' The facts giving rise to this regular first appeal are that the appellant, Buland Khan, filed a suit for possession of certain land through pre-emption, against the respondent, Chiragh Din and others.
The appellant was directed by the Civil Judge. Who was seized of the suit, to deposit Zar-e-Panjam (1/5th of the sale price) before 8th April, 1979. The appellant did not do so and, instead, made an application on the said date for the extension of time for deposit of Zar-e-Panjam saying that he could not make the necessary deposit before the stipulated date on account of his illness. His request was opposed by the respondents but the learned Civil Judge allowed him to deposit Zar- e-Panjam before 30th July, 1979. The respondents were not satisfied with the order of the learned trial Court and, therefore, they challenged the same before an Additional District Judge by means of a revision petition. That petition was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge as he was of the view that the appellant had not placed sufficient material on the record to substantiate his plea of indisposition. Resultantly, the learned Additional District Judge set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge and rejected the plaint under subsection (4) of section 22 of the Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1913, for the appellant's failure to deposit Zar-e-Panjam within the time initially allowed to him. Feeling aggrieved by the revision order of the learned Additional District Judge, the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court.
2. As indicated at the outset, it is a first appeal. According to learned counsel for the appellant it has been filed under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal under section 96 lies against a decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction." When I asked the learned counsel as to how the present appeal was competent when the decree impugned herein was passed by the learned Additional District Judge not in exercise of original jurisdiction but in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction conferred on him under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was submitted by him that since the suit was decreed for the first time by the learned Additional District Judge the decree passed by him will be deemed to have been granted by a Court exercising original jurisdiction and, therefore, the instant appeal would lie.
3. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. As pointed out earlier, the rejection of plaint was ordered by the learned Additional District Judge in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction and not a Court of original jurisdiction. It was the order assailed before the learned Additional District Judge which had been passed by the Court of original jurisdiction, namely, the Court of Civil Judge who by that order, had extended time for deposit of Zar-e-Panjam by the appellant. The mere fact that the learned Civil Judge did not reject the plaint by refusing to extend time and thereafter the rejection of the plaint was ordered by the learned Additional District Judge in consequence of the revision petition filed by the respondents would not make the order of the learned Additional District Judge an order passed by a Court exercising original jurisdiction.
Therefore, in view of the present phraseology of section 96, the regular first appeal before me does not lie.
4. It is also not possible for me to treat this appeal as a regular second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure because under the said provisions of law a Second appeal can be filed against a "decree passed in an appeal" by any Court subordinate to a High Court. The decree which is subject-matter of the present appeal was not passed by the learned Additional District Judge in appeal but in the revision filed by the respondents. Therefore, the appellant cannot avail of the provision of section 100 either.
5. Another difficulty confronting the appellant is that he cannot take exception to the impugned decree by filing a revision petition to this Count because according to subsection (4) of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure no proceedings in revision can be entertained by the High Court against an order made by a Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. As stated earlier, the impugned order too was passed by the learned Additional District Judge in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction. It is, therefore, not possible for me to treat this first appeal as a revision petition.
6. The result, therefore, is that the present appeal cannot be entertained as an appeal or a revision petition. It is, therefore, dismissed in limine.