' JAVED IQBAL, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against judgment dated 22.2.2007 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore whereby Criminal Appeal preferred on behalf of petitioner has been dismissed and judgment dated 27.4.2002 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Gujranwala has been kept intact whereby the petitioner was convicted under Section 302, PPC and sentenced to death with payment of Rs, 3,00,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased and in case of default to suffer S.I. For six months.
2. Precisely stated the facts of the case are that" Ghulam Rasool father of the complainant used to ply fruit Rehri to earn his livelihood, Ijaz Ahmad alias Ajju-appellant had purchased fruits of Rs, 400/- from him on different occasions. Ghulam Rasool-deceased demanded back the aforesaid amount time and again from the appellant who used to promise to pay back the same. On 28.8.1998 at about 10.30 a.m. The deceased went to the house of the appellant to get the amount.
As the appellant was not available, the deceased came back. At about 12.30 p.m. The deceased was going to bazaar to purchase cigarettes, while the complainant and his uncle Sher Muhammad were following the deceased so as to see off Muhammad Arshad/PW-9, a guest, who had come from Gujranwala. As soon as the deceased reached in front of the appellant's house, the appellant, while carrying, a pistol in his hand, came out of his house and attacked upon the deceased. He caused two successive tires which hit the deceased on the left side of his chest, in view whereof the deceased fell down. The PWs, who were witnessing the occurrence, tried to apprehend the appellant. The appellant, while threatening the PWs with pistol, declared that he had taught a lesson for demanding money. The appellant decamped from the spot. The complainant and his companions took the deceased in injured condition for medical treatment to Civil Hospital, Gujranwala, but he succumbed to the injuries before reaching the hospital. The motive, as stated above, was that the deceased was done to death by the appellant for demanding back the money outstanding against the appellant on account of purchase of fruits on different occasions". After completion of usual investigation challan was submitted and petitioner was tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Gujranwala which culminated to his conviction as per detail mentioned above. The appeal preferred on behalf of petitioner assailing the judgment of learned Sessions Court has been dismissed, hence this petition.
3. Mr. M. Javed Aziz Sindhu, learned ASC entered appearance on behalf of petitioner and argued with vehemence that prosecution has failed miserably to prove the guilt against the petitioner and no conviction could have been awarded on the evidence produced by the prosecution which is vague and sketchy. In order to substantiate his view-point it is pointed out that no reliance could have been placed on the statement of Khalid Javed (PW-8) being a relative of deceased and moreso various cases were registered against him qua sale of liquor and other narcotics and thus he was a man of dubious character. It is argued that the statement of Muhammad Arshad (PW-9) should have been discarded by the leaned Courts below being relative of the deceased and chance witness as he was . Residing two kilometers away from the house of deceased and there was absolutely no possibility of his presence in the house of deceased at the time of alleged occurrence. It is contended that FIR was lodged with a considerable delay which speaks a volume about deliberation and concoction.
4. The learned Deputy Prosecutor General while controverting the view-point as canvassed at bar on behalf of petitioner supported the judgment impugned with the submissions that the statements of prosecution witnesses have rightly been considered by the learned Trial Court, determination whereof has been upheld by the learned High Court and merely on the ground of inter se relationship the statements of prosecution witnesses which otherwise are forthright and confidence inspiring cannot be discarded. It is further pointed out that the medical evidence as led by the prosecution has supported the ocular version of prosecution witnesses. It is further contended that it was not essential for the prosecution to prove motive in view of the overwhelming evidence which has come on record against the petitioner.
5. We have carefully examined the above-mentioned contentions in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. We have minutely gone through the judgment impugned and perused the entire evidence keeping the defence version in juxtaposition with the eminent assistance of learned ASC on behalf of petitioner and learned Deputy Prosecutor General for State.
In our considered view the evidence led by the prosecution being worthy of credence, forthright and confidence inspiring has been considered by the learned -Trial and Appellate Courts strictly in accordance with law and the principles enunciated by this Court qua the appreciation of evidence.
No specific infirmity or irregularity could be pointed out showing that the evidence has not been appreciated in its true perspective. We have carefully examined the statement of Khalid Javed (PW-8) and statement of Muhammad Arshad (PW-9) who stood firm to the test of cross- examination and nothing beneficial could be extracted rendering any assistance to the case of petitioner. It is well-settled by now that merely on the ground of interse relationship the statement of a witness cannot be brushed aside. The concept of "interested witness" was discussed elaborately in case titled Iqbal alias BaN v. The State (1994 SCM R 1) and it was held that "friendship or relationship with the deceased will not be sufficient to discredit a witness particularly when there is no motive to falsely involve the accused. The principles for accepting the testimony of even an interested witness are set out in Nazir v. The State (PLD 1962 SC 269). In Khalil Ahmed v. The State (1976 SCM R 161) the testimony of deceased's son aged 15 years wa accepted as he was not personally involved in any act of enmity and his statement was consistent, corroborated by the presence of injuries on his person, human blood-stained articles recovered from the accused and supported by two other witnesses. In Allah Ditta and others v. The State (1970 SCM R 734) the testimony of four P. Ws. Out of which two had sustained injuries was accepted although they were' related to the deceased because they were natural witnesses, injuries sustained by two Prosecution Witnesses proved their presence and involvement in the occurrence and there was motive on the part of the accused to attack the deceased. Further their evidence found support from the medical evidence. Reference can also be made to Muhammad Akbar v. Muhammad Khan and others (PLD 1988 SC 274) and Shehruddin v. Allah Rakhia (1989 SCM R 1461 at 1465) where testimony of injured witness was accepted. In assessing the value of evidence of eye-witnesses it is necessary to examine whether in the facts and circumstances of the case their presence at the scene of occurrence in such a situation as would make it possible for them to witness it should be believed and further that whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In Din Muhammad v. Crown (1969 SCMR 7775 it was observed that to test the testimony of a witness Court should not only consider whether there is consistency in the narrative, but should also consider whether the version is probable or not (Shoukat Ali v. The State PLD 2007 SC 93).
6. On the touchstone of the criterion as mentioned herein above the statements of Khalid Javed (PW-8) and Muhammad Arshad (PW-9) have been examined and they by no stretch of imagination can be termed as "interested witnesses" and their version has rightly been considered and believed by the Courts below. We are not persuaded to agree with the contention of learned ASC on behalf of petitioner that the statement of Muhammad Arshad (PW-9) being a chance witness should have been ignored for the simple reason that nothing has come on record showing that Muhammad Arshad (PW-9) was a chance witness and merely on the ground that his residence was located at a distance of two kilometers away from the house of deceased cannot be made a convincing ground to discard his statement. It is worth mentioning that chance witness is a person who cannot account for his presence at a particular place at a particular time. It is worth mentioning that Muhammad Arshad (PW-9) is son-in-law of deceased and before the occurrence his wife and son arrived in the house of deceased and a day prior to the occurrence Muhammad Arshad (PW-9) visited the house of deceased to see his wife and child which is neither unusual nor something amazing. It is well-settled by now that "a chance witness who is named in the FIR and found independent and trustworthy can be relied upon safely". In this regard reference can be made to the case titled Irshad alias Shada v. The State (1971 SCM R 655).
7. The eye account has been corroborated by medical evidence and the- factum of absconsion.
The petitioner was arrested by Muhammad Akram Khan, SI (PW-12) on 23.10.1999 about one year after the occurrence. The prosecution has proved the factum of absconsion by producing Naeem Ullah, ASI (PW-2), Faqir Ullah, SI (PW-13) and Maqbool Ahmad, Inspector (PW-14). It may not be out of place to mention here that "the Court can accept the testimony of an interested witness without any corroboration if the same is found reliable but as a matter of prudence the Court insists on the corroboration of his evidence when he is labelled inimical or chance witness. In this regard reference can be made to the case titled Sohni v. Bahaduri and 5 others (PLD 1965 SC 111), Abdul Ghaffar v. The State (PLD 2007 SC 467).
8. We have also examined the prime contention of the learned ASC that prosecution has failed to prove motive against the petitioner for commission of alleged offence I benefit whereof is to be given to the petitioner which seems to be devoid of merit because it is not mandatory for the prosecution to prove motive. It is worth mentioning that for the last so many years the judicial consensus seems to be that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive irrespective of the fact whether it has been alleged or otherwise. The question of motive, its import and significance has been examined by this Court in case of Waris Khan v. The State (2001 SCM R 387) which was authored by one of us (Mr. Justice Javed Iqbal) wherein it was held as follows:-- ' "It is well-entrenched legal position that a weakess of a motive or its absence or where alleged but not proved would hardly make any difference in case the eye account is worthy of credence, unimpeachable, confidence-inspiring and accusation established beyond shadow of doubt. Let we mention here at this juncture that the principles as laid down a few decades ago regarding motive are still in force which can be summarized as follows:-- ' "Proof of motive or previous is not necessary to sustain a conviction for murder in a case where a person is coolly and barbarously put to death [(1867) 7 W.R.) (Cr.) 60; 1932) 11 Pat.280] or when the offender is caught red-handed while committing murder. [(1929) 31 Cr.LJ 774, 30 P.L.R. 749]. Where the fact of murder has been clearly established, it is by no means incumbent on the prosecution to show what particular motive actuated the criminals mind and induced him to commit the particular crime. [(1924)
26. Cr.LJ 774, (1925) AIR (L) 328]. Where however, the persecution puts forward a substantive case as to the motive for the crime, the evidence regarding the motive has got to be considered in order to judge the probabilities. Failure to prove motive, however, cannot outweigh the positive evidence as to the crime. [(1924) 41 C.L.J. 35, (1925) AIR (C) 525]. The motive may never be discovered and the suggestion of a motive possibly a wrong motive, may lead the Court astray. [(1930) 8 'Q.W.N. 107, (1931) AIR (0) 119]. But motive for a crime, while it is always a satisfactory circumstance of corroboration when there is convincing evidence to prove the guilt of an accused person, can never supply the want of reliable evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the commission of the crime with which he is charged. "[(1926) 7 Lah. 84, 89].
9. It was held in the year 1938 in case Tun Khine v. King (40 CrLJ 49: AIR 1938 Rang. 331) that "it is not part of the prosecution's duty to suggest a motive for a crime; nor it is any duty of the Court to determine why an offence was committed". It is noticeable that "where there is clear proof of motive for the crime that lends additional support to the finding, of the Court that the accused was guilty, but the absence of clear proof of motive does not necessarily lead to the contrary conclusion. The absence of proof of motive has this effect only, viz. That the other evidence bearing on the guilt of the accused has to be very closely examined: Atley v. State AIR 1955 SC 807).
10. Besides what has been held a few decades ago the scrutiny of judicial precedents and principles laid down while discussing motive would reveal that no substantial change whatsoever has been made except in. a few cases where benefit was given to the accused on the ground that the motive remained shrouded in mystery. We also intend to discuss the latest pronouncement to clarify the ambiguity, if any, in this regard. It was held in case Talib Hussain v. State (1995 SCM R 1776) as follows:-- ' "We may point out that there is no legal requirement that in order to award maximum penalty of death in a murder case, the motive should be alleged' and proved. If the prosecution proves the case against an accused in a murder case beyond reasonable doubt, the normal sentence is death. If above normal sentence is not to be awarded, the Court is to make out a case for reduction of sentence on the basis of mitigating circumstances".
' It was held in case State/Government of Sindh v. Sobharo (1993 SCM R 585) as follows-- ' "Absence or weakness of motive does not come in the way of the case of prosecution and can be condoned if there is otherwise strong and reliable evidence in support of the case".
' The same view was followed in case Mushtaq Ahmad v. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 1975 SC 160).
"While discussing motive it was observed in case Manzoor Ahmad v. The State (PLD 1983 SC 197Y as follows:-- ' "Failure of motive sometimes to be found to have reacted on manner of appreciation of deposition while in other cases such circumstance not to make any dent in prosecution case insofar as question of guilt or otherwise of accused be concerned: 1982 SCM R 781, 1981 SCMR 175, PLD 1975 SC 227, PLD 1974 SC 87, PLD 1969 SC 127 and 1968 SCM R 502."
' In case Sardar Ali v. State (1969 SCM R 542) it was held that "motive is useful in appreciating and evaluating evidence but itself no proof of crime charged."
' In case Ahmed Nisar v. State (1977 SCM R 175) it was held as under:-- ' "Generally speaking motive, more or less, is a guess on the part of the prosecution witnesses. What truly motivates an accused person to commit a crime is best known to him and not to others.
Absence of motive or failure on the part of the prosecution to prove it does not, therefore, adversely affect the testimony of the eye-witnesses if they be otherwise reliable."
' The concept of motive remained a subject of comprehensive elucidation and discussion in case Abdul Wahab v. State (1999 SCM R 1668) wherein it was held as follows:-- ' "Motive shrouded in mystery" is not a legal principle which can be applied in all murder cases for reduction of capital sentence where there is no motive alleged/proved by the prosecution or where initially a motive is alleged but the same is not proved or withdrawn or a different motive appears in the prosecution evidence. 'Motive shrouded in mystery' by itself is not a mitigating circumstance for lesser sentence. Where -there is no motive alleged but the guilt of the accused is otherwise established on the basis of evidence, it could be said that in such a case the motive is "shrouded in mystery" and that it cannot be said as to what was the precise and immediate reason for the murder. But there is no legal requirement that, in order to award maximum penalty of death in a murder case, the motive should be alleged and proved and that, if the prosecution proves the case against any accused in a murder case beyond reasonable doubt. The normal sentence is death. If the normal sentence was not awarded, the Court is required to make out a case for reduction of sentence on the basis of mitigating circumstances. Therefore, in murder cases where no motive is alleged, the same remains shrouded in mystery; yet, if the prosecution establishes its cases against the accused beyond reasonable doubt; the normal sentence awarded in such case is death, unless there are mitigating circumstances justifying award of lesser sentence.
' When the plea is advanced that motive is shrouded in mystery, evidence or circumstances should be such that there is a definite indication or inference that murder must have been taken place on account of provocation or other reason of the kind that could be considered as mitigation circumstances for reduction of sentence, but merely advancing a plea that the motive is shrouded in mystery by itself is not sufficient to make out a case for lesser sentence. Facts and circumstances of each case are considered to find out whether there are any mitigating circumstances justifying reduction of sentence."
' The said conclusion was derived after having considered the following authorities:-- ' "Wali Muhammad v. Bajoo 1978 SCM R 257, Sher Ali v. State 1980 SCM R 291, Ghulam Nazir v. State 1981 SCM R 805, Sher Daraz Khan V. State 1983 SCM R 266, Arif v. State 1984 SCM R 124, Mati-ur- Rehman v. State 1985 SCM R 489, Ahmad Khan v. State 1985 SCM R 975, Faqir Masih v. Mubarik Masih 1987 SCM R 697, Nabi Bakhsh v. State 1988 SCM R 213, Abbas Hussain v. State 1992 SCM R 320, Roheeda v. Khan Bahadur 1992 SCM R 1036, Muhammad Ishaque Khan v. State PLD 1994 SC 259, Zulfiqar v. State 1995 SCM R 1668, Intizar Hussain v. Muhammad Sarwar 1996 SCM R 872, Ghuncha Gul v. State 1971 SCM R 368, Muhammad Nazir v. State 1985 SCM R 507, Fazal Ghafoor v. State 1987 SCM R 136, Muhammad Mushtaq v. State 1973 SCM R 219, Ali. Hussain v. Mukhtar 1983 SCM R 806, Nawaz Khan. v. Ghulam Shabbir 1995 SCM R 1007, Talib Hussain v. State 1995 SCM R 1776, Muhammad Iqbal v. The State 1984 SCM R 1184, Muzammal Din v. Nur Hussain and others 1985 SCM R 495, Abdul Aziz v.
The State and others 1994 SCM R 35, Muhammad Siddique v. The Statd 1994 SCM R 88, Muhammad Bashir v. Khalid Mehmood and another 1994 SCM R 1096, Muhammad Din v. The State 1994 SCM R 1847 and Noor Muhammad v. The State Criminal Appeal No, 174 of 1995, 1999 SCM R 2722."
8. No doubt that there are certain authorities wherein somewhat different view has been taken such as Naubahar v. State 1999 SCM R 637, Mir Khan V. Satbbirai 1968 SCM R 1225, Ghulam Ullah v.
State 1996. SCMR 1887 and Muhammad Yaqoob v. State 1999 SCMR 1138 but thereafter the consistent view of this Court on the proposition as mentioned hereinabove has not been changed.
In view of the overwhelming law available on the subject there would be no justification for the constitution of larger Bench as the controversy has been set at naught completely and in a comprehensive manner". (Ashfaq Ahmed v. The State 2007 SCMR 641).
9. We have kept the defence version in juxtaposition which seems to be absurd and without substance for the simple reason that it was not possible for a son to kill his father that too in a ,broad day light and. In a thickly populated place which object could have been achieved conveniently at home. Various contradictory suggestions were made to the prosecution witnesses in this regard which have rightly been ignored. The arrest of deceased in a gambling case by the police as suggested could not be proved and even no such suggestion was made to the Investigating Officer which otherwise has no bearing on merit, of the case. Even otherwise a bald suggestion carries no weight in the absence of any convincing evidence and hence the question of believing the defence version which seems to be unfounded does not arise. The defence plea has rightly been discarded by the learned Courts below. We have also adverted to the question that FIR was got lodged with delay which is not inconsonance with the record which is indicative of the fact that FIR was got Lodged at 1.30 p.m. And hence there was no possibility of deliberation or concoction.
10. After having gone through the entire record we are of the considered view that prosecution has established the guilt to the hilt by producing cogent and concrete evidence which cannot be discarded on flimsy grounds. No illegality or infirmity could be pointed out .Warranting interference in the judgment impugned. The petition being devoid of merits is dismissed and leave refused .