' S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Arz Muhammad has sled an appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 against the order dated 29th June, 1980 of respondent No. 1 impleading D. C., D.
0. Khan, Ahmed Ali son of Zafar Khan, Haroon Jalal son of Jalaluddin Khan Mazari and Commandant, B. M., P. D.
0. Khan. It has been prayed that the order of respondent No. 1 dated 29th June, 1980 may be set aside as being illegal and without lawful authority.
2. The brief facts of the case are as under :- ' The appellant and the pro forma respondent Haroon Jalal were appointed directly as Dafadar by the Commandant B.M.P., D.G. Khan (Political Assistant) respondent No, 4 vide his order dated 16th January, 1980 and 15th January, 1980 respectively. Taking exception to this appointment Ahmed All filed a representation before the Deputy Commissioner. In that representation it was urged on his behalf that the fifty per cent. Formula as laid down by the Commissioner in various orders for direct recruitment to the post of Dafadar had not been followed and he being in the B.M.P. Force for the last 19 years continuous service holding the rank of Lance Defadar was entitled to be promoted. It was also further said that the recruitment of the appellant as well as Haroon Jalal pro forma respondent was in fact a punishment inflicted upon him without affording him an opportunity of being heard. This representation was rejected by respondent No. 1 vide impugned order dated 29th Tune, 1980 whereby the respondent No, 4 was directed to adopt 50: 50 formula for filling the post of Defadar i,e, one by direct recruitment and the other through promotion amongst the other staff.
Aggrieved against this order the appellant filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, D.G. Khan. This suit did not materialize and the appellant was directed to file an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal (the only competent forum).
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the Respondent assisted by the Government Pleader and have perused the record of this case carefully with their assistance. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that under rule 3 of the 1935, B.M.P. Rules known as Dera Ghazi Khan Border Military Police and Baluch Levy Service Rules had empowered D.C. To appoint Jamadar or Subedar and in the case of remaining category of the service by the Commandant was the authority to make such appointments only. Relying on the above-mentioned Rules it was contended that D. C. Was not justified to pass the impugned order.
Similarly the learned counsel has taken exception to the impugned order on the grounds that vide Financial Commissioner letter dated 30th January, 1951 the order of the competent authority could not be reviewed by the D. C. It was also argued that the D.C. Was not vested with any powers to interfere with the orders of promotion passed under the Rules by respondent No, 4.
' On the other hand the learned Government Pleader supporting the parawise comments made by the Department before this Court raised his preliminary objections of jurisdiction. It was contended on his behalf that as the Tribal Area became territorially a part of the Punjab by virtue of Pakistan (Punjab Boundary) Order, 1950 and was known as 'Excluded Area' therefore the laws of the Punjab were not made applicable in this area. However, after lengthy arguments on this point he conceded that this Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate in such matters. However, he vehemently argued that in view of section 4 (one of the sections of Service Tribunal Act, 1974) no appeal could lie before this Tribunal unless the order pulled was 'final order' made by a departmental authority. He submitted that in the present case no such final order has been passed by the D. C. Respondent No. 1 in respect of the service of the appellant. All that the D. C. Has done is that he only remanded the case to respondent No, 2 the Political Assistant/Commandant B.M.P. For ultimate decision. The appellant has neither been removed from service nor has been discharged in any way. According to the learned counsel there was still fair chance that he may not be removed and be retained in service. The other point advanced by him was that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred. He repeated the history of the case by saying that the impugned order was announced in the presence of the appellant on 29th June, 1980 and the present appeal was filed on 17th August, 1980, exactly 49 days after the actual knowledge of the impugned order.
Section 4 (I) of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974 has specifically fixed 30 days as the limitation for filing appeal before this Tribunal. Lastly it was argued that the proviso (a) to section 4 (1) of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974 clearly provides that an appeal/ review or representation to a departmental authority was must, before any appeal could lie before this Tribunal.
' With regard to the merits of the case it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that respondent No, 2 was already in service of B. M. P. Was eligible for promotion to the post of Dafadar and was entitled to be considered for promotion by virtue of section 8 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The case of the respondent was fortified on the score that the Commissioner, Multan Division had directed that out of all the new vacancies in the B. M. P. 50% vacancies must be filled by promotion from serving members of the Force and the remaining 50% are to be filled through direct recruitment. In the present case both the vacancies were filled by way of direct recruitment by the Political Assistant/Commandant, B.M.P. An act against the expressed direction of the Commissioner.
We have given or anxious thoughts to all the arguments advanced byl both the sides and will refrain from entering into the merits of this case,' as appeal is liable to be dismissed on short ground of being premature.; The order of D. C. Cannot be considered a final order as envisaged vide', section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act. The appellant is entitled to seek" his remedy before this Court after a final order is passed against him by the competent authority and has also exhausted the available remedies open to him under the rule. The result is the appeal is dismissed as being premature.