1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The dispute in this petition for leave relates to a square of land (hereinafter called the said square) in Chak No. 20, Tehsil Phalia in Gujrat District. The said square was granted to the first respondent for his bravery in the discharge of his duties as a Police Officer. Learned counsel admitted that this grant had been made in 1961 and thereafter the first respondent had developed his land. The petitioners before us, on the other hand, were evicted from village Narang when land was required for the construction of Kharian Cantonment, therefore, they were shifted to Tehsil Phalia, arid they or some of them claimed the said square. Therefore, Writ Petition No. 723 of 196'_ had been filed by them in the Lahore Seat of the West Pakistan High Court in order to challenge the grant of the said square to the first respondent, but this writ petition was dismissed in liming on 16- 12-1963 and this order was allowed to become final.
2. However, although no steps were taken -by the petitioners to challenge the dismissal of this writ petition, one Major Muhammad Yusuf approached the Member, Inspection Team on behalf of the petitioners and the Member, Inspection Team "moved the Board of Revenue" for the cancellation of the grant of the said square to the first respondent. Therefore by a letter dated 13th December, 1963 the Board of Revenue informed the first respondent that the grant of the said square had been cancelled, but according to learned counsel, this letter contained an assurance that the first respondent would be given some other land in compensation. Next, according to learnedcounsel, the first respondent challenged this order of the Board of Revenue in a review application, but as the review was dismissed, he filed a writ petition in the Lahore Seat of the West Pakistan High Court against the said order of 13th December, 1963 and the order dismissing his review petition. It is relevant to observe that the first respondent has given in his writ pettion full particulars of the manner in which he developed the said square together with particulars of the expense incurred by him in developing his land.
3. The first respondent had filed this writ petition only against the Pro--vincial Government, the Board of Revenue, the Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat and Major Muhammad Yusuf on whose intermeddling the grant in his favour had been cancelled. However, at some stage during the pendency of the writ petition the petitioners before us and/or their predecessor in-- interest had been impleaded in the first respondent's writ petition as respondents. Learned counsel was not able to inform us whether this application for impleading the petitioners (who were impleaded as respondents in the High Court) had been moved by the first respondent or by the petitioners themselves. Be that as it may, as the petitioners were impleaded in the first respondent's writ petition they were given full opportunity to contest it and they contested it. However, the writ petition was allowed by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court on 6-12-1974 on the short ground that the Board of Revenue's order of 13th December, 1963 was void, because admittedly it had been passed without hearing the first respondent, and because he held this order to be . Void, the learned Judge further observed :- "The fact that the petitioner went in review before the Board will be of no avail to the Department or the respondent, for, if the basic order is void then any superstructure raised thereupon falls automatically to the ground. Yusuf All v: Muhammad Aslam Zia and others PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104 refers. The petition succeeds leaving the parties, to bear their own costs.
4. Accordingly, as the first respondent's writ was allowed, the petitioners have filed this petition, for leave.
5. Mr. Qureshi's first .Objection was that out of 56 persons, who had been impleaded as respondents in the writ petition under appeal, ten had died during the pendency of the writ petition and as the first respondent had not taken any steps to implead the legal heirs of these deceased respondents, the writ petition had abated, and therefore, the judgment of the learned Judge vas void.
6. The plea ferns on a4echnicality and it is clear that none of the petitioners (who were respondents in the High Court) bad drawn the attention of the Lahore High Court that some of the respondents had died before the learned Judge pronounced his judgment allowing the first respondent's writ petition Therefore, we will not grant leave to examine a question which could have been but was not raised before the learned Judge.
7. Learned counsel's next submission was that the first respondent was not entitled to be heard, because the order of 13th December, 1963 was an administrative order and in the alternative, he submitted that the learned Judge had erred in. Relying on Yusuf Ali's case, because the first respondent had been heard by the Board of Revenue in his review application. The first limb of the submission does not merit examination, because it is contrary to the law repeatedly declared by this Court. Next, as to the effect of the review application filed by the first respondent, the question turns on the rule laid down by this Court in Collector, Sahiwal v. Muhammad Akhtar (1971 S.C M R 681). There Hamoodur Rehman, C. J., who pronounced the judgment of the Court observed at page 684 : "The Courts in Pakistan have, however, taken the view that where the giving of a notice is provided for by the statute itself, then the failure to give such a notice is fatal and cannot be cured. But where there is no specific statutory provision and reliance is only placed on the principles of natural justice and audi alteram parten, there if at some stage or other the person aggrieved has been given a fair opportunity of representing his point of view, then the defect, if any, in the initial order may be deemed to have been cured."
8. Learned counsel was not able to refer us to any provision of law under which the grant awarded for valour can be cancelled. But, even if it is assumed that the law permitting the cancellation of a grant for valour does not in terms confer a right of hearing on the aggrieved person then on the B law laid down in the case cited, the illegality in the order of the Board of Revenue dated 13-12-1963 could be cured only if the review application had given the first respondent "a fair opportunity of presenting his point of view" before the Board of Revenue.
9. Now, as a review lies on very narrow grounds, prima facie, the review could not have given the first respondent "a fair opportunity of presenting his point of view". Additionally, although the petitioners rely on the order of the Board of Revenue dismissing the first respondent's review application, they have withheld a copy of this order from us. We have, therefore, to assume that the review did not provide a fair opportunity to the first respondent to present his case, and therefore, on this ground, we agree C with the view of the learned Judge that the illegality in the order of 13-12-19631 was not cured by the hearing given by the Board of Revenue to the first respondent in a review application.
10. Additionally, although the case of the petitioners hinges on the assun p--tion that the Board of Revenue was entitled to cancel a grant made for a gallantry award, learned counsel was not able to show us any provision empowering the Board of Revenue to cancel such a grant. He submitted that the cancellation would fall under section 25 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, because the grant must have been under section 10 of this Act. Even on the assumption that the grant was under section 10 of this Act, we do not find anything in the provisions of section 25 which could lend the remotest support to the claim of the petitioners that D the Board of Revenue were competent to cancel a grant made for valour and that after the grantee had incurred thousands of rupees on developing the land in good faith.
11. The petition is without merit and is dismissed.