1. ' SYED ZAKIR HUSSAIN, J.---This suit has been filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants for the relief as follows:-- "(A) For a Declaration that the plaintiffs are the lawful co-owners of the suit property, namely, an area of 10 acres of land in Deh Okewari, District East Karachi, bearing Survey Nos. 310, 311 and 312, which has been purchased by the plaintiffs for valuable consideration and which has been leased out to the plaintiffs for 99 years, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to hold and enjoy the suit property during the entire period of the lease;
(B) For a Declaration that the Order, dated 22-2-1999 (P-22) passed by the defendant No,1 is null, void ab initio, inoperative, illegal, without jurisdiction and lawful authority, and has no legal effect, and that the said order has been passed by defendant No,1 in violation of and in contradiction to the aforesaid confirmed status quo orders passed by this Hon'ble Court in Suit No,1017 of 1997;
(C) For a declaration that the order, dated 22-2-1999 (P-22) passed by the defendant No,1 has not affected in any manner whatsoever plaintiffs' rights, title, interests, possession and construction in respect of the suit property;
(D) For Specific Performance against defendants Nos. 2 to 6 directing them to fulfil/complete their remaining part of the Agreement (P-10), dated 4-11-1997 in respect of the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs;
(E) Direct defendants Nos.1 and 7 to complete transfer and mutation of the Suit property in the names of the plaintiffs in the relevant record of Rights, and further direct the defendant No,7 to forward the layout plan of the suit property to Master Plan Department of K.D.A., which has been illegally stopped because of defendant No, l's aforesaid illegal order;
(F) For permanent injunction restraining defendants Nos. 1 and 7, their agents, representatives, assigns, officers, or any other person/persons acting directly or indirectly through them, jointly and severally, from acting upon the aforesaid illegal order, dated 22-2-1999, and/or from cancelling the allotment and mutation of defendants 2, 3 and 4 and subsequent leases in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property, and/or from dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit property, and/or from interfering in any manner whatsoever in plaintiffs' possession and title of the suit property and the construction carrying thereon;
(G) For any other/additional relief(s) that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and property in the facts and circumstances of this case; and
(H) Costs of the Suit."
2. ' The facts in brief are that the plaintiffs purchased the landed property bearing Survey Nos. 310, 311 and 312, in Deh Okewari, District East, Karachi, from the private defendants Nos. 2 to 4, through their attorney, the defendant No,5, for consideration of Rs,2,500,000.00, the payment whereof, has been made as per settled schedule of payment agreed upon in that behalf between the parties.
3. ' The Board of Revenue, the defendant No,1, passed an order on 22-2-1999 thereby cancelling the original order of allotment of the plaintiffs (on the basis of which, the said sale transaction stood struck between the parties), holding the same as bogus being obtained on no legal footings. The plaintiffs, however, could not get the final transfer deed executed, and the mutation effected, in their favour, in the record of rights, in virtue of the said sale transaction, for the obvious reason indicated above, hence, they filed this suit for the aforesaid reliefs. The defendants filed the joint written statement and denied the transaction and claim of the plaintiffs. The defendant No,1 filed an application under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. Which was heard on the last date of hearing, i.e, 24-2- 2010, on which date, the plaintiffs were called absent. Learned counsel for the defendants argued at length and stated that the matter involved in the suit, had already been brought in Court by the same plaintiffs, under adjudication in several other suits, before the present suit was filed, for the same purpose and which are either pending adjudication or dismissed in default and for non- prosecution. The suit, therefore, is barred under sections 10 and 11, C.P.C. The same is also hit by the provisions of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act as to the extent of the relief of declaration, which cannot be sought for, on the basis of the sale agreement, and which can always be available only to the person already holding a right to property, whereas a person under a sale agreement, is holding a right not to the property, but to get a right to the property, for which, his remedy is to sue for specific performance of the contract of such sale only, and the suit for the relief of specific performance, too, according to the learned counsel, is not maintainable since the allotment order/title of the defendants, on the basis of which, the sale transaction had taken place, was found to be bogus, and, so declared by lawful authority. Besides, the said order, is not open to be questioned, particularly, by the plaintiffs, and more particularly; in the manner, they have brought it is dispute, before this Court. It was/were, actually the purported allottee (s), i.e, the said private defendants, who could have challenged it and that, too, before the revenue authorities, particularly, when the judicial order, dated 22-2-1999 was passed by the Member (RS & EP), Board of Revenue, who thereby declared the said allotment order as illegal, bogus, and void, as already stated above, in presence of the said defendants, being contestants of the matter thereof, yet they did not challenge the same before any competent forum, to date throughout, while on the contrary, when they appeared in the Suit No,1017 of 1997, on 30-11-1999, being defendants thereof, they negated their own claim, if any, as to the aforesaid sale transaction, by way. Of affidavits filed therein together with the statement (given before the First Class Magistrate), of one of them, to such effect, which were taken by the Court on record on 30-11-1999. The said suit was dismissed on 11-4-2000.
4. Other suits on the same subject-matter, are Suits Nos. 684/99 and 793/99. The said suits were ordered by the Court in the Suit No,1017/1997 on 20-3-2000, to be tagged, for being hearing together. The said transaction of sale pertains to the date falling after the date of grant of status quo order on the same subject-matter, in the said dismissed suit. Therefore, in the light of what has been highlighted above, the suit is hit by the provisions of sections 42, 54 and 56 of the Specific Relief Act. Besides, the same is hit by doctrine of res judicata, too, and hence, barred by section 11, C.P.C. While the pendency of the earlier suits on the same subject, between the same parties, involving directly and substantially, the same issues, by itself, operates as bar against the proceedings of the instant suit being filed subsequent thereto, and such proceedings are bound to be stopped under section 10, C.P.C. As such.
5. ' The last but not the least, the learned counsel stated, that the Board of Revenue and the Deputy Commissioner, Karachi (East) are wrongly sued and the government is a necessary party, which has not been sued and, therefore, the suit is also hit by the provisions of section 79, C.P.C. And Article 174 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Learned counsel, however, elaborated that the Board of Revenue is not government in terms of the said provision of law and cannot be sued in its present form since the same is neither natural nor legal person nor corporate sole, in terms of the provisions of Order I, Rule 3, C.P.C. In support of the contentions, reliance has been placed on the case of Government of Balochistan, CWPP&H Department and others v.
6. Nawabzada Mir Tariq Hussain Khan Magis and others reported in 2010 SCM R 115, relevant portion whereof reads as under: "(3) A bare perusal of the lease granting order, as reproduced hereinabove, would reveal that it was mainly granted to consider as to whether the suit was instituted properly to the provisions as enumerated in Article 174 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and section 79, C.P.C. As admittedly the Government of Balochistan was not impleaded as party through the Secretary concerned. The question which needs determination would be as to whether without impleading the Provincial Government of Balochistan, the suit instituted by the respondents can be considered a validly instituted suit in view of the provisions as enumerated in section 79, C.P.C. Which is reproduced here in below for ready reference:-- "(79) Suit by or against the Government:---In a suit by or against the Government the authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, shall be---
(a) in the case of a suit by or against the Federal Government, Pakistan;
(b) in the case of a suit by or against a Provincial Government, the Province;"
7. ' Reliance is also placed on the case of Secretary, B. & R., Government of West Pakistan and 4 others v. Fazal Ali Khan, reported in PLD 1971 Karachi 625, the relevant paragraphs thereof, run:- "(6) It will be seen from sub-rule (2) of the above rule that where no application is made by the Government Pleader under sub-rule (1), "the case shall proceed as in a suit between private parties." This is exactly what has happened in the present suit. The Assistant Government Pleader who appeared for the appellants in the suit no doubt did conduct the defence on their behalf but he had not made any application such as is provided for under sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 cited above.
8. In these circumstances, it would be obvious that the suit proceeded as if it was a suit between private parties. The reported case, therefore, is of no avail to the respondent. Since the Provincial Government was a necessary party to the suit and was not a party to it, the suit must fail."
9. "(9) The second point which learned counsel for the appellants urged is that the suit brought by the respondent against the appellants in the form in which it was brought was not maintainable. On this question learned counsel has contended that the suit was brought against official designations or titles and not against legal or natural persons which is not possible under the law.
10. According to him, the appellants could not be sued with reference to their designations for their official acts, unless they were "Corporations sole", whereas they in fact are not. Only legal and natural persons can be sued as defendants in terms of Order I, Rule 3, C.P.C. When no statute provides that a public officer shall be a "Corporate sole" and can be sued in its corporate name, as the case here is, he has to be sued under the ordinary law which becomes applicable."
11. Being in agreement with what has been submitted by the learned counsel in support of the application, referred to above, I do hereby reject the plaint of the suit in hand under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. In the interest of justice. The said application being C.M.A. 3815 of 2000, stands disposed of accordingly. There is no order as to costs.