The applicant has applied to this Court under section 561-A for setting aside the order dated 22nd May 1969 of the learned Additional City Magistrate No. 10, Karachi, by which he rejected the to applications dated 24th April 1969 and 8th May 1969 of the applicant, in which he had prayed that the complaint was not maintainable for the reason, firstly that since the marriage was solemnised before the promulgation of West Pakistan Dowry (Prohibition on Display) Act XV1 of 1967, hereinafter referred to as Act XVI of 1967, its provisions were not applicable to his marriage and, secondly, that under section 4 (2) (b) of Act XVI of 1967 the period prescribed for the return of dowry was within one year and that this period had not expired on 8th May 1968 when the complaint was filed, it was therefore that this complaint was premature and no cognizance could have been taken on it.
2. In brief, the, facts are that the applicant was married to respondent No. 2, at Karachi on 30th July 1967. She then went to Quetta to reside with her husband. She also alleged that sizeable dowry was given to .Her by her own relations and the applicant and his relations. These articles were sent to Quetta. However, on or about 25th November 1967 she was brought back to Karachi by air and it was after her arrival in Karachi that she was divorced by the applicant which was confirmed by a written document sent from Quetta, respondent No. 2, having failed to receive back her dowry from the applicant filed a complaint in the first instance on 24th March 1968 in the Court of Additional City Magistrate, Karachi which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 7th May 1968, whereafter another complaint was filed on 8th May 1968, upon which cognizance was taken under section 4 of Act XVI of 1967. On 24th April 1968, the applicant filed an application in the trial Court for his discharge under subsection (2) of section 253; Cr. P. C. On the ground that no offence was made out as the marriage was solemnised before the promulgation of Act XVI of 1967. Before any order could be passed on this application another application was filed by the applicant on 8th May 1969, in which he requested for the same relief upon the ground that under clause (b) of subsection,' (2) of section 4 of Act XVI of 1967 the period, within which the dowry has to be returned, is "within one year" and since that period had not elapsed, it cannot therefore be said that there was any commission of an offence and the complaint when filed was therefore premature. These to applications were rejected by the learned Additional City Magistrate by his order dated 22nd May 1969.
3. Before me the learned counsel for the applicant has again raised the above to contentions. It is not disputed that the marriage was solemnised before Act XVI of 1967 was promulgated. It is, therefore, argued that this Act cannot apply to the instant case as neither there is any provision in the Act nor can any intention be spelled out to give it a retrospective effect. It is well-settled that statutes should/be so construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless retrospective effect be clearly intended. There is, therefore, force in this contention. However, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 relied on the preamble of the Act which reads :-
4. Preamble.-Whereas' it is expedient to prohibit in the Province of West Pakistan the display of dowry, and to provide for the delivery of dowry to the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given or received, and matters incidental and supplemental thereto," and contended that the word "given" which is a past participle, gives to the Act retrospectivity so as to cover a case of marriage solemnised even before the' promulgation of the Act. I do not agree with this contention, for the word `given' is merely indicative of the the at which the marriage was performed and benefits conferred, which is earlier to delivery and it is therefore that this past participle is used; however no retrospectivity can be construed from the use of this past participle.
It is also well settled that a 'preamble merely explains or declares the reasons. And motives for and the object ,sought to be accomplished by enacting the statute, but it cannot, for any purpose, control, restrict, extend, qualify; alter, detract from or add to the statute itself where it is expressed in clear and unambiguous term. It is only when the wording of the statute gives rise to doubts as to its pro--per construction, that the preamble can be referred to in order to arrive at the proper construction to be put on the enacting portion of the statute. It follows, therefore, that the preamble cannot be construed to extend the operation of the Act to a the prior to its promulgation. The trial Court while repelling the objection has viewed it from a wrong angle, namely, that "the Act does not say that those who had already been married are not to be benefited by the lawful sanctions provided by the Act." This reasoning ignores the salient principle of interpretation that in the absence of the intention in the enactment itself to give retrospectivity to it, such a result cannot be presumed.
4. On the above conclusion thus reached the seconds contention does not arise for decision. In the result I would set aside the order dated 22nd May and quash the proceeding initiated upon the complaint. The application is accordingly accepted.