' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.--- The suit for the recovery of Rs,2,20,000 filed by the respondents against the petitioners was decreed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 2-4-2008; against the above, the petitioners filed an appeal but without affixing the court-fee; this appeal was admitted to regular hearing, however, on 1-7-2008, the Court directed the petitioners to make up the deficiency of the court-fee by 21-7-2008 (admittedly Rs,15,000 as court-fee was payable in the matter); the petitioners did not comply with the said order and resultantly, their appeal was dismissed on 21-7-2008; this revision petition against the said order and decree has been filed on 25-5-2009, which admittedly is barred by- time and along with the revision, an application under section 5 of the Limitation. Act, has been moved.
2. Learned counsel for the respondents, at the very outset, has raised an objection that the revision petition is barred by time. The learned counsel for the petitioners has explained that as on 21-7- 2008, their (petitioners) counsel was not present, rather Malik Khuda Bakhsh, Advocate appeared as their counsel, who otherwise was the counsel of the respondents, therefore, the order regarding the payment of the court-fee was not conveyed to the petitioners, thus it could not be complied with; even on 21-7-2008, when the order for dismissal of the petitioners' appeal was passed, none represented the petitioners, therefore, on this score as well, the petition shall be governed by Article 181; the petitioners came to know about the order impugned when "Ishtehar Nilaam" was affixed at their door before 29-5-2009 and this should, therefore, be considered as the starting point of limitation for the purposes of revision; he further states that under the provisions of section 115, C.P.C., this Court has suo motu jurisdiction to correct the order, which has been passed with material irregularity or is the result of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction; that the limitation period under the provisions of section 115, C.P.C. Shall run when the copy of the order has been handed over to the concerned party, which was not so delivered. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Muhammad Bashir v. Province of Punjab, and others 2003 SCM R 83 and Premier Insurance Company Pakistan Ltd. Through Chairman and another v.
Anis A. Sheikh 2007 CLC 511. Lastly, is stated that on account of the act of the Court, as none was present, the Court should not pass an order either directing for affixing of the court-fee or dismissal of the petitioners' appeal.
3. Heard. Admittedly it was a decree for the recovery of an amount of Rs,2,20,000 and the petitioners should have known that the appeal requires affixation of the court-fee of an amount of s.15,000 but contumaciously on such appeal, the court-fee has not been paid; though there seems to be some clerical error in marking the presence of the petitioners' counsel as also the respondents, yet it was the petitioners, who were directed to make up the deficiency in the payment of the court-fee and they themselves or their counsel should have verified and abreast of the said order. However, despite the above, the court-fee was not paid. It is absolutely ridiculous and misconceived to state that the petitioners for long did not get in touch with their counsel or themselves sought information about the fate of their appeal, which has already been dismissed on 21-7-2008 and if they were indolent and negligent in this behalf, it is they, who should be blamed.
' As regards the argument that the copy has to be provided to the petitioners' counsel in terms of section 115, C.P.C., when the petitioners applied for the copy by following the procedure it was provided to them, but it was not the duty of the Court to have sent the copy to the petitioners at their addresses given in the appeal; no law in this regard has been cited. Above all when the copy was applied by the petitioners, the limitation of 90 days had already elapsed. I am not convinced that any fraud has been practised by the respondents as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners in procuring the impugned order. No case is made out for interference in the revisional jurisdiction.
' In the light of above, this petition has no merits and the same is hereby dismissed.