1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, J.-These appeals, by special leave, arise from the common judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 23rd of October 1973, by which Writ Petition No. 2004 of 1964 was dismissed and L. P. Rs. Nos. 76 and 60 of 1972 were allowed.
2. The appellant is the same in both the appeals. She is the owner of Khasra No. 2383. Measuring 20 kanals,13 marlas and 93 sq. Ft. Herein described as 11-A, Lawrence Road, Lahore. She applied on 16th of December, 1963, for a no-objection certificate for constructing an ultramodern and air--- conditioned cinema house on this land ; and alongwith it she annexed six copies of the site plan and a copy of "Amerti" Khasra No. 2383 stating further that the locality was a predominantly commercial area and that the proposed cinema house would not be within 200 yards of any school or other building or hospital or mosque. By letter dated 15th of January, 1964, the District Magistrate, who was also the Secretary, Cinema Committee, Lahore recommended the case of the appellant to the Secretary, Government of West Pakistan, Information Department, Lahore, for the grant of No-Objection Certificate. It was specifically stated therein that the "Cinema Committee" had, under the housing scheme, allowed constructions of cinemas in the area for commercial purposes ; and that the area shown in the site plan was . "sufficient and suit--able". This recommendation was. Accepted by the Government of West Pakistan on 3rd of February, 1964, and a No-Objection Certificate was granted by the District Magistrate by his order dated 7th of February, 1964, which was valid for a period of one year. However, by order dated 4th of May, 1964, the District Magistrate, Lahore, withdrew the earlier order on the ground that the Government of West Pakistan did not consider it desirable to allow the construction of new cinema houses on sites situate in residential areas. Against the withdrawal of the no-objection certificate the appellant filed Writ Petition No 2004 of 1964 in the former High Court of West Pakistan on 1st December, 1964.
3. During the pendency of this petition, the appellant again applied on 5th of March, 1969, for the grant of no-objection certificates for two cinema houses and the Governor gave his approval on 17th of March, 1969. Accord--ingly, the District Magistrate issued the requisite certificates on 3rd of April, 1969. However, two conditions were imposed firstly, that the plan should be approved by the Lahore Municipal Corporation as well as by the P. W. D. And secondly, that the cinema houses should be air-conditioned, sound proof and fitted with all modern and latest equipment---s. This certificate was valid for a period of one year.
4. As the appellant was not able to construct the cinema houses within the prescribed period on account of some difficulty in obtaining the loan, she applied for extension of time which was extended up to 2nd of April,. 1971, by order dated 3rd of February, 1970. Again she was not able to construct the cinema houses during the extended period and she applied on 29th of March, 1971, for further extension of time but this time the District Magistrate caused a notice dated 6th of May, 1971, to be published in local newspapers inviting objections from the public. The objectors, namely, Jamat-e-Rabbani, Masjid Shamas, and Anjuman, Hazrat Shah Inayat, filed written objections which were considered by the Divisional Cinema Committee, Lahore, in its meeting held on 19th of May, 1971, and it also heard the attorney of the appellant and ultimately concluded that the objections were untenable and that the appellant had made out a case for extension of time. This recommendation was sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, which was approved and the District Magistrate, by order dated 12th of June, 1971, extended the time up to 2nd of April, 1972.
5. The objectors felt aggrieved by this order and filed Writ Petition No. 1274 of 1971 through their representatives which was subsequently withdrawn and thereafter respondents 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1976 filed Writ Petition No. 69 of 1972 and respondents 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1976 filed Writ Petition No. 129 of 1972 ; and both these petitions were dismissed in limine by a common order dated 15th of March, 1972, against which these respondents preferred separate Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 76 and t0 of 1972 which were heard alongwith Writ Petition No. 2004 of 1964 and by a common judgment dated 23rd of October, 1973, the Letters Patent Appeals were allowed and the writ petition was dismissed.
6. The High Court held that the . Divisional Cinema Committee did "not truly speaking consider the objections of the two sets of objectors" as it failed to record any finding in terms of rule 5 of the West Pakistan Cinematograph Rules, 1962, and treated the case as one of extension of time which in its turn depended on the no-objection certificate earlier granted without inviting objections and, therefore it bad no foundation in law. There was thus violation of rule 5 (1) and (2) of the Rules. The High Court further held that as no personal hearing was given to the objectors whereas the attorney of the appellant was heard by the Divisional Cinema Committee, it was an unfair treatment and, accordingly, there was no sufficient compliance of the rules of natural justice as the justice should not only be done but that it should appear to have been done." Therefore, for this reason as well the No-Objection Certificates had no legal basis.
7. Leave to appeal was granted to consider the following questions :- "(i) That the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petitions filed by the respondents in limine was in exercise of discretionary powers of the Court with which the Letters Patent Bench should not have interfered with lightly ;
(ii) that neither the Commissioner nor the District Magistrate, Lahore, nor the other members of the Divisional Cinema Committee acted in judicial capacity in granting a no-objection certificate to the petitioner for construction of the cinema on 11, Lawrence Road, Lahore. Their orders could not, therefore, be reviewed by the High Court in writ jurisdiction ;
(iii) that the learned Judges of the Letters Patent Bench were in error in holding that in granting No- Objection Certificate, the Government could not relax the application of Rules framed under the Cinematograph Act : such as the rule that a Cinema House may not be built in the proximity of a mosque or a school which is of directory nature ;
(iv) that the relevant rule does not require the recommending authority to give reasons for grant of a no-objection certificate ; . (v) that the learned Judges of the Letters Patent Bench did not give due consideration to the petitioners' case that in fact there was no mosque, shrine or school situated within 200 yards of the site of the cinema as alleged by the respondents ; and
(vi) that in granting the no-objection certificate the Government had taken into consideration the huge expenditure incurred by the petitioner on the construction of the cinema under the authority of the earlier no---objection certificate."
8. As the controversy essentially relates to violation of rule 5 (2), we would, accordingly, reproduce it here "(2) The District Magistrate shall take into consideration any local objec--tions and make recommendation to the Commissioner. Of the Division whether 'No-Objection Certificate' should be granted or not."
9. It is not disputed that the Divisional Cinema Committee was not com--petent to consider the objections or to recommend the grant of no-objection certificate. But the grievance before the High Court seemed to be that the objections of the two gets of objectors were not duly considered in the sense that they were not dealt with on merits and, there was, therefore, no finding recorded as against the objections which remedy were that the proposed site was situate almost adjacent to the mosque and Khanqa of Hazrat Shaikh Hafiz Muhammad Inayatullah Qadri alias Shah Inayat and the graveyard attached to it, and that a part of the proposed site of the cinema house was waqf property as it belonged to the said mosque and Khanqa ; and further that Masjid Shamas and the Mazar of Pir Hadi Rahnoma Shamsi were situate within a distance of 200 yards from the site and that Masjid Shohda. Catholic Church and the attached girls school and other places of worship and residential houses were also situate in close proximity of- the site in question. In this connection the further grievance was that the objectors were not heard although the attorney of the appellant was granted this indulgence.
10. Now, the question arises as to whether there was sufficient compliance of rule 5 (2) of the said Rules which merely requires that the objections "shall be taken into consideration". But there is no further' obligation that while recommending the case for the no-objection certificate, the reasons for not accepting the objections, should be given. Should it then be considered as an obligation to give the reasons for rejecting the objections when the word "con--sidered" sufficiently indicated that the Divisional Cinema Committee had deliberated on the objections and impliedly rejected them in the context of the material before it. The words "shall be taken into consideration" do not spell out an inquiry in the sense in which it is understood but require the District Magistrate or the licensing authority to consider the factors as enumerated in Rule 5 (1) while exercising the discretion to grant or to withhold the grant of a "no-objection certificate"; and as the rejection of the objections is not justiciable, either by way of an appeal or a revision, under the Rules, it would, therefore, be an excessive requirement to, insist that the reasons for the rejection should also be given. It is sufficient that it should appear from the order that the objections were duly considered.
11. Further, the Rule, as enacted, cannot be enlarged to make the giving of reasons obligatory as that is also not a requirement of natural justice. (See De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edition, page 195). The High Court, while dealing with the case of the concerned respondents, had itself not given any finding in this behalf although they had filed the site plans and ought it be said that in the absence of this consideration by the High Court the dis--cretion exercised by the Divisional Cinema Committee cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious so as to require rectification merely on a hypothetical plan.
12. The High Court further held that the Divisional Cinema Committee had given an unfair treatment to the objectors as they did not afford to them an oral hearing. Mr. S. M. Zafar vehemently urged that the attorney of the appellant was heard merely on the aspect of the extension of time for which he alone could have given the reasons ; and so far as the objectors were concerned, this consideration was irrelevant and, therefore, it was not necessary to give them a personal hearing.
13. He further contended that the sub-rule under consideration did not spell out a personal hearing and all that it requir--ed was the submission of written objections for the consideration of the District Magistrate or the licensing authority. In support of his submission he relied on Dr. Mumtaz Hussain v. University of Sind, Hyderabad and others(PLD 1966 Kar. 429in which it was held;- "A personal hearing before deciding a matter is not a necessary require--ment of the principle of natural justice. All that is necessary is a full and fair opportunity of making a representation or showing cause. What is a full and fair opportunity depends upon the facts of each case. In some cases it may be enough if a party has placed his point of view and has shown cause for the consideration of the authority, and no prejudice is shown to have been caused."
14. It was further held in this case that the right of personal hearing is intended to apply to cases of a judicial or quasi judicial nature and not to departmental or administrative cases which were governed from time immemorial by rules different from those obtaining in case of judicial or quasi- judicial nature. In support of the above conclusion, we may add here a passage from De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn., page 201 which clearly .Defines the situation :- "In the absence of clear statutory guidance on the matter, one who is entitled to the protection of the audi alteram partem rule is now prima facie entitled to put his case orally ; but in a number of contexts the Courts have held natural justice to have been satisfied by an opportu--nity to make written representations to the deciding body, and there are still many situations where a person will be able to present his case adequately in this way."
15. Viewing the present case according to the accepted notions, there is no inquiry envisaged by the sub-rule and the duty cast is to take the objection, into con--sideration which, by no means, also includes within it the duty to hear the objectors in person. It is different if the District Magistrate or the licensing authority needs clarification or some further information in which case he may, in his discretion. Give an opportunity to the objectors of a per--sonal hearing. But apart from it, the objectors did not indicate in the objections that they would like to be heard in person; and that this opportunity was denied to them. On this footing it is difficult to accept the conclusion of the High Court that they did not receive a fair treatment. This discussion is sufficient to dispose of the appeals and no additional points need be considered.
16. Accordingly, we allow the appeals with cost and set aside the order of the High Court in Letters Patent Appeals and recall the writs issued.