 19 of the said Act, but without going into this question, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition in limine on the ground that as the first petitioner relied only on an agreement of sale in his favour, he had no locus standi to challenge the cancellation of the allotment of the said land, and as the second petitioner had admittedly not challenged it herself, the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition in limine on 29-8-1974. Hence this petition for leave.
6. Learned counsel submitted that the Revenue authorities bad misread section 19 of` said Act, because the second petitioner's claim was based on an agreement of sale, and an agreement was not a transfer, within the meaning of section 19 of the said Act. But, precisely, because an agreement does not amount to a transfer, it does not confer any interest in the land. On the plain language of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act an agree--ment "does not by itself create any interest in . . . . . Such property." Therefore, no exception can be taken to the view of the- learned Single Judge that first petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the cancellation of the allotment of the said land in the second petitioner's favour.
7. In order to overcome this difficulty, learned counsel stated that as the first petitioner had paid the entire sale consideration, he was entitled to be heard by the Collector and that in any event, as he was the attorney of the second petitioner, he had filed the appeal before the Commissioner in the exercise of his powers as attorney of the second petitioner. The short answer to this argument has been given by the Commissioner in his well --considered order. The Commissioner has referred in his order of 10-5-1971 to the first petitioner's contention that for the rear )ns stated in the appeal, the second petitioner was not legally competent to apply for cancellation of the allotment." The Commissioner has rejected this plea with the observation "The issues before me are simple. The grantee under section 10, C.G.L.A, is Mst. Rahim Jan; resent in Court. She requested for cancellation of this area. Any person holding a power of attorney from her to do so can only have a secondary po3ition. The right of the principal to act is not abrograted by the creation of any attorney." ----As the principal, namely, the second petitioner opposed the first petitioner's appeal before the Commissioner, we see no error whatever in the view taken by the Commissioner. Learned counsel then referred us to the second petitioner's affidavit before the Board of Revenue in which she had stated that "somebody styling himself" as her attorney had applied for the cancellation of the allotment of the said land. But, although she has in this, affidavit denounced the application for cancellation of the allotment of the said land, she has not stated in this affidavit that she did not appear before the Commissioner on 10-5-1971 nor has she stated in that this affidavit that the Commissioner had erroneously stated in his order that she herself had "requested for cancellation of the sale." Clearly, therefore, no reliance can be placed on this affidavit and in the circumstances, the first petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the Collector's order cancelling the allotment of the said land.