JUSTICE (R'I'D.) ABDUL HAFEEZ CHEEMA, CHAIRMAN--- This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24-112009 passed by the learned Presiding Officer Punjab Labour Court No,6 at Rawalpindi.
2. The facts of the case briefly are that the appellant-Union is CBA for the workers of the respondent-Factory. The Predecessor CBA of the appellant entered into a settlement with the management on 26-2-2008. The period of operation of the settlement was 3 years i.e, w.e.f, 1-4- 2007 to 31-3-2010 in terms of section 60(2) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. The life of the CBA which was three years under Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 was reduced to two years under Industrial Relations Act, 2008. In this view of the matter the appellant-Union was of the view that this period of the settlement would be reduced to two years by force of law, as such the settlement shall BE ceased to be operative after expiry of two years. They, therefore claimed that they have every right to issue fresh demands because the earlier settlement had come to an end.
3. The management of Lakson Tobacco Company filed a petition before the Punjab Labour Court No,6 Rawalpindi claiming that the earlier settlement was still operative and the CBA was not entitled to put any fresh demand during the currency of the earlier one. The CBA contested the petition and ultimately it was decided by the learned Labour Court that the settlement was still operative till 31-3-2010, as such the new CBA has no right to put up any demand.
4. Jeway Pakistan Worker Union, Lakson Tobacco Company Ltd., has challenged the decision of the Labour Court on the main ground that the Labour Court has failed to appreciate that under section 57 Industrial Relations Act, 2008 the settlement now shall be deemed to be only for two years by operation of law. As such the judgment may be set aside and they may be declared entitled to issue fresh demand. The appeal has been stoutly resisted by the management of Messrs Lakson Tobacco Company.
5. The facts of the case are not disputed between the parties that the settlement was entered into for three years and had to remain operative until 31-3-2010. Now the only issue is: "Whether in view of the curtailment of the life of the CBA to two years under Industrial Relations Act, 2008 the period of earlier settlement for three years shall by force of law stand reduced to two years only."
6. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that it stood reduced to two years by force of law and the interpretation of the learned Labour Court was clearly faulty.
7. On the other hand it was argued that the period of subsistence of CBA and that of settlement are two different phenomenons as such they could not be clubbed together.
8. Arguments have been heard and record has been perused.
9. The period of the settlement which has been provided under section 57 of the Industrial Relations Act, 200$ cannot be construed to be operative retrospectively. The earlier agreement entered into between the parties before the enforcement of Act, 2008 shall be governed by the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. Section 56(1)(d) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 lays down that a settlemenf or an award according to section 56 shall be binding on all the parties to the industrial dispute. Clause (c) postulates that it shall be binding on the heirs, successors or assignees of the employer in respect of the establishment to which the industrial dispute relates where an employer is one of the parties to the dispute. A CBA is entitled to enter into an agreement/settlement with the management for any period agreed to between the parties much beyond the CBA's own life. Reference in this connection can be made to an unreported judgment in Civil Appeals Nos.K-33 and K-34 of 1966 by the Honourable Full Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan wherein it was held: "It appears to me, however, that this is not a very convincing reason. Upon the wording of the legislation itself it is manifest that the Legislature was clearly making a distinction between the duration fixed by contract and the duration fixed by statute. In the case of a contract it is open to the parties to fix as long a period as they like, as, indeed, the agreement of 1962 has in the present case done. It is to continue for a period of ten years. But where this is not done the legislature steps in and fixes a minimum duration subject to the right of the parties to determine it thereafter by notice. The legislature has in doing so acted equally consistently with another well-accepted principle that the right of the employer and employee to regulate their relationship by contract should be interfered with as little as possible. Thus the law steps in only where the parties have failed to make provision by contract.
10. In this view of the matter, the appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.