' ASAD MUNIR, J.--- This civil revision filed by Mst. Parveen Akhtar, calls in question the judgment and decree dated 19-5-2009 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jhelum, whereby the appeal filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2 has been accepted and the judgment and decree dated 28-1-2008 passed by learned Civil Judge, Jhelum, has been set aside.
2. The brief facts forming the background of this petition are that the petitioner along with her two minor sons namely, Aman and Faizan, as well as respondents Nos.1 and 2 are the legal heirs of late Khurshid Ahmad who died on 16-6-2001. Petitioner is the widow of late Khurshid Ahmad while respondents Nos.1 and 2 are the children of late. Khurshid Ahmad out of his marriage with Mst.
Shafqat Bibi who was divorced by Khurshid Ahmad before his death. During his life time, late Khurshid Ahmad insured his life through two Insurance policies one issued by Eastern Federal Life Insurance' and the other by Postal Life Insurance. The said policies became payable on the death of late Khurshid Ahmad and a sum of Rs.10,72,500 became due on account of the said policies. On 27-7-2001, respondents Nos.1 and 2 through their mother filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against respondents Nos.3 to 5 who were responsible for the issuance of the aforesaid life Insurance Policies. The respondents Nos. 3 to 5 filed their written statement on 281-2003 wherein it was stated that the petitioner, being a nominee in the said insurance policies, had received from them the insurance amount to the tune of Rs.10,72,500.The learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 28-1-2008 dismissed the suit of respondents Nos.1 and 2 whereupon an appeal was preferred which was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jhelum vide his judgment and decree dated 19-5-2009. In terms of the judgment and decree dated 19-5-2009, the suit was decreed in favour of respondents Nos.1 and 2 to the extent that the respondents Nos.1 and 2 were declared to be entitled to recover 3/8th share from the amounts of the insurance policies from the petitioner. Now through this writ petition the petitioners have assailed the judgment and decree dated 19-5-2009 by contending that petitioner No.1 being the nominee in the insurance policies, was the sole beneficiary and could keep the insurance monies to the exclusion of other heirs.
Reliance has been placed on PLD 1991 SC 731 wherein the Shariat Appellate Bench of the honourable Supreme Court has held that amounts due on account of benevolent fund and group insurance are not part of the estate as these assets are not acquired by the deceased during his life-time. It is also contended that the impugned judgment and decree does not take into account the fact that some debts out of the insurance money were paid on behalf of the deceased on account of installments payable in respect of some plot in the name of the deceased. Thirdly, it has been contended that recovery of money against the petitioners could not have been ordered as the suit of respondents Nos.1 and 2, as framed, did not seek such relief.
3. After going through the record as well as the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it appears that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived as the nominee under an insurance policy is a mere trustee of the amount received and cannot appropriate the same to his use or benefit but is bound to distribute the amount of insurance policy among the legal heirs as per their entitlement. There can be no debate on this point as the honourable Supreme Court in Mst. Omat-ul-Habib and others v. Mst. Musarrat Parveen PLD 1974 SC 185, has laid down as under:--- "The nomination merely confers a right to collect the money or to receive the money. It does not operate either as a gift or as a will and, therefore, cannot deprive the other heirs of the nominator who may be entitled thereto under the law of succession applicable to the deceased. The nominees thus collect as a trustee for the benefit of all persoiis entitled to inherit from the deceased employee."
' The ruling of the honourable Supreme Court has been followed in Messrs Latif Ibrahim Jamal v.
Controller of Estate Duty 1989 PTD 1027 and Mrs. Shaista Younas Khan and others v. Mrs. Asia Khatoon and others 1995 PLD 560, wherein while interpreting sections 38 and 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938, it was held that nominee in an insurance policy is a mere trustee who is bound to distribute the insurance monies among the legal heirs.
4. I also think PLD 1991 Supreme Court 731 is not applicable to the facts of the present case as the issue raised therein before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the honourable Supreme Court related to the entitlement of the nominee to benevolent fund under the Federal Employee's Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act, 1964. In this regard, I refer to the last para of the aforesaid judgment wherein it is made clear that the question of entitlement of a nominee under group insurance by reference to Shariat was not addressed as it was not part of the subject-matter of the appeal.
5. 'The present case simply involves the question of distribution of insurance money among the legal heirs which include not just the petitioner as a nominee but others including respondents Nos.1 and 2. Keeping in view the foregoing discussion, I have no hesitation in saying that the petitioner had no right to deny the other heirs from receiving their shares as per their entitlement.
The plea of the petitioner that the insurance money received has been utilized for re-payment of the debts of the deceased due in respect of remaining instalments for plot which he had purchased, does not appear to be supported by record. As regards the ground of suit not being properly framed either the Civil Judge has inherent powers to take notice of subsequent events and do justice to save the parties from unnecessary litigation.
4.(sic) For the reasons discussed above, I see no infirmity, illegality or irregularity on the part of the Courts below who have exercised their jurisdiction lawfully. No interference is called for by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction, therefore, this civil revision is dismissed with no order as to costs.