' Through this constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner being aggrieved, has challenged the validity of order dated 5-1-2010, passed by the learned Judge Anti Terrorism Court No,II, Gujranwala, whereby, an application under section 23 of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, moved by respondents Nos.1 to 13, for transfer of a complaint case under sections 324, 440, 452, 506, 337-A-(ii), 337L-2, 109 P.P.C. Read with section 6/7 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 has been accepted and the case has been transferred to the court of learned Area Magistrate for the purpose of trial.
2. The facts leading to the filing of instant constitutional petition are that a criminal case F.I.R. No,521 of 2004 dated 28-6-2004 under sections 324, 409, 420, 468, 471, 506, 395, 427, 148, 149, 109 P.P.C., had been registered at Police Station Civil Line, Gujrat on the complaint of Ch. Fakhar Nisar Advocate, District Courts Gujrat with the allegation in brief, that two groups of Advocates clashed with each other during a full house meeting of District Bar Association, Gujrat at 11-10 a.m. On 28-6- 2004, which had been convened on a notice requisition, tabled by some members of the District Bar Association, Gujrat and the pressed agenda of the meeting was to discuss the probability of dismemberment of some local bar members of D.B.A. Gujrat including, Ch. Fakhar Nisar Advocate; that only 92 members of District Bar Association, Gujrat attended the said session as against 321 members required for satisfaction of quorum due to which requisition was supposedly rejected by the house; on seeing this, a group of Advocates all at once, started raising slogans and resorted to hooliganism; they abused the complainant party, extended threats of murder and hurled chairs etc. Upon them to commit their murder, manhandled Muhammad Nadeem Iqbal Advocate and snatched cash etc. From the complainant. In the meanwhile, some one pointed out the insufficiency of quorum resultantly, the resolution was dropped; the situation worsened as some outsiders, not the members of District Bar Association, Gujrat, forcibly entered the bar room, committed worst degree of disturbance, ransacked the bar room, defiled its dignity and badly damaged furniture and fixtures of the bar room; the complainant and his fellow advocates saved their lives by getting away from the place of occurrence; that the attackers carried away the record of the bar room and tampered with it.
3. On the other hand, Ch, Muhammad Asghar Shaheen Advocate acting Secretary District Bar Association, Gujrat moved an application for registration of a cross-case with almost identical counter allegations with the addition that six advocates on their side had been injured by the other side during the said brawl; it was further alleged that Raja Munawar DPO, Gujrat had sabotaged a peaceful session of the District Bar Association, Gujrat by using his nominated disciples.
4. As the police hesitated to record the cross version case so the complainant was constrained to move an application under sections 22-A/22-B, Cr . P. C . Before the learned Ex-officio Justice of Peace, Gujrat for registration of the cross-case which was allowed on 30-6-2004. The cross case was registered against the complainant party of F.I.R. Which stood the test of investigation, still, Ch. Muhammad Asghar Shaheen, Advocate was constrained to file a private complaint under sections 324, 337A-(ii), 337-L-2, 440, 452, 506 P.P.C. Read with section 6/7 of ATA, 1997 before the Anti Terrorist Court, No,II, Gujranwala to seek justice.
5. The learned Anti-Terrorism Court after recording the statement of the complainant and that of his witnesses under sections 200, Cr.P.C. And 202, Cr.P.C. Summoned the respondent-accused but interestingly, the list of the respondent accused did not contain the names of any of the advocates though figured, in the aforesaid application for registration of a cross-case.
6. The learned Public Prosecutor, the Anti Terrorism Court No,2, Gujranwala added. Section 7 of ATA, 1997 in the cross version, registered on 29-6-2004 where-against a constitutional petition bearing Writ Petition No,16951 of 2008 was filed before this Court which was allowed on 10-6-2009 in terms that, addition of section 7 of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
7. The respondent-accused: of the private complaint moved an application under section 23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for transfer of the complaint from Anti Terrorism Court to a Court of ordinary jurisdiction which was accepted by the learned Judge Anti Terrorism Court No,2, Gujranwala on 5-1-2010. Hence, instant constitutional petition.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order has been passed in violation to the settled principles/rules governing the subject; that the learned trial court has erred in passing the impugned order and has wrongly termed the occurrence as a dispute between the two groups of lawyers, supporting and opposing the strike call; that the view taken by the learned trial court is based on misreading and non-reading of the record; that the impugned order has been passed in a fanciful way, without taking into consideration the real facts of the case; that the learned trial court had no authority to review its earlier order dated 8-6-2009, whereby, the respondent-accused had been summoned to face the trial under the aforesaid provisions of law including under section 7 ATA, 1997; that the learned trial court has failed to appreciate that the respondent/accused were not the law practitioners and they were outsiders, who, with the blessing of the lordship of Muslim League (Q) and that of Raja Munawar, DPO, Gujrat, respondent No,1, reached the Bar Room of District Bar Association, Gujrat, ransacked it and caused destruction of the property worth lacs of rupees besides, committing other offences; that the offence committed by the respondent-accused falls within the definition of terrorism as defined by section 6 of ATA, 1997 but the learned trial court without any just cause, passed the impugned order which is not sustainable by any means; that the occurrence committed by the accused caused fear, panic, dread and fright to a section of the society which was widely publicized through print and electronic media which generated more anxiety and sense of insecurity in the minds of the public at large; that the impugned order being perverse, arbitrary, whimsical and illegal has resulted in miscarriage of justice which is liable to be set aside.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at length and perused the impugned order, as well as available record attached with the petition.
11. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 amended from time to time, has now attained the form of comprehensive and efficacious statute to deal with ever growing menace of terrorism. The definition of word "terror" as it stands today, was added to the act "ibid" through the Anti Terrorism (Amendment Order) 2001. The Ordinance XXXIX of 2001) promulgated on 15-8-2001. The amended section 6 (1) (b) satisfies the "design" and section 6(l)(c) denotes the "purpose"in respect of a terrorist act and the other essential ingredient i,e, "means rea" is provided under section 6(1 )(b)(c).
So the act of terrorism is stated to have been committed where, all the three aforementioned ingredients are in existence. Terrorist act is one which is necessarily committed with the intention and purpose, and mens rea of committing terrorism if the use or threat of that action is "designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government, or the public or section of public or community of sect or if such action is designed to create sense of fear or insecurity in the society or such act or threat thereto is made for the purpose of fanning the religious, sectarian or ethnic hatred". The spread of fear or terror to a section of the society or to society as a whole may be the byproduct of an ordinary criminal act but it cannot be termed as a terrorist act, within the meaning of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, unless the aforementioned ingredients dominate the mind of the perpetrator of such an act as, the emphasize is on the motivation and objection and not on the result. A gruesome or barbaric act committed to satisfy personal vendetta or vengeance may result in spread of shock, horror, fright or panic, to the public at large and it may render many, denerved, crestfallen and hopelessly demoralized, still, it shall not be an act of terrorism which has been defined by the Anti Terrorism (Amendment Order) 2001 in the aforementioned terms. The nexus emphasized by the stature, between the act committed and the ingredient in trinity, as mentioned hereinbefore, does constitute a terrorist act, which is committed to destabilize the society or overawe the government. To determine the question if an offence falls within the ambit of sections 6/7 of the Act, the allegations alleged in the F.I.R, (including the crossca se), record of the case and attending circumstances have to be taken into consideration.
As laid down by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, in a luminous judgment titled Basheer Ahmad v. Muhammad Siddique and others (PLD 2009 SC Page 11) a Terrorist Act shall be assessed to have been committed as under:- "In order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within the ambit of section 6 of the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, it would be essential to have glance over the allegations made in the F.I.R., record of the case and surrounding circumstances. It is also necessary to examine that the ingredients of alleged offence have any nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under sections 6, 7 and 8 thereof. Whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not, the motivation, objection, design or purpose behind the said act is to be seen. It is also to be seen as to whether the said act has created a sense of fear and insecurity in the public or any section of the public or community or in any sect. "
The motivation, object, design or purpose behind such an act have to be assessed to label an act as a terrorist act.
11. We find that two groups of advocates clashed with each other on the day of occurrence in the backdrop of specific circumstances relating to a full house session of the District Bar Association Gujrat with agenda of discussing the probabilities of dismembering certain members of District Bar Association Gujrat which was purely a personal agenda of the District Bar Association Gujrat, and it had nothing to do with any design to commit the act of terrorism. If a few had received injuries during the course of occurrence it was, at the most, an aftermath of the brawl between the two groups of advocates so, by no stretch of imagination of the occurrence contained in the F.I.R, or in the private complaint could be termed as the act of terrorism. l2. The learned trial court has furnished sufficient reasons to reach the conclusion that the instant occurrence did not fall within the mischief of definition of section 6 of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 and termed it a purely indigenous trouble, haunting affairs of District Bar Association, Gujrat which resulted in the above said unpleasant occurrence but, it does not attract the definition of a terrorist act from any angle. The impugned order appears to have been passed strictly in line with and on the principles underlined, by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the aforementioned luminous judgment.
13. There has not been any misreading or non-reading of the record in making the impugned order which does not call for any interference by this Court.
' For the foregoing reason, the instant petition fails which is dismissed in limini.