1. MS. RUKHSANA AHMAD, J.---The case is kept for hearing of C.M.A. No,6728 of 2008 which is an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. In which the plaintiff has prayed for restraining the defendant No,1 from appointing any other brand ambassadors and from engaging services of any other celebrity/performers/artists/public personalities and/or any other persons to promote its products till pending and adjudication of the subject suit. The said application was heard by my learned brother on 26-6-2008, Where in the parties were directed to maintain status quo till next date of hearing. The learned counsel for the defendant No,1 has filed counter affidavit and also drawn the attention of this Court that the said contract which was executed with the plaintiff, dated 1-9-2006, for the period of two years which is expired and restraining his clients/public personalities for the promotion and against the interest of justice. He has contended that the very application is neither competent nor maintainable as the plaintiffs have no prima facie case before this Court and balance of convenience and inconvenience also lies in favour of answering defendants.
2. The very grant of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.0 is governed by the principles laid down in A sections 52 to 57 of Specific Relief Act, 1877. And section 56 of SRA clearly states "that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent breach of a contract, the performance of which cannot be specifically enforced". He has further contended that it is a well settled principle of law that a contract for personal services cannot be specifically performed keeping in view the provisions of section 21(6) of the SRA. The Advocate has drawn the attention of this Court to the plaint and the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs claim in the suit is based on an agreement, dated 1-9-2006 entered between plaintiff and defendant No,1 where under the plaintiffs were appointed brand ambassadors of the answering defendant No,1 for marketing and endorsement of the products. The learned Advocate has argued that grant of an injunction in favour of the plaintiffs will therefore be opposed to the very principles governing the grant of injunctions. He placed his reliance on 1974 SCMR 519:-- "Secondly it appears to us that none of the Courts have noticed that although ad interim injunction are granted under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the principles, which govern the grant of injunctions, contained in the Specific Relief Act have also to be kept in view. Under section 56, clause (0, one of the principles is that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which cannot specifically be enforced. Now it is well- settled that contracts for personal service are not contracts which can be specifically enforced.
3. The granting of an injunction, therefore, in a service matter, like the present one, is opposed to the principles governing the grant of such injunctions, for, by such an injunction the Courts really foist an employee upon an unwilling employer".
4. Secondly it is the contention of the learned Advocate of defendant No,1 that section 21(a) of the SRA clearly states that a contract for the nonperformance of which money is an adequate Relief cannot be specifically performed, hence no injunction can be granted on the basis of such a contract. The fact that the plaintiff have claimed damages against the defendant No,1 through the suit as evident in paras. 38 and 39 of the plaint and prayer clause (6)(f) and (g) this clearly established that money is an adequate relief for them and that the agreement is incapable of being specifically performed, thus no injunction can be granted by the Court on the basis of the agreement. That under section 54 of SRA an injunction can only be granted if it is proved to the Court that no standard existed for the calculation of damages suffered by the party to the contract and that pecuniary compensation could not be obtained. The plaintiffs have claimed damages in the suit, and this itself shows that the loss if any suffered by the plaintiffs can be ascertained in terms of money and therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled for grant of an injunction.
5. ' Reliance has been placed upon PLD 1992 Karachi 17 (Muhammad Raza v. Haji Abdul Ghaffar and 6 others). Relevant at page 20 wherein it was held:-- "...The plaintiff has already claimed the damages in his suit as mentioned in prayer clauses 1, 2 and 3 this itself goes to show that the loss, if any, sustained by the plaintiff can be ascertained in terms of money and therefore, he would not be entitled to grant of injunction..."
6. ' Further it has been argued by the Advocate that the fact that the agreement has been validly terminated by the defendant No,1 as the term of the agreement was two years starting from September 1, 2006 and since the said two years period has already completed on August 30, 2008.
7. No injunction can be granted by this Court.
8. Having heard the learned advocates, I am of the view agreeable to above contentions raised and argued by him and status quo granted c earlier is withdrawn and stands vacated and C.M.A.
9. No,6728 of 2008 is disposed of. As far as the C.M.A. No,9917 of 2009 the contention of the advocate for the defendant No,1 is that the plaintiffs are providing the address for service of defendants Nos.2 and 3 on same address of his clients defendant No,1 which is wrong and they do not have knowledge of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 addresses. This application copy it is contended by Advocate to have been given to the Advocate of the plaintiff but till today no counter-affidavit has been filed, the same is allowed prayed. Parties are directed to file their respective issues. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.