1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.-The present proceedings arise out of an order passed by Commissioner Workmen's Compensation under the Act known as Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923. The brief facts of the case are that Kaloo non-applicant was awarded compensation amounting to Rs, 6,300. He filed a review petition which was accepted and the amount of compensation was enhanced to Rs, 20,000. The order with regard to the enhancement of the compensation was passed on 23-10-1980. While the appeal against the same was preferred on 23- 10-1980. The Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation was arrayed as one of the respondents in the appeal. After the expiry of period of limitation an application was made on behalf of the appellant on 25-11-1980, praying that Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation had been arrayed as respondent under a mistake and a prayer for impleading Kaloo son of Faqir Khan as respondent and for deleting Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation as respondent was made. A notice was issued to Kaloo non-applicant who contested the application on the ground that he could not be impleaded as respondent because the period of limitation for filing the appeal against him had already expired and thus he was no more interested in the result of appeal.
2. ' The learned Additional Advocate-General has cited PLD 1959 Dacca 693 and PLD 1967 SC 426 in support of his contention. In former case the facts were that plaintiff, instead of suing in his real name, sued in his trading name and amendment was sought to rectify the mistake. It was held that correction as to the description of the name of the plaintiff did not amount to a substitution of new party and as such it was not hit by provisions of section 22 of Limitation Act. In latter case it was held that case was one for amendment to rectify the mis description of the party which did not amount to bring in a new party and as such bar contained in section 22 of Limitation Act was not applicable in the case. It is evident from the facts of the aforesaid cases that those pertained to the rectification with regard to the description of a party and not the substitution of a party as is sought in the instant case. Therefore, aforesaid authorities have no application to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, the point which needs determination is as to whether appellate Court has power to implead a person as party after the expiry of period of limitation, prescribed for appeal. Before dealing with the aforesaid point it would be expedient to survey some authorities on this point. In PLD 1963 SC 244, the objection was raised that appeal before the High Court was not properly constituted because one of the defendants was not made a party within the period of limitation. It was further held that as the defendant who was sought to be impleaded as respondent was not a necessary party the appeal was not rendered incompetent but it was opined that had the party sought to be impleaded been a necessary party, the objection would have pr evailed. In PLD 1951 B J 1, the view taken was that a person who was not impleaded as respondent within the period of limitation could not be regarded as a person interested in the result of appeal within the meaning of Order XLI. Rule 20, C. P. C. And as such could not be impleaded as party after the expiry of period of limitation. It was further held that section 151, C. P.
3. C., being a residuary provision could not be resorted to, for impleading a person in the appeal after the expiry of period of limitation. The provisions contained in Order I, rule 10, read with section 107(2), C. P. C., were held to be inapplicable because a special provision for impleading a party in appeal under Order XLI, rule 20, C. P. C., existed on the statute book. In PLD 1964 SC 559 prayer for impleading employer as party in the appeal after the expiry of period of limitation was made. The prayer was refused on the ground that power under Order XLI, rule 20, C. P. C., could not be exercised in case of extreme negligence, especially where a valuable right had accrued to such party by lapse of time. In PLD 1968 Kar. 47, the partners of the firm who were not necessary party were not impleaded within the period of limitation of appeal. A prayer of impleading the partners was refused on the ground that a valuable right had accrued to the partners because the period of limitation had expired. The appeal was held as incompetent and was dismissed. In PLD 1975 Lah.
4. 580, the prayer for addition of parties under Order XLI, rule 20, C. P. C., was rejected on the ground that discretionary powers in the aforesaid provisions were to be exercised with care and caution, especially where a valuable right had accrued to such party due to lapse of time. In AIR 1944 Lah.
5. 76, which is a Full Bench case, it was held that the appellant had no right to apply to add a party under Order XLI, rule 20, C. P. C., because the said provisions dealt with the discretionary powers of appellate Court which were exert sable by Court only suo motu. It was further held that at appellate stage a party could not be impleaded under Order 1, rule 2, read with section 107(2), C. P. C., because there was a special provision for impleading a party in the appeal under Order XLI, rule 20, C. P. C. In AIR 1927 P C 252, it was held that appellate Court rightly refused to exercise jurisdiction to implead party under Order XLI, rule 20, C. P. C., after the expiry of the period of limitation because party sought to be impleaded could not be said to be interested in the result of appeal as stipulated under Order XLI, rule 20, because such party was not impleaded within period of limitation and there was no appeal pending against such party. In another Full Bench case reported as AIR 1959 Pb. 277, view taken in AIR 1927 P C 252, AIR 1944 1_ ah. 76 and in numerous other cases was dissented from and it was held that Appellate Court had ample powers to bring a party on the record if such party had been left out due to bona fide mistake or due to the mistake of official of the Court in supplying an erroneous copy of the judgment or decree. It was held that no inflexible rule of interpretation of the words "interested in the result of appeal" had been given by Privy Council in AIR 1927 FC 252 and it must be decided on the facts of each case whether the person sought to be added is one "interested in the result of appeal". It was observed that interpretation of the aforesaid expression was only valid in the case in which it was given and had been erroneously followed in the subsequent cases. It was further opined that in proper cases the Court could resort to its inherent power to bring a party on the record. In another Full Bench case reported as AIR 1958 Andh. Pra. 743, the view taken was that although in case of application of provisions of Order XLI, rule 20, there was no bar of limitation yet party not impleaded within period of limitation was no more interested party in the result of the appeal and such party could not be impleaded by resorting to the provisions of Order XLI, rule 20.
6. ' The survey of the authorities shows that after the judgment of Privy Council reported as AIR 1927 P C 252, some Courts took the view that a party not impleaded in appeal within period of limitation, could not be impleaded under Order XLI, rule 20, because such a party could not be regarded as "interested" in the result of appeal as visualised under Order XLI, rule 20, while a contrary view was taken by others and it was held that the Privy Council ruling could not be taken as laying down an inflexible rule of interpretation of Order XLI, rule 20. It was held by these authorities that interpretation of the expression "interested in the result of appeal" by Privy Council was valid only in the case in which it was given. This view was expressed in AIR 1937 Mad. 741 ; AIR 1937 Bom. 401 and some other authorities.
7. ' After considering the reasoning in support and against the divergent views, we are of the opinion that Privy Council's view must be limited to facts of that case only. We are of the view that observations of Privy Council as referred to earlier, do not lay a rigid rule that a party who has not been impleaded in the appeal within period of limitation can never be deemed an interested party in the result of appeal. Otherwise, it would be difficult to conceive a case where right of appeal does not become barred, because under the Rule, the action is taken only on the hearing of appeal.
8. ' If rigid interpretation is placed on the rule, it would also stand in way of Courts in administering justice. After all, the purpose of procedure is to pave the way leading to justice and not hinder it. It is true that by expiry of period of limitation of appeal, the respondent obtains some sort of 'right' which has been termed in many cases as 'valuable right'. But if the delay in filing appeal is condoned under section 5 of Limitation Act the so-called 'valuable right' vanishes and argument that as a valuable right has accrued to opposite-party, the party omitted cannot be added, does not stand in the way of condonation of delay. In or opinion, by enacting Order XLI, rule 20, the Legislature intended to empower the Court to allow a party to be added to an appeal already filed, in cases where omission was caused B by a bona fide mistake or by no mistake of the party, seeking the addition of the party. The purpose for enacting Order XLI, rule 20 was more or less the same as the purpose of investing the Court with powers to condone the delay under section 5 of Limitation Act. Therefore, the argument that so-called 'valuation right' must be guarded at all costs is not tenable. The words "Interested in the result of appeal" can reasonably be interpreted to mean, parties who are to be affected by the decision of the appeal. The intention of Legislature appears to be that Court should exercise powers C under Order XLI, rule 20 qua the parties whose presence is actually necessary as opposed to those it is not. The power has been left to the discretion of the Court to pass order in each case, taking into consideration the cause for omission to implead the party at the time of filing the appeal. We are also unable to agree with the view that although Court can exercise such powers suo motu yet it is debarred from exercising such powers at the instance of a party. If the addition of party is necessitated by the circumstances of the case, it would not make any difference, if matter is initiated by the party.
9. ' It is difficult to believe that while enacting Order XLI, rule 20, the Legislature had intention to debar the Court to add a party who was not impleaded by appellant due to bona fide, honest and genuine mistake. We are fully fortified in or aforesaid views by Full Bench case reported in AIR 1959 Pb. 227 already referred to, wherein a thorough survey of the case law on the subject has been made.
10. ' Coming to the instant case, we are of the view that name of Kaloo, non-applicant was omitted due to a bona fide mistake, because no title of review petition is given on the attested copy of impugned order, as in such cases.
11. ' The upshot of the discussion is that we accept the application for arraying Kaloo, non-applicant as respondent in the appeal, in place of Commissioner Workmen's Compensation.