1. ' MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J.---Since common questions of law and facts are involved in all the aforesaid petitions i,e,, C.Ps. Nos.S-122 of 2009, S-540 of 2009, 131 of 2009 and 132 of 2009, hence these are being disposed of by common judgment. Throdgh these petitions, the petitioners have challenged order dated 26-11-2009 passed by Xth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi South in Rent Case No,564 of 2002 and judgment dated 12-2-2009 passed by Vth Additional District Judge, Karachi South in F.R.A No,03 of 2006, F.R.A.No,11 of 2006 F.RA.No, 44 of 2006.
2. ' Facts giving rise to the present petitions are summarized as under:-- ' Petitioner (hereinafter called as "PSO") was sitting tenant, running petrol-pump on the piece of land bearing Survey No,36/4, Sheet No,PR-1, measuring 1133 Sq. Yards on thereabouts, situated adjacent to Rimpa Plaza M.A Jinnah Road, Karachi (hereinafter called as "premises") having obtained the same under lease-agreement dated 9-8-1960 by the original landlord. Under the aforesaid lease agreement it was the responsibility of the petitioner to pay all charges for gas, electricity or water consumed in or upon the premises as shown by separate meter or meters thereof and to pay the rent of such meter or meters. It was further agreed that the petitioner/company will pay and discharge all government/municipal dues or other rent cesses, rates, taxes and assessm ent payable in respect of premises from the date of the company taken over possession of the premises. It was further agreed between the parties that petitioner/company will not assign the demise premises or any part thereof without previous consent in writing of landlord. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 purchased aforesaid premises through conveyance-deed dated 29-9-1999. After purchase notice for change of ownership under section 18 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter called as "S.R.P.O.") was served upon the petitioner. Thereafter respondents Nos.1 and 2 requested petitioner to hand over the vacant possession of the premises to them as it was needed by respondents Nos.1 and 2. Since possession was not handed over by the petitioner, respondents Nos.1 and 2 filed rent case being Rent Case No,564 of 2002 before learned Xth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi South on the ground of personal bona fide need, default in payment of water charges, property tax and subletting under Section 15 of the S.R.P.O. After service of the notice petitioner as also respondent No,3, who is dealer of P.S.O., filed their separate written statements. Respondents Nos.1 and 2 examined respondent No,1 as their witness by filing his affidavit-in-evidence, who also brought on record number of documents which were exhibited Ex.No,A/1 to A/13. As against the above, P.S.O.
3. Examined their attorney Faiz Mahmood Khan Durrani as their witness. Respondent No,3/dealer examined himself as his witness.
4. ' After hearing the parties learned Rent Controller framed the following issues:- "1. Whether the applicants are required the demised premises for their personal bona fide use?
2. Whether opponents have committed default in payment of rent, property tax and water charges?
3. Whether the opponent sub-let the portion of demised premises to others without consent or permission to the landlord?
4. What should the order be?"
5. ' Issue No,1 was answered in negative. However issues Nos.1 and 3 were answered in affirmative.
6. Learned Rent Controller directed the petitioner and respondent to vacate the premises and hand over the vacant possession of the premises within thirty days from the date of order.
7. ' Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order of the learned Rent Controller P.S.O. Filed F.R.A.No, 11 of 2006, dealer filed F.R.A.No,03 of 2006 and respondents Nos.1 and 2 feeling themselves aggrieved against the findings of the learned Rent Controller on issue No,1, also filed F.R.A.No,4 of 2006.
8. ' Learned Appellate Court heard the parties and dismissed the F.R.A. No,03 of 2006 filed by petitioner and respondent No,3. However appeal filed by respondents No,1 and 2 against the findings on issue No,1 being F.R.A.No,44 of 2006, was allowed. Through the above petitions the petitioners have assailed the judgment of learned appellate Court as also the order passed by learned Rent Controller.
9. ' Mr. Mohammad Sadiq, learned counsel for petitioner has made the following submissions:-
(1) That need of landlord for seeking ejectment for the purpose of raising construction of high-rise building for selling to others does not come under the provisions of section 2(g) and section 15 (2)
(vii) of S.R.P.O.
(2) That water charges and property tax, that are admittedly not paid by the petitioner to the relevant authority, .But it does not constitute default in payment of rent as the same was not payable to the landlord.
(3) That the alleged sub-letees were not party to the proceedings, hence point of subletting was not proved.
(4) That the findings recorded by Court below are opposed to record and law, hence liable to be set aside.
10. ' In support of his aforesaid submissions, learned counsel placed his reliance on the following judgments:
(i) Pakistan State Oil Company Limited v. Sikandar A. Karim and others 2005 CLC 3.
(ii) .Mst. Rehana Begum v. Mst. Shagufta 1995 SCMR 323.
(iii) Badruddin v. Muhammad Yousuf 1994 SCMR 1900.
(iv) Muhammad Usman and another v. Dr. Muhammad Hanif 1999 SCMR 2234.
(v) Izhar Hussain Naqvi v. Muhammad Saeed 1986 CLC 1485.
(vi) Abdul Mateen v. Muhammad Hussain (Late) through Legal Heirs and another 1997 CLC 216.
11. ' Mr. Iftikhar Javed Oazi, learned counsel for respondent No,3 made the following submissions:
1. That rent application filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2 was based on mala fide and not in good- faith, hence learned Rent Controller ought to have rejected the same.
2. That need for raising high-rise building on the suit land was not a personal need in terms of provisions of S.R.P.O.
3. That sub-letting was not proved through cogent evidence.
12. ' As against the above, Mr. Khalid Javed Khan learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 addressed the Court and made the following submissions:
(1) That petitions in their present form are not maintainable under the law, as neither any illegality nor' any misreading or a jurisdictional defect has been pointed out by petitioners in the petitions, hence same are liable to be dismissed.
(2) That findings of facts recorded by two courts below on the issue of default in payment of water charges and property tax as also the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below on the issue of subletting cannot be disturbed in the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court as the same are based on proper appreciation of evidence on record and strictly in accordance with law.
(3) That personal bona fide need was successfully proved on record by landlord, hence learned Appellate Court has rightly reversed the findings of learned Rent Controller on the issue of personal need, hence does not call for any interference by this Court.
(4) That findings of learned Appellate Court on all the issues are strictly in accordance with law and the evidence on record has been properly appreciated in its proper perspective, hence such findings cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction.
13. ' In support of his aforesaid submissions, learned counsel placed his reliance on the following judgments:--
(i) Mrs. Tahira Dilawar Ali Khan though Attorney and 2 others v. Mst. Syeda Kaneez Sughra and 2 others PLD 2007 Karachi 50.
(ii) Abdul Razzaq v. Messrs Ihsan Sons Limited and 2 others 1992 SCMR 505.
(iii) Mst. Mobin Fatima v. Muhammad Yamin and 2 others PLD 2006 Supreme Court 214.
(iv) Messrs Kwality Food Products v. Mst. Sehba Nishat Haq 1991 MLD 1331.
(v) Abdul Ghafoor v. Mst. Amtul Saeeda 1999 SCMR 28.
(vi) Sher Afgan v. Sheikh Anjum Iqbal PLD 2004 Supreme Court 671.
(vii) Abdul Rahman through Legal Heirs and 6 others v. Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. And another PLD 2004 Supreme Court 921.
14. ' I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also examined the record with the assistance of learned counsel for the parties.
15. ' Prior to taking up the points raised by learned counsel for petitioner, I deem it proper to take up the points raised by Mr. Khalid Javed Khan, learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 with regard to maintainability of the petitions. Learned counsel has submitted that these petitions are not maintainable as neither any jurisdictional defect has been pointed out nor any illegality in the impugned judgment has been shown by the petitioners. He further submitted that no misreading or non-reading of the material available on record has been pointed out by the petitioners' side. To support his contentions learned counsel has placed reliance on the Judgments (1) PLD 2006 Supreme Court 214 (Mst, Mobin Fatima v. Muhammad Yamin and 2 others), 1992 SCMR 505 (Abdul Razzaq v. Messrs Ihsan Sons Limited and 2 others), PLD 2007 Karachi 50 (Mrs. Tahira Dilawar Ali Khan through Attorney and 2 others v. Mst. Syeda Kaneez Sughra and 2 others).
16. ' In the first reported judgment learned counsel has invited my attention to paragraph-8 of the report wherein the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has dealt with the issue in the following words: "8. The High Court, no doubt, in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 can interfere if any wrong or illegal conclusions are drawn by the Courts below which are not based on facts found because such an act would amount to an error of law which can always be corrected by the High Court."
17. ' In the second reported judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents Nos.l and 2 learned counsel has invited my attention to the findings recorded by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan with regard to the powers of High Court under Article 199 of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
18. 1973. He specifically pointed out the observations of the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the reported judgment in paragraph 15, wherein honourable apex Court has held as under:-- "15. The High Court in constitutional jurisdiction could not have sat as a Court of appeal on the question of fact. The finding of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal can be interfered with by a High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction if the same is based on no evidence or is founded on misreading of evidence or is recorded by ignoring material evidence on record.
19. However, a finding of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction merely on the ground that a different view on the basis of same evidence was possible."
20. ' In the third reported judgment, wherein learned Judge who authored the judgment while relying upon the judgment of honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:- "In the case of Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Forest Department v. Ghulam Nabi and 3 others (PLD 2001 SC 415), it was held by the Hon' ble Supreme Court that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be exercised to reappraise evidence, and come to its own independent findings, where findings of facts were recorded by authority below after giving good reasons in support of it.
21. Referring to the plethora of case law, it was further observed that there is no cavil to the proposition that that Superior Courts have ample jurisdiction to refuse a relief where granting it would tantamount to injustice, as High Court is not bound to grant relief to the petitioner simply because he was legally entitled to the same the grant of such relief is immoral, unfair or against the dictates of good conscience and fair play it hardly needs any elaboration that High Court is not obliged to "press into service its Constitutional jurisdiction in every case in which illegality, or void action or void order is impugned; but the Court is to see whether the grant of relief prayed for fosters the cause of justice or will it perpetuate injustice."
22. ' There is no cavil with the proposition advanced by the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 with regard to the functions and powers of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. It is settled law that findings on facts recorded by competent tribunal can be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction if the same was based on no evidence or was recorded by ignorance of material evidence on record. Findings of facts cannot be interfered with by High Court in its said jurisdiction merely on the ground that different view on the basis of the same evidence was possible. Applying the above rule to the present case it is to be seen whether the learned Courts below have recorded their findings in accordance with evidence available on record and the law. If any misreading or non-reading is noted which has caused serious prejudice to a particular party, in that event jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is to be invoked and illegality committed by the Court below is to be rectified. If it is found that findings of the Courts below are in accordance with law and also in line with the evidence on record normally no interference is called for. The point raised by learned counsel is answered, accordingly.
23. ' Now taking up the first submission of Mr. Mohammad Sadiq, learned counsel for petitioner that need of landlord for seeking ejectment for the purpose of raising construction of highrise building for selling to others does not come under the provisions of section 2(g) and section 15 (2)(vii) of S.R.P.O. To deal with above question it will be advantageous to reproduce the clause (g) of section 2 of S.R.P.O, which reads as under:- "2. Definitions.---In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,---
(a) -------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) -------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) -------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) -------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) -------------------------------------------------------------------
(f) ---------------------------------------------------------------------
(g) "personal use" means the use of the premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), son or daughter;"
24. (h)
25. (i)
26. (j)
27. (i)
(ii) ..
28. (k)
29. ' Similarly clause (vii) subsection (2) of section 15 of S.R.P.O is quoted hereunder:- "15. Application to Controller.---(1) Where a landlord seeks to evict the tenant otherwise than in accordance with section 14, he shall make such application to the Controller.
(2) The Controller shall, make an order directing tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises within such period as may be specified in the order, if he is satisfied that---
(i) ..
30. (ii)
31. (iii)
32. (iv)..
(v) ..
33. (vi)
(viii) the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children."
34. ' From the perusal of clause (g) of Section 2 of S.R.P.O. It is apparent that personal use means the use of premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), son or daughter. Similarly under section 15 of the S.R.P.O. The Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises, if the landlord requires the premises in good faith or his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children.
35. ' Now adverting to the rent application filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2 wherein in paragraph-6 the respondents Nos.1 and 2 have stated as under:-- "6. The applicants submit that they need the said property for bona fide personal use and for constructing commercial project thereon for which the applicants have requisite resources at their disposal and therefore, the opponent is liable to be evicted from the said property forthwith".
36. Similarly respondent No, 1 in his affidavit-in-evidence, in paragraph-6 has stated as under:-- "6. I submit that applicants need the said property for bona fide personal use and for constructing commercial project thereon for which applicants have requisite resources at their disposal and therefore, the Opponent is liable to be evicted from the said property forthwith."
37. ' In his cross-examination the respondent No,1 has stated as under:-- "It is correct to suggest that I have stated in my application for ejectment as well as in my affidavit in evidence that I want to construct shops offices and showrooms on the above mentioned plot."
38. ' From the reading of the above quoted provisions of S.R.P.0 and the evidence available on record, it is clear that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have stated in their rent application that they needed the property for bona fide personal use and for constructing commercial projects thereon for which applicants have requisite resources on their disposal. It is admitted position on record that the respondents Nos.1 and 2 are builders/developers by profession. Similarly in his cross-examination, respondent No,1 has admitted that he wants to construct shops/offices and showrooms on the above mentioned plot.
39. ' Keeping in view the evidence on record, if section 2(g) of S.R.P.O is read, it will be noticed that personal use means the use of premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), son or daughter. Similarly an examination of section 15(2)(vii) of the S.R.P.O. Further clarifies term personal use that if landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children.
40. ' Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in their evidence have nowhere stated that which part of the building they want to occupy and for whose personal use such premises is required. Admittedly it is the case of respondents Nos.1 and 2 that after demolishing the present structure a high-rise building will be erected on the subject land. In view of above legal position the submission of learned counsel for petitioner appears to be correct that the learned Appellate Court has not considered the legal position discussed hereinabove while passing the impugned judgment.
41. ' Learned counsel for petitioner in support of above submission has relied upon the judgment cited at Sr. No, 1, relevant whereof is quoted hereunder:-- "18. First I want to deal with the ground of personal use. As mentioned above the Rent Controller rejected it but the Appellate Court reversed that finding and accepted that ground also. For proper appreciation of the plea the contents of the rent case relating to personal need are reproduced below:-- "(7) That the applicant is a leading Builder/Town Planner of the city and have experience in construction some very well-known projects in Karachi, particularly Rabi Centre, Rabi Arcade and Rabi Square, which are all in the same vicinity of the demised premises. The applicant is presently supervising the construction of one of the most prestigious projects of the city namely Silver Sand Beach View.
(8) In the aforesaid circumstances the demised property is required by the applicant for his personal bona fide use and occupation in good faith as such the opponent is liable to be ejected from the demised property on this ground also."
19. After a look at the above mentioned two paragraphs one gets that first the landlord highlighted his experience as a builder having constructed big and prestigious projects and then, in the following para, he simply stated that being an experienced builder he wanted the demised property for his personal bona fide use. It was surely inappropriate and vague plea about the personal requirement wherein the landlord did not speak expressly as to what for he required the demised property which is a huge plot. Without express and clear plea the Court can neither consider nor decide the question of the requirement and its reasonableness.
20. It was only in the evidence where the attorney of the landlord deposed that the landlord wants to raise commercial construction upon the plot and use some parts thereof himself and give other parts to some third party. The evidence deserves to be excluded of the consideration for being beyond the pleadings.
21. Although law does not permit it but even it, for the sake of academic point of view, the evidence is considered then also it does not satisfy the requirement of law for eviction of a tenant on the ground of re-construction. Firstly, it is a simple word that the landlord shall use part of the new construction himself without any further explanation or details. The plan of proposed construction shows big number of shops etc., therefore, the landlord was required to say expressly as to how he wants to use them. A simple and bold word that the landlord shall use some shops himself does not discharge the responsibility of proving personal requirement reasonable and in convincing manner to the satisfaction of the Court. Secondly, when the landlord also intends to give a part of the new construction to third party he is legally required first to accommodate the tenant for carrying on his business at same level but in the plan of proposed construction no such provision is available."
42. ' In the present case learned Appellate Court while passing the impugned judgment has based its findings mainly upon the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for 'respondent Nos.1 and 2 before the Appellate Court i,e, PLD 2004 Supreme Court 921, but the facts of above referred case are entirely distinguishable from the present case as in the reported judgment there were three landlords who filed joint application wherein they stated that premises was required by appellants Nos.1, 3 and 4 for business purpose and for residential purpose of two sons of appellant No, 1 and one son of appellant No, 2 but in the present case neither such assertion was made by respondents Nos.1 and 2 in their rent application nor any evidence in support of their claim for personal bona fide use was brought on record, hence learned Appellate Court has wrongly based its findings on the above reported judgment which is entirely distinguishable on facts than the present case. The judgment cited by learned counsel for petitioner is fully attracted in the circumstances of the present case.
43. ' In view of above, the findings recorded by learned Appellate Court on the point of personal bona fide need cannot be sustained, which are accordingly set aside and the findings recorded by learned Rent Controller vide his order dated 26-11-2009 on personal bona fide need are restored.
44. ' Now taking up the second submission of Mr. Mohammad Sadiq, learned counsel for petitioner that water charges and property tax which were admittedly not paid by petitioner to the relevant authority, but such non-payment does not constitute default in payment of rent entailing penalty of ejectment as it was not payable to the landlord. Learned counsel for petitioner has heavily relied upon the judgment passed by honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. In case of Badruddin v Muhammad Yousuf reported as 1994 SCMR 1900 and has invited my attention to paragraph-15, which is quoted hereunder:-- "15. We may also point out that if under the terms of the tenancy a tenant is liable to pay directly the electricity and/or gas charges to the company concerned and there is no liability on his part to pay the same to the landlord, in that event, the landlord cannot press into service the ground of default on the ground of non-payment of electricity and/or gas charges though he may be entitled to press into service the breach of the terms of the tenancy for seeking ejectment, if on account of default in payment of electricity and/or gas charges, the Company concerned disconnects the supply and thereby impair the utility and the value of the demised premises."
45. ' It is pointed out that the facts of the present case and the facts of reported judgment are entirely different and the reported judgment is distinguishable on facts and does not advance the case of the petitioner. In the reported case there were five shops in all in building owned by landlord. There were five sub-meters in each shop and all the tenants had to pay electricity charges as per consumption shown in the sub-meters and said amount was to be paid by all the tenants to the landlord. But in the present case as per the lease-agreement, bills for water charges and property tax were received by petitioners themselves and they have been paying directly to the relevant authorities, but admittedly after 1990 they defaulted in payment of water charges and property tax.
46. The respondents Nos.1 and 2 have brought on record ample documentary evidence to show that petitioner and respondent No,3 have deliberately not made payment of water charges and property tax which has accumulated to the tune of Rs,3,85,918 towards water charges and Rs,1,38,764 towards property tax at the time of filing of rent case. Learned counsel for petitioner has invited my attention to the definition of rent in S.R.P.O., which is quoted hereunder:- "(i) "rent" includes water charges, electricity charges and such other charges which are payable by the tenant but are unpaid;"
47. ' The examination of above quoted provision of law would show that rent includes water charges, electricity charges and such other charges which are payable by the tenant but are unpaid. The respondent No, 1 successfully proved on record that petitioner and respondent No, 3 have defaulted in payment of water charges and property tax. The witness of petitioner namely Faiz Mehmood Khan Durrani has stated in his cross-examination as under:-- "It is correct that we did not pay the property tax after 2000 Vol: says that we never received any challan. It is incorrect that we had not paid the water charges since 1990 to the concerned department. It is correct that the paid challan is not produce in this rent matter. It is correct that I had not produce any such notice to show that dispute plot for the petrol pump site. Vol: says that the dispute plot is a commercial site. It is correct that applicants are builder."
48. ' The judgment cited by Mr. Mohammad Sadiq learned counsel for petitioner (1995 SCMR 323) has no applicability to the circumstances of the present case. In the renorted case the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan compared explanation (1) to subsection (2) of section 13 of the late West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and clause (i) of section 2 of the S.R.P.O and after examining the aforesaid two provisions of law the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan held that there seems to be as marked distinction between the above explanation (i) of subsection 2 of section 13 of the late Ordinance and the definition of rent given in clause (i) of section 2 of the S.R.P.O., inasmuch as under the above explanation (i) water charges or electric charges or both, if they were payable by the tenant to the landlord were to be deemed as rent for the purpose of default, whereas under the latter, the definition of rent itself includes not only water charges and electric charges but all other charges which are payable by the tenant and which are not paid by him. The above clause does not require that the above charges should be payable by tenant to his landlord. The aforesaid judgment nowhere says that if electricity and water charges are payable to the landlord and if not paid the tenant shall not be guilty of default in payment of rent. It also does not say that if water charges and other charges are payable to the relevant authority and if not paid by the tenant he shall not be held guilty of default in payment of rent. Mr. Khalid Javed Khan, learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 has placed reliance on the case of Messrs Kwality Food Products, wherein it was concluded as under:- "Even if I accept the contention from the side of the appellant that electricity charges and telephone bills stood paid in view of such explanation, the effect of admission regarding non- payment of water, conservancy, fire, betterment and professional taxes still cannot get wiped off.
49. Such payments, apart from electricity and telephone charges, were also a clear responsibility of the appellant-tenant under clause (6) of the agreement between the parties, the legal position in terms of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, as per section 2(i), being that the concept of 'rent' includes 'water charges, electricity charges and such other charges which are payable by the tenant'. It would follow that any default in the payment of any such charges would tantamount to equal default in the same degree under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 as if that had been defaulted in the payment of rent, pure and simple, itself."
50. ' He has further Placed his reliance on the case of Mst. Amtul Saeeda, wherein the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has held as under:-- "Even on the question of default in respect of payment of electricity charges, the onus clearly was on the appellant to show that no default had been committed in this regard. According to the "Explanation" incorporated in section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, subsection (2), when electricity charges are payable by the tenant to the landlord, such charges shall be deemed to be rent. However, in the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinace "rent" has been defined and the definition also includes electricity charges, in case such charges are payable by the tenant but the same have remained unpaid. In the present case, there appears to be no controversy over the fact that payment of electricity charges of the KESC was the responsibility of the appellant. The evidence recorded before the Rent Controller indicates that electricity bills were directly received by the appellant and their payment was also his responsibility. The evidence further indicates that electricity was disconnected by the KESC as its bills mounting to Rs, 4,753 had remained outstanding against the appellant. It appears that no satisfactory evidence could be produced by the appellant before the Rent Controller in rebuttal. Reliance, therefore, by Mr. Naraindas Motiani upon the judgment of this Court in Rehana Begum v. Shagufta (1985 SCMR 323) appears to be completely misplaced as in this case the landlady had failed to prove that default had been committed by the tenant in respect of electricity charges and the findings arrived at by the Courts below in this regard had been found to be based on misreading of evidence. But in the present case electricity charges being included in the definition of "rent" and the tenant being liable to pay the same, would make himself liable for ejectment in case of their nonpayment when the same is clearly established by evidence before the Rent Controller."
51. ' Lastly Mr. Khalid Javed Khan made reference to the case of Sher Afgan, wherein the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan while dealing with the definition of rent as provided under S.R.P.O has held as under:-- "From the definition of rent it is clear that rent included above charges. Default in payment of such charges, renders the tenant liable to be evicted from the premises in view of inclusion of such charges in rent. In fact, such charges are a part of the rent. The covenants of agreement remain operative in spite of expiry of the agreement, which are permissible under general law and are not inconsistent to the special law. For this proposition reference can be made to the case of this Court reported as Mrs. Zarina Khawaja v. 'Agha Mahboob Shah (PLD 1988 SC 190). In view of above, it is evident that default was committed by the respondent in payment of rent and it was willful."
52. ' After examining, the above quoted judgments rendered by honourable apex Court, it can safely be concluded that if any tenant commits default in payment of rent to the landlord or he commits default in payment of water charges, electricity charges and such other charges which are payable by him to the relevant authority, the tenant shall be held guilty of default in payment of rent and the consequences provided under section 15 of the S.R.P.O would follow for his ejectment from the case-premises.
53. 'The findings recorded by both the Courts below on the aforesaid issue are strictly in accordance with evidence available on record and the law on the subject. The findings of both the Courts below are in line with rule laid down by the honourable apex Court in the above noted judgments. Entire evidence has been properly appreciated by both the Courts below and does not call for any interference by this Court in its constitutional, jurisdiction. Accordingly findings recorded by learned Courts below are maintained on the issue of default in payment of water charges and property tax.
54. ' Now taking up the third submission of Mr. Mohammad Sadiq, learned counsel for petitioner as submitted by him that alleged sub-letees. Were not party to the proceedings hence learned Courts below could not have answered the issue of subletting in affirmative. The cross-examination of petitioner's witness namely Faiz Mahmood Khan Durrani is quoted hereunder: "It is correct that there are tyer shop, service station, General store they are part of the business of petrol pump and connected with the business. It depends upon the dealer to let out the portion to Opticion and Lock & Key repairer to other person. It is not require that sought permission from the applicant to let out the portion to key and lock maker and optition."
55. ' From the perusal of the above, it is admitted on record that petitioner has parted with the possession of two portions, one has been handed over to lock and key repairer and the other to the Optician, admittedly without seeking written permission from the landlord.
56. ' Learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon the case law reported as 1986 CLC 1485 in support of his submission with regard to subletting and has submitted that in the case, in hand, the landlord did not bring any evidence on record to prove the case of subletting as names and particulars of sub-letees were not disclosed in the application nor such sub-letees were party to the proceedings. The cross-examination quoted hereinabove of the petitioner's witness clearly shows that witness has admitted in cross-examination that petitioner had let-out two portions one to optician and other to lock and key repairer. It is also admitted position that no permission in writing was obtained from the landlord prior to induction of the optician and lock and key repairer in their respective portions. In this view of the matter the judgment cited by learned counsel is not applicable to the circumstances of the case. Accordingly it is held that the finding recorded by learned lower Courts on the issue of subletting is strictly in accordance with law and the evidence available on record. Such findings do not call for any interference by this Court.
57. ' Now taking up the submission of Mr. Iftikhar Javed Qazi, learned counsel for respondent No,3, with regard to personal need has been answered by me in the earlier part of the judgment wherein findings recorded by learned Appellate Court on the issue of personal need has been reversed and the findings recorded by learned Rent Controller have been restored. With regard to the submission of learned counsel that rent application was not filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in good faith, is not supported by any evidence available on record hence cannot be made basis for interference in findings of fact recorded by two competent forums which have been held to be in accordance with law. The submission of learned counsel has no force which is accordingly repelled.
58. ' The upshot of above discussion is that the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Court on the issue or personal bona fide use are set aside and the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller on the above issue are restored. However findings of both the Courts below on the issue of default in payment of water charges and property tax and also on the issue of subletting are maintained subject to above modification in the Appellate judgment. The petitions No, C.P.S-122 of 2009, 540 of 2009, 131 of 2009 and 132 of 2009 filed by petitioners are dismissed with no order as to costs.
59. Petition-dismissed.