' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.-- This petition for leave to appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 21st April, 2004 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, whereby Constitutional petition filed by respondents has been allowed, in compliance whereof petitioner-Government issued Challans dated 26th May, 2004 to respondents for depositing of conversion of land use charges and scrutiny fee amounting to Rs,2,100,000+Rs,600,000 (total Rs,2,700,000) respectively and needful has been done by them accordingly.
2. Learned counsel stated that petitioner-Government in principle has no objection for conversion of land use but claims charges/fee according to the policy issued in the month of January, 2004, therefore, the respondents be directed to pay charges as per the rate specified in the new policy.
3. Learned counsel for caveat opposed petitioner's claim on the premises that new policy wherein charges/fee has been exorbitantly increased shall be applicable prospectively, being an instrument dealing with fiscal matters.
4. We are afraid the contention so raised by the petitioner's counsel is not correct because it is settled principle of law that rights of the parties shall be governed/decided as per the law prevailing at the time when cause of action has accrued, particularly in the matters pertaining to fiscal disputes, unless manifestly intention of the law is otherwise as it has been held in the case of Mehran Associates Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 1993 SCM R 274. Relevant paras therefrom are reproduced herembelow:- ' The, appellant's case may fall under some other provisions of the Ordinance but unless we hold that they were the owner of the buildings, their case cannot be covered by subsection (13) of section 13 of the Ordinance. At this stage, it may be pertinent to refer to the well-settled principles of Interpretation of taxing provisions in a statute. In this regard, it may be advantageous to quote certain passages from the Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, Page 256, Crawford on Statutory Construction, 1940 Edition, pages 502-503, and Craies on Statute Law, Fifth Edition, page 106:- ' Passage from the Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, P.256: "Statutes which impose pecuniary burdens are subject to the same rule of strict construction. It is a well-settled rule of law that all charges upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language, because in some degree they operate as penalties: the subject is not to be taxed unless the language of the statute clearly imposes the obligation, and language must not be strained in order to tax a transaction which, had the legislature thought of it, would have been covered by appropriate words. In a taxing Act' said Rowlatt, J., 'one has to took merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be strictness of interpretation may not always ensure to the subject's benefit, for if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. As a general rule, and in accord with the prevailing view, revenue laws, and particularly tax laws, should be constructed in favour of the taxpayer and against the Government."
' Besides it, any instrument dealing with fiscal matters is to be construed strictly because it imposes financial burden in terms of money upon the person who claims relief under said law. Reference in this behalf can be made to the judgment reported as Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 1993 SCM R 920.
5. As in instant case respondents have submitted application for conversion of land use much prior to issuance of the new policy, which now has been framed, therefore, the respondents shall be liable to pay the charges which were prevailing at the time when application for seeking permission was submitted by them and the learned High Court vide order dated 21st April, 2004 has rightly invoked above principle of law in instant case.
6. In addition to above, we are of the opinion that as now order of the High Court has been complied with and there is no live issue between the parties requiring adjudication by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
' Thus for the foregoing reasons, we see no substance in the petition as such same is dismissed and leave declined.