1. DORAB PATEL, J-By this application the petitioners seek a review of our order dated 11th November,1979 by which we had dismissed the petition for leave filed by the petitioners against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court dated 7th March, 1979. As the facts relevant to this petition have been set out at length in our order of l l th November, 1979, it would be sufficient to observe here that the petitioners are the heirs of one Dr. Muttaqi, who had a controlling in-- terest in the Muslim Insurance Company. Mr. Zafar admitted that there had been serious charges against Dr. Muttaqi who was declared a delinquent under section 106 of the Life Insurance Act (hereinafter called the said Act) and his liabilities to the Muslim Insurance Com--pany with interest stood at about Rs. 36 lacs when we passed order of 11th November, 1979.
2. Proceedings for the recovery of the amount due from Dr. Muttaqi were initiared more than seventeen years ago, and, his shares in the Muslim Insurance Company were attached and sold.
3. The first lot of shares was sold on 23rd August 1978 and the second lot on 8th February 1979 by orders of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court. Therefore, the petitioners had challenged these orders in an inter-Court appeal in the Lahore High Court and as that appeal was dismissed they had filed a petition for leave which was dismissed on l1th November, 1979.
4. Mr. Zafar seeks a review of our order dismissing his petition for leave, and, according to learned counsel, there were three errors in our order, but they related only to our observations and findings about the sale of the second lot of shares on 8th February, 1979.
5. As we had, in our order, approved of this Court's judgment in Naeem Finance Ltd. And another v.
6. Bashir Ahmad Rafiqui, Administrator, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. And another (1), according to Mr. Zafar we had held that the provisions for the sale of movable property contained in Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code were applicable to sale under the said Act, but as the sale of the second lot of shares was not by a public auction, it was in violation of the express provisions of rule 77 of Order XXI, and, therefore, our order upholding that sale was erroneous and this error amounted to an error apparent on the record.
7. This rather involved submission does not furnish any ground for a review, because even if we assume that the impugned sale should have been held, but was not held under Order XXI, rule 77 of the Civil Procedure Code, it would only mean that our order was erroneous. But, an order cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous or because a different view is possible. Secondly, after examining this Court's judgment in the case of the Naeem Finance Limited, we had expressly clarified that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were not applicable in terms to sales under the said Act. Therefore, the conduct of a party will always be relevant to his plea to the technicalities of the Civil Procedure Code, and, in this connection, after examining the conduct of the petitioner, we had observed that Mr. Zafar---s submission "does not merit examination on the further ground that it is contrary to the position taken by the petitioners in their application which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge" on 8th February, 1979. And we would recall here that the application, which was thus dismissed, had been filed on 29th January, 1979 long after the Official Receiver's notice of 18th December 1978 inviting offers for the second lot of shares. Yet the petitioners had never alleged in any of their applications that the method of sale adopted by the Court was against the provisions of Order XX1, rule 77 of the Civil Procedure Code. And, on the contrary, the attorney of the petitioners had submitted an offer for the shares, in pursuance of the Official Receiver's public notice, even in their application of 29th January, 1979, instead of challenging the method adopted for the sale, the petitioners had made a second and revised offer for this sale. In these circumstances, to grant them leave to examine their belated objection about the alleged violation of rule 77 would be to put a premium on dilatory tactics and there is no error much less any apparent error in our order of 11th November 1979.
8. Mr. Zafar then submitted that the learned Single Judge should have allowed the petitioners and the third respondent to bid before him on 8th March, 1979 when the sale was confirmed. The question was within the discretion of the learned Single Judge, and he rejected the prayer of the petitioners on cogent grounds. As the learned Judges of the Division Bench agreed with the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judg against the petitioners, no case whatever has beenmade out for interference by this Court. In any event, rule 78 of Order XXI is fatal of Mr. Zafar's objections, and we would clarify here that this rule was enacted in order to prevent delays in execution proceedings through frivolous objections, therefore, the equitable principle laid down in this rule is fully applicable to sales under the said Act.
9. Although this rule is fatal to this application, as we have heard Mr. Zafar at great length, we would now turn to what he described as the two other errors in our order refusing leave, and the first error according to learned counsel, was our observations that the only question in the petition for leave was "whether the petitioners were heard and whether the proceedings were conducted in a fair manner." Now, according to learned counsel, these observations were erroneous, because there was no justification for not selling the second lot of shares in the manner prescribed in Order XXI, rule 77 of the Civil Procedure Code. We have rejected the submission that the sale could be impugned because of the alleged violation of this rule, therefore, as this so-called second error is only an attempt to repeat the submis--sion, which we have already rejected, it is not necessary to discuss it further.
10. Finally, although this plea has not been taken even in the review petition, third error, according to Mr. Zafar, was our observation that the learned Single Judge had shown the utmost indulgence to the petitioners. We would, therefore, recall here that the petitioners had been allowed to take part in the sale of the first lot of shares, even though they had not submitted a signed tender. Then, when the second lot of shares was sold, the learned Single Judge had pointed out, in his order of 8th February 1979 that the attorney of the petitioners had submitted an offer of Rs. 93,881. As this was considerably lower than the third respondent's offer, by a strange coincidence which Mr. Zafar did not attempt to explain, the petitioners revised their offer to Rs. 1 lac in their application of 29th January, 1979. Although this offer was made long after the expiry of the date fixed for entertaining offers, the learned Single Judge allowed the petitioners to rely on this very belat--ed offer. As even this revised offer was less than that of the third res--pondent, it was not accepted and in is this background that the peti--tioners are aggrieved by our observation that the learned Single Judge had shown indulgence to them.
11. The criticism relates to a question of fact, namely, the conduct of the petitioners, and merely because a different view could have been taken of this question, it would not mean that there is any error ap--parent in our order. But, we must emphasize that in the circumstances discussed, we see no merit whatever in learned counsel's submission and we would reaffirm our view that the learned Single Judge had granted the utmost indulgence to the petitioners although they had been resorting to dilatory tactics.
12. The petition is without merit and is merely an attempt to re-argue the grounds on which leave had been sought. It is, therefore, dismissed.