'RAJA MUHAMMAD SHAFQAT KHAN ABBASI, ---This writ petition has been filed on 6-4-2007 by Mst.
Sarwar Mai and Bilawal (petitioners) to challenge the propriety of the judgment and decree dated 27-5-2000 passed by the learned Judge Family Court, whereby suit for jactitation of marriage, filed by Allah Ditta (predecessor of respondents Nos,3-A to 3-F) has been decreed and so also judgment and decree dated 13-1-2001 passed by learned Additional District Judge, whereby appeal filed by the petitioners has been dismissed.
2. Brief facts mentioned by the respondent No,3/plaintiff in his plaint arc that Allah Ditta, the plaintiff aged 65 years was an insane person since his birth and had never contracted marriage with petitioner No, I/defendant; that the plaintiff being insane was not in a position to go through the procedure of proposal and acceptance, which is a necessary ingredient for performance of Nikah; that the petitioner No,2, namely, Bilawal is not son of the respondent No,3/plaintiff, as Allah Ditta being insane was impotent and had not consummated with petitioner No,1; that the alleged Nikah Nama was prepared in order to grab the valuable property of Allah Ditta, respondent No,3; petitioner No, I/defendant, Mst. Sarwar Mai by filing her written statement had controverted the contents of plaint on legal as well as factual grounds and averred that a valid Nikah was performed between her and Allah Dina and from their wedlock petitioner No,2/defendant, namely, Bilawal was born; that the purported next friend of Allah Ditta has filed this suit with ulterior motive in order to deprive them from their lawful rights; out of divergent pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as seven issues including that of relief; both the parties produced their evidence, oral as well as documentary in order to support their respective claims; learned Civil Judge, Muzaffargarh after going through the evidence and the material available on the file decreed the suit of the plaintiff on 27-5-2000; being aggrieved thereof, petitioner No, 1/defendant, Mst. ,Sarwar Mai filed an appeal under Section 14 of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge. Muzaffargarh on 13-1-2001. Hence., the instant writ petition.
3. During pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner filed three Miscellaneous applications bearing C.M.Nos.808 of ?007, 438 of 2008 and 801 of 2009. 1 would like to deal with the same first.
(i) Insofar as C.M. No,808 of 2007 is concerned, it was an application under sections 94 and 151. C . P.
C. Read with Order XL, Rule 1 C P.C. For the appointment of a receiver, who will look after the property left by Allah Ditta deceased.
'Factum of marriage has not yet been proved by the petitioner. Both the Courts below have given findings of fact that she is not legally wedded wife of Allah Dina. Bence, question of inheritance or appointment of the receiver of the property cannot be raised at this stage. It has also been noticed that on the same subject the petitioner had moved an application bearing C.M. No, 608 of 2009, which was dismissed as not pressed on 9-3-2009.
(ii) Through C.M.No,438 of 2008, which is an application under Order XLI, Rules 27 and 33 C.P.C., the petitioners have sought permission to adduce evidence of Sardar Muhammad Shah, Chairman, Union Council Danire, District Muzaffargarh, in order to prove that order dated 18-1-1993, whereby he dismissed notice of Talaq given by Allah Ditta, which was tendered by Iqbal Ahmad P.W. And Dr. Muhammad Saleem, Physician, DHQ Hospital Muzaffargarh, who issued certificate in May, 1999, declaring Allah Ditta plaintiff/ respondent as incapacitated to lead independent life.
(a) Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that delay per se is no ground to refuse additional evidence specially when evidence sought to be produced, is likely to go to the root of the case; that this Court has ample power to permit production of the additional evidence for the just and fair decision of the case. He places reliance on Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Rehmat Ali 1998 MLD 1622, Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Rehmat Ali and others 2005 CLC 1719, Muhammad Shafi v.
Mst. Zainab Bibi and others PLD 1959 Lah. 941, Muhammad Ali and another v. Abdul Khaliq and another PLD 1958 Lah. 226, Ali Muhammad v. Nazir Ahmad and another 1999 YLR 456, Mst. Begum through legal heirs and 27 others 2000 CLC 744, Ghulam Ahmad Chaudhary v. Akbar Hussain through legal heirs and another PLD 2002 SC 615 and Zar Wali v. Yousaf Ali Shah 1992 SCMR 1778.
(b) Learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the application and submitted that the petitioners have failed to produce the evidence in question during the trial or before the appellate Court which was available at that stage; that petitioners had opportunity to produce the same but elected not to do so; that they cannot be allowed the said relief at this stage to make a new case. He placed reliance on State of U.P., v. Manbodhan Lal, Srivastava AIR 1957 SC 912, Jawala Singh and others v. Jagdish Singh and others AIR 1941 Lah. 144, Jamadar Singh v. Sheikh Naiyab Ali AIR 1941 Calcutta 378 and Munna Lal v. Radha Kishan AIR 1915 Allahabad 476.
(c) Admittedly, the petitioners have not produced Dr. Muhammad Saleem, Physician, DHQ Hospital Muzaffargarh and Muhammad Shah, Chairman Union Council Danire, District Muzaffargarh during the trial or before the appellate Court. Even this application has not been filed at the time of filing of writ petition in the year 2007. It has been moved in the year 2008 after one year of the filing of the writ petition. Petitioner has not given any plausible or probable explanation why he has not moved such application. Petitioners have not sought production of additional evidence before the relevant forum and they cannot ask for the said relief at this belated stage. Nothing is mentioned in the application that some new facts or evidence has been discovered subsequent to the decision of the Courts below or what have prevented them for production of the proposed evidence at the relevant time. This Court can proceed in the matter on the basis of material/evidence produced by the parties without taking the additional evidence. Judgments cited by the petitioners are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, inasmuch in these judgments it was either the appellate Court or the trial Court, which had allowed the request of additional evidence on discovery of new material. It has been observed in the case of Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Messrs Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd., Lahore PLD 1971 SC 550 that the appellate Court ought not to have exercised discretion in allowing production of additional evidence, of documents, which could be easily fabricated and manufactured. Reliance was placed on case of Muhammad Ikhlas and others v. Muhammad Ismail and others PLD 1963 SC 466, and the Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Communication and Works Department and another v. Gulzar Muhammad PLD 1969 SC 60, Kesarmal and another v. N.K.V. Valliapaa Chettiar PLD 1954 Privy Council 101 and State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava AIR 1957 SC 912.
In this view of the matter, this CM for production of additional evidence B has no force and the same is hereby dismissed.
(iii) As far as C.M. No,801 of 2009 is concerned, through this application under section 151 C.P.C., petitioner Mst. Sarwar Mai has sought sending of the remains of the corps of Allah Ditta deceased for DNA Test, who died about one year before in order to resolve the controversy involved in the matter.
(a) Learned counsel for the respondents while vehemently opposing the request contended that the petitioner is estopped to raise this request at this stage; that the petitioner cannot improve or make out new case; that this Court cannot hold inquiry or record additional evidence in the present proceedings; that DNA test cannot determine the factum of marriage of the petitioner Mst.
Sarwar Mai and Allah Ditta.
(b) The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner Mst. Sarwar Mai on 9-4-2009 after about one year of the observation made by this Court in its order dated 29-4-2008 qua DNA test of the minor for determination of dispute regarding his paternity "Deoxyribonucleic Acid" commonly called the DNA. As regard DNA test and the report made on the basis thereof, it has been observed in Azhar Amin alias Naji v. The State 2008 PCr.LJ 824 page 830 that:--- "(9) It is further stated that different methodologies allow experts to identify these distinguishing elements of DNA and this sort of technology is extremely complex; few people are able to understand it.
(10) In National Forensic DNA Study Report (Authors P.Larrich Ph.D. Trans c Part Ph.d, Michael J.
Gaffiney JD, Charles L Johnson M.A. And 3 others) It is stated that lack of appropriate storage space can lead to valuable DNA evidence become degraded. "
Test will not be conducive and the same will not serve any useful purpose except unnecessary delay, multiplicity of litigation, which might create other complications. This Court cannot assume role of investigator to hold inquiry. Reference in this respect is made to Arab Jhanglu v. Panjalshah Yakubalishah and another AIR 1938 Sindh 198, wherein the relevant head note (at page 199(e) reads as under:--- "It is not within the judicial duties of a judge to raise a case not raised by the party himself and to decide it for him."
'The DNA test by itself cannot set the matter at rest, when it is being opposed by the contesting party with right to produce its rebuttal. This would tantamount to a fresh trial and needs a factual inquiry, which is beyond the scope of the constitutional jurisdiction. Reliance in this respect is made to Messrs Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. v. Karachi Metropolitan Corporation through Director Octroi and another PLD 1990 Kar. 186, Sapphire Textile Mills v. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Hyderabad 1990 CLC 45, Shah Jahan and others v. Syed Amjad Ali, Hawaldar and others 2000 SCMR 88, Muhammad Ibrahim v. Mst. Farzana and another PLD 1994 Kar. 255, Shri Sohan Lal v. Union of India and another AIR 1957 SC 529 and Muhammad Nazim v. Mst. Rehana Parveen Begum and 3 others 1990 MLD 344. There will be no certainty with such test/report, when the dead body and grave might not be identifiable due to lapse of considerable period and carrying out of the impugned test under grave doubts would create further complications, instead of resolving the matter.
(c) I fail to understand why the petitioner has not made such a request Before the trial Court or appellate Court or during the lifetime of said Allah Ditta, but it has been made for the first time after two years of filing of the instant petition. I am not inclined to record additional evidence at this stage in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. It is the duty of the parties to prove their case. The conduct of the petitioner indicates that she was not vigilant. This Court cannot assume the role of investigator or of trial Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The controversy involved in the present case is existence of marriage of the petitioner with late Allah Ditta or otherwise. Both the Courts below have decreed the suit for jactitation of marriage filed by the respondent/plaintiff Allah Ditta against Mst. Sarwar Mai petitioner. In case of carrying out the exercise of DNA test of the remaining corps of the late Allah Ditta, who was allegedly a lunatic by birth and for the sake of arguments if the result comes positive even then the same will not prove the factum of marriage. It will be only proof of legitimacy or illegitimacy of Bilawal. In case Muhammad Azhar v. The State PLD 2005 Lah.
589, this Court declined the request of DNA test made by the husband-complainant who has levelled D charge of Zina against his wife with the allegation that child was illegitimate as a result of Zina with the accused. In this case, this Court had observed that:--- "The DNA to be tested can be extracted from the cells of a variety of body fluids and tissues. While the majority of tests are carried out using DNA from blood cells, cells obtained from the lining of the cheek using a mouth-wash or cells in the roots of a person's hair." The DNA test may further help in establishing the legitimacy of a child for several other purposes.
'In a case reported as Manzoor Ahmad and others v. Khan and 35 others 2007 CLC 1028, request for conducting of DNA test was declined by the appellate Court on the ground that same was not made before the learned trial Court and the Peshawar High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C. Upheld the order of the appellate Court. I am conscious of the fact that Islamic Laws lean in favour of the legitimization, rather then stigmatization. Reference can advantageously be made to the case Manzoor Hussain v. Zahoor Ahmad 1992 SCMR 1191 and Manzoor-ulHaq v. Kaneez Begum 1991 CLC 109. It may be observed that Bilawal, the alleged son of Allah Ditta, may have a right to approach appropriate forum for the determination of genetically about a biological father.
4. On merits, it has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that both the Courts below have not considered the evidence in its true perspective; that they have not applied their judicious mind; that Qaiser Iqbal was not competent to file suit as next friend; that evidence of Muhammad Nawaz, D.W.1, Ghulam Hassan, D.W.2 and Hafiz Muhammad Qasim, D.W.3 was brushed aside without any cogent reason; that both the Courts below have not properly considered the documentary evidence produced by the petitioners and have come to the wrong conclusion that petitioners in order to inherit huge property of Allah Ditta have filed this suit; that petitioners could not challenge the impugned judgments and decrees in time due to the impression that father of Mst. Sarwar Mai had filed the writ petition. The learned counsel prayed that C.M.No,3 of 2007 for condonation of laches be accepted and delay in filing the writ petition be condoned. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that in view of the insertion of Article 2-A in the Constitution, Courts are required to decide the case on merits and petitioner cannot be non-suited on the ground of laches as technicalities should not be hindrance in the way of justice and that question of limitation does not arise in case of dispute of inheritance. H places reliance on the case of Khurshid Alam and another v. Al-Khair Gadoon Limited 2004 CLC 1266, Mst. Sakina Bibi v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1992 Lah. 99 , Muhammad Rafique and others v. Muhammad Ali and others 2004 SCMR 704 and Alam Din and 14 others v. Muhammad Ali and 35 others 1999 MLD 2146.
'Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents argued that both Courts below have considered all the material/ evidence of the parties and gave concurrent findings of fact, which cannot be interfered at this stage in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction.
5. Insofar as petitioner's application C.M. No,3 of 2007 for condonation of delay is concerned, Mst.
Sarwar Mai has specifically stated therein that she was under the impression that her father Allah Wasaya had filed writ petition, but after his death she came to know that no writ petition has been filed. Reasons advanced by the petitioner for the condonation of lathes that her father borrowed Rs,20,000 from one Faqir Muhammad for the payment of fee to engage the counsel. He informed the petitioner that he has filed the case in the honourable High Court. She has stated that some clerk looted her father in this regard. Her father used to go to Multan and on return he informed her that the case is in progress, which will be decided shortly. There is nothing on the record to show that petitioner has ever given any power of attorney to any counsel. Mere bald and vague assertion of the petitioner that some clerk has looted her father has no significance. Reasoning given for the condonation of delay is not plausible and probable because her father was not a party in the proceedings. Explanation furnished by the petitioners is not convincing. Even otherwise, the alleged version of the petitioners in this regard, tells about the negligence of the petitioners, as they have not produced document/Muhktiarnama, which she has alleged in the C.M. Showing that they have engaged any counsel. Even name of the clerk, amount of fee paid or settled has not been disclosed, which indicates her own inactiveness tantamounting to gross negligence. This by itself does not provide any justification of condonation of delay. The period of limitation commenced from the passing of the judgment, dated 13-1-2001. It is well settled that object of law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent. Law of limitation is required to be construed E strictly, where long period of delay is not explained; superior Courts have not shown indulgence in the matter of condonation. Question of limitation being not a mere technicality cannot be taken lightly. Right E accrued to the other party due to limitation cannot be snatched away without sufficient cause.
'There is plethora of case law contemplating that delay/laches by itself provide sufficient ground to deny the relief. Reliance can be placed on the case of Allah Nawaz Sheikh v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and another 1997 SCMR 573, Shahid Pervaiz alias Shabir Hameed v.
Muhammad Ahmad Ameen 2006 SCMR 631, Rehmat Din and others v. Mirza Nasir Abbas and others 2007 SCMR 1560, Abdullah and others v. Muhammad Amin 1968 SCMR 1235, S. Sharif Ahmed Hashmi v. The Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and others 1980 SCMR 711, Mst. Hawabai and others v. Muhammad Siddique and another 1987 SCMR 591, Pakistan through hairman,Railway v. The Punjab Labour Court No,2, Lahore and 2 others 1982 CLC 711, Mubarak Ali and others v.
Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner with delegation of powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner PLD 1968 Lah. 903, Khan Bahadur v. Sher Ahmed and 3 others PLD 1993 Pesh. 241, Babu Singh and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1979 SC 1713, Wajdad and 2 others v. Mir Muhammad Baluch and another PLD 1982 Quetta 41, Mansoor Ahmad v. Burmah Eastern Limited and another PLD 1969 Dacca 94 and Sh. Muhammad Hafiz Ullah v. Ghulam Yasin and others 1970 SCMR 41.
'It has been held in Shahid Pervaiz alias Shahid Hameed v. Muhammad Ahmad Ameen 2006 SCMR 631 that poverty is no ground for condonation of delay. Equity leans in favour of those who are vigilant. Although no period for limitation was provided for the writ petition under Article F 199 of the Constitution, but the same has to be filed within a reasonable period of time. In this context, reference can be made to the case of Mahboob-ur-Rehman v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1968 Lah. 1085, wherein it is laid down that the impugned order, which is a nullity in law, does not itself condone the delay. Case of Shams Din v. Aman Ullah and 3 others PLD 1987 Lah. 471 is quoted to highlight that period of limitation for filing writ petition is three months, whereas this writ petition has been filed after more than six years without any reasonable, plausible explanation for this inordinate delay. It may be observed that even the appeal of the petitioner was also time-barred.
Learned appellate Court has dealt with this issue in paragraph 7 of its judgment in detail and came to the conclusion that appeal filed by the petitioners was time barred. There is no justification of condonation of such huge period of delay of more than six years in assailing the impugned judgment, which clearly shows gross negligence of the petitioners in filing this writ petition as well as appeal. In these circumstances, I am of the view that present petition is suffering from laches and I am not inclined to condone the delay in filing this petition. Hence, C.M.No,3 of 2007 is hereby rejected. However, in the interest of justice I will deal the case on merits also.
6. Petitioner made statement before the learned trial Court on 27-5-2000 that they do not press issues Nos.4 to 6. Learned trial Court after considering the evidence of respective parties and other material while dealing with issues Nos.1 to 5 have held that Qasier Abbas, who is nephew of the plaintiff-Allah Ditta has competently filed the suit as a next friend on behalf of Allah Ditta/plaintiff.
Learned trial Court has dealt with issues Nos.1 to 5 in the following manners:--- "But it is to be noted that the defendant No,1 as D. W.4 has admitted in the cross-examination that before her marriage with the plaintiff one Iqbal and others tried to transfer the land belonging to the plaintiff in their name. At this an inquiry was held by the orders of the Assistant Commissioner, Muzaffargarh and on the orders of the Assistant Commissioner medical examination of Allah Ditta was conducted and a news about this inquiry was published in the newspaper. The plaintiff has produced this newspaper as Exh.P.2. A perusal of this news shows that Allah Ditta was declared insane by the Doctors. The plaintiff has brought on file a photocopy of the report of the Medical Superintendent DHQ Hospital Muzaffargarh as Mark-A according to which Allah Ditta was found mentally retorted and unable to live an independent life. This report was made on 14-5-1991. The defendant No,1 as D.W.1 has admitted in the cross-examination that she has filed an application in the District Court for a declaration that plaintiff Allah Ditta is a lunatic and that his property be managed under the Lunacy Act. She has admitted that she has filed this application in 1993 which means that Allah Ditta was insane in 1995. She has also admitted that during the proceeding of her suit before the District Court Allah Ditta was medically examined at Nishter Hospital, Multan. The plaintiff has produced an attested copy of this report issued by the Department of Psychiatry and Drug Abuse Treatment Center Nishtar Medical College and Hospital, Multan as Exh.P.12 wherein the Doctors have declared Allah Ditta insane and unable to take care of himself. From the reports of the Doctors as well as the admission of the defendant No,1 it has established that the plaintiff was insane at the time of institution of this suit. Under the law a person of unsound mind is treated like a minor and he can sue through a next friend".
'Learned trial Court during the post trial reconciliation proceedings put certain question to the plaintiff and made observation. Which indicates the state of mind of the plaintiff/Allah Ditta.
Learned trial Court has observed in the following manner:- "At the time of post trial reconciliation efforts I have put him questions in the presence of the defendants in my Retiring room as he was unable to stand and answer the question in the open Court. In the presence of the defendants he did not recognize them and failed to give reply to any question put by the Court. At every question he only lifted both her hands and pointed upwards. So I myself have come to the conclusion that Allah Ditta is not of sound mind. So it is declared that the suit is not premature."
7. Learned Judge Family Court after considering the relevant material came to the conclusion that alleged Nikah is valid and petitioner Mst. Sarwar Mai falsely claim herself to be the wife of the plaintiff/Allah Ditta and petitioner No,2/Bilawal is not the son of the plaintiff. Learned judge Family Court after considering the evidence of the parties dealing the issue No,7 in the following way:--- "The defendant has not maintained that his Nikah was solemnized through his Wali. So under the law Allah Ditta was not able to enter into her valid contract of marriage. So the alleged Nikah dated 4-121991 is void one and is inoperative on the rights of the plaintiff.
'The defendants have brought an attested copy of this alleged Nikah Nama between the plaintiff and the defendant No,1 as Exh.D.2 and the original form No,3 delivered to the defendant No, 1 as Exh.
D .
1. According to Exh.D.1 this alleged Nikah between the plaintiff and the defendant No,1 was registered in Union Council Darin whereas the Exh.D.2 has been issued by Union Council Usman Koria. Under the law a marriage can be registered in one Union Council but in the present case the attested copy issued by another Union Council whereas the original part of Nikah has been issued by another Union Council. The original Nikah Namas ire being produced in the Court but these have never been found signed by the Secretary Union Council. But strangely the Exh.D.1 has been signed by the Secretary Union Council dated 2-10-1990 even before the alleged Nikah between the plaintiff and the defendant No,1. It appears that to fortify their fraud they have stamped this part of Nikah and has signed it even before the alleged Nikah between the plaintiff and the defendant No, 1 .
According to the version of the defendant this alleged Nikah was solemnized in the house of the father of the defendant No,1 which is situated in Mauza Malow Koria. But this Nikah has been solemnized by a person who is not a Nikah Khawan of this Mauza as is evident from the statement of the alleged Nikah Khawan Muhammad Qasim when he appeared in the witness box as Exh.D.3.
He has admitted in the cross-examination that Mauza Malow Koria is not included in his jurisdiction and that there is some other Nikah Khawan of this Mauza. The defendant has never explained the reason why the Nikah was not solemnized by the Nikah Khawan of their own Mauza. This Nikah Khawan as D.W.3 has stated in the cross-examination that the plaintiff Allah Ditta himself performed Ejab-o-Qabool but in the cross examination he has admitted that he has never talked to Allah Ditta during his whole life. This admission of D.W.3 belies his version that he got performed Ejabo-Qabool from Allah Ditta the plaintiff."
8. Similarly appellate Court held that appeal filed by the petitioner was time barred. Appellate Court after considering all the material and evidence produced by the parties, upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge Family Court. Appellate Court has discussed relevant issues in detail in paras, l2, 13, 14 and 15. After considering all the material evidence, the appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree passed by the Judge Family Court. I have considered both the judgments of Courts below as well as the material available on record.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has* failed to point out any misreading or non-reading of evidence or any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgments. The plea raised by the petitioners in this writ petition does not justify any interference by this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. It is settled principle of law that all the factual and legal controversies between the parties have been comprehensively concluded by concurrent findings recorded in the judgments of both Courts below delivered after duly appraising the entire evidence adduced by the parties. Neither any instance of misreading or non-reading has been found in the impugned judgments nor the same suffer from any jurisdictional defect.
'There is nothing to indic to the non-existence of jurisdiction in the Courts below, nor there is anything to dem nstrate that the learned Courts below have committed any sort of illegality in the exercise of their respective jurisdiction. In family matters, this Court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own findings in place of concurrent findings of facts of learned Courts below. This Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction could not enter into such exercise, which necessity entails of factual inquiry. The Court has to keep in view the parameters of its lawful authority and also the fact that any moral judgment based on disputed questions of fact beside being brought with pitfalls, which can defeat the very purpose of the writ jurisdiction as held in Muhammad Hanif and others v. Muhammad Khan and others PLD 1996 Lah.
58. Plea not raised in a lower forum cannot be permitted to raise in a constitutional jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own findings for that of subordinate tribunal or Court, Shah Jahan and other v. Syed Amjad Ali Hawaldar and others 2000 SCMR 88. Reliance is placed on 2007 MLD 1710, Export Promotion Bureau and others v. Qaiser Shafiullah 1994 SCMR 859, Santosh Kumar Saha v.
District Magistrate of Faisalabad and another PLD 1959 Dacca 738 and Muhammad Nazim v. Mst.
Rehana Perveen Begum and 3 others 1990 MLD 344.
9. The upshot of the above discussion is that this petition has no force and the J same is dismissed.