1. ' RAFIULLAH SULTANI, J.--- This writ petition is addressed under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974.
2. Brief facts giving rise to instant writ petition, as alleged, are that . The petitioner was serving as Supervisor in the Board of Secondary Education at Mirpur and he was ousted from service on the basis pf false charge of leakage of question papers vide order of the Board dated 8-12-1998.
3. Feeling aggrieved by the afore-said order, petitioner filed an IA appeal which was accepted on 22- 6-1999 resultantly he was reinstated in service according to Annexure B. Later on a corrigendum order was issued on 1,6-11-1999 in which the words "acceptance of the appeal" were inserted. Non- petitioner No,2 revoked the earlier order dated 16-11-1999, passed by him, vide subsequent order dated 22-11-1999 without providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Petitioner -represented his grievance before non-petitioner No,1 which was partly accepted and the impugned order was set aside to the extent of fine on 10-9-2004. It is claimed that the impugned orders are discriminatory, against the law and justice and liable to be struck down .And petitioner be ordered to reinstate in service with all back benefits which he is entitled under law. The writ petition was admitted for regular hearing on 25-6-2008. The non-petitioners submitted written statement after the appearance before the Court on 24-12-2008 in which they denied the allegations levelled in the writ petition.
4. ' The learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the grounds of appeal and further contended that a criminal case was registered against the petitioner regarding the leakage of question papers and prosecdtion failed to prove his case, resultantly the petitioner is acquitted. On account of that the inquiry conducted by the Department has got no value in the eye of law. He further contended that a man cannot be awarded sentence twicely in same offence. It was argued that the impugned orders are discriminatory, against the law and justice and without providing opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. It was next argued that the petitioner has filed appeal before Service Tribunal which was B dismissed on 8-12-2004, after that he filed the instant writ petition before this Court and no delay has been caused by the petitioner. It was further argued that the impugned order dated 8-12-1998, passed by the Board was not under chapter No,2.1 of Calendar of the Board. He cited , following case-law in support of his version:-- 2005 CLC 1816; 2007 PLC (C.S.) 1303 and 2008 PLC (C.S.) 975.
5. ' The learned counsel for the non-petitioners reiterated the grounds of written statement and further contended that in prayer clause of writ petition, the impugned orders dated 8-12-1998 and 10-9-2004 have not been challenged. The impugned order dated 12-11-1999 has been challenged and copy of said order is not traceable from the record. It was argued that filing of appeal before Service Tribunal by the petitioner has not been supported by record. It was next argued that the word "Board" contains the meaning of full Board. It was further argued that law of laches is fully applicable in this case and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. It was argued that criminal .Proceedings and departmental proceedings are not inter linked and departmental inquiry can be held even though the petitioner is acquitted from criminal case. In support of his version, he cited following caselaw:--PLD 1998 SC (AJ&K) 1, 1995 MLD 1350 and 2000 SCR 179.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case carefully.
7. In prayer clause of writ petition, the impugned order of non-petitioner No,2 dated 12-11-1999 has been challenged but the said order is not traceable from the file and copy of said order has not been appended along with the writ petition. Under Rule 32(2) of High Court Procedure Rules, it is mandatory for petitioner to append copy of impugned order along with writ petition. It is evident from the record that on 12-11-1999, no order was passed by the non-petitioner No,2. If it is considered that date of said order is wrongly written due to clerical mistake by the petitioner then it was his (petitioner's) duty to file application for correction of date of said order but unfortunately it has not been done by the petitioner since from the date of filing of writ petition i.e, 19-5-1999 till up to now. Even otherwise, the impugned orders dated 8-12-1998, 22-11-1999 and "Notification dated 10-9-2004, which the petitioner sought to be struck down, are not available in prayer clause of the petition. The instant writ petition has been filed before this Court on 19-5-2005 while challenging the validity of the order dated 8-12-1998, after lapse of time of 7 years and order dated 12-11-1999 after lapse of time of 6 years and Notification dated 10-9-2004 after lapse of period of 8 months.
8. No satisfactory explanation has been offered by the petitioner for such delay. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he filed appeal before Service Tribunal against the impugned orders has been neither pleaded in writ petition nor copy of judgment of Service Tribunal has been appended by the petitioner along with the writ petition. It was held by the apex Court in case titled Mahmood-Ur-Rehman v. Atta Ullah Atta and 3 others reported in 1997 SCR 330=PLD 1998 SC (AJ&K) 1, Cap.(e), which reads as under:-- "(e) Laches--- ' Cause of action---The cause of action, if any, arose to the appellant in September, 1995 when he was not appointed as Assistant Commissioner---Writ filed in August 1997 hit by doctrine of laches and no relief could be granted---Writ filed by respondent does not give a fresh cause of action to the appellant."
9. ' It was held in case titled Azad Government of the State of J&K and others v. Haji Samundar Khan and others, Azad Government of the State of J&K and others v. Ch. Muhammad Din and Azad Government of the State of J&K and others v. Gulzaman and others 1995 SCR 259=1995 MLD 1350, which reads as under:-- "Laches---Writ petitions were belated by 5 to 8 months. No reasonable explanation given for delay-Writs were held to be hit by laches."
10. As stated earlier that the impugned orders have been challenged after lapse of period of many years and due to this reason the doctrine of laches is fully applicable on the instant writ petition.
11. ' Coming to the next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned orders have been passed without providing opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, the said contention is not supported by record of the case. It is evident from the record that the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 8-12-1998 and the said order was challenged by the petitioner. It has been specifically pleaded by the petitioner in para. No,5 of writ petition that he challenged the impugned order dated 22-11-1999 before non-petitioner No,1 who accepted his representation partly and set aside the impugned order to the extent of fine. It is also evident from the record that petitioner was fully aware about the inquiry and he joined the inquiry, conducted by the F Board, before his dismissal from service. After joining the inquiry, he is not in position to challenge the order of Board which was passed after completion of inquiry. According to order dated 26-6-1999, passed by competent authority, the impugned order dated 8-12-1998 was set aside on representation of the petitioner with the direction to conduct fresh inquiry within a time of one week. The learned counsel has argued at Bar that lastly the petitioner has filed an appeal before Service Tribunal which was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction and now, he has come to this Court to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The said order is not available on the record. The impugned order dated 22-11-1999 has attained finality which cannot be challenged on the basis of ground of unheard.
12. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 22-11-1999 has not been passed by full Board under chapter No,21 of calendar of Board, is not sustainable because the said order was passed by the competent authority in accordance with chapter 21 of calendar of the Board.
13. ' The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he G (petitioner) has been, acquitted from criminal case and departmental inquiry cannot be conducted is not tenable in the eye of law and has no effect on disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner cannot said that no regular inquiry was conducted by the Board to probe into the matter. The petitioner has never challenged the proceedings of the inquiry and he has not denied that regular inquiry was not conducted by the Board. The petitioner did not raise any objection during inquiry proceedings. The petitioner was suspended from service on 5-6-1998 and dismissed from service on 842-1998 after completion of inquiry. Acquittal order of the petitioner from criminal case does not, per se, absolve the departmental liability of civil servant as both departmental and criminal proceedings are entirely different and not inter-linked; one is related to criminal liability and the other is related to discipline of service. This controversy was resolved by the apex Court of Pakistan in case titled Amir Abdullah v. Superintendent of Police and others reported in 1989 SCMR page 333, which reads as under:--- "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--- ' Article 212(3)---Civil service---Dismissal from service---Acquittal from criminal charge--- Relevancy of judgment in criminal case and departmental proceedings---Prosecution on criminal charge and departmental disciplinary proceedings--Distinction---Dismissal from service on charge of misconduct, challenged---Plea that as petitioner has been acquitted of criminal charge, it was not open to the departmental authorities to take disciplinary action against him, repelled--- Objects of prosecution on criminal charge and departmental disciplinary proceedings were entirely different; one relates to the enforcement of criminal liability and the other is concerned with the service discipline---Acquittal on criminal charge had no bearing on disciplinary proceedings."
14. ' Again this point of view was reiterated in case titled Khaliq Dad v. Inspector General of Police and 2 others reported in 2004 SCMR page 192, Cap.(a), which reads as under:--- "(a) Civil service--- ' Disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings--Difference---Acquittal from criminal case--- Effect---Both such proceedings are not inter dependent and can be initiated simultaneously and brought to logical end separately with different conclusions---Criminal proceedings do not constitute a bar for initiation of disciplinary proceedings relevant to Efficiency and Disciplinary Rules---Acquittal in criminal case would have no bearing on disciplinary action."
15. ' It was also held in case titled Government of N.W.F.-P through Secretary Finance, Excise and Taxation Department Peshawar and '2 others reported in 2003 SCMR page 338, Cap.(b), which reads as under:--- "(b) Civil Service--- "Criminal proceedings" and "departmental proceedings"--- Distinction---Acquittal of civil servant from a criminal charge--- ' Impact---Prosecution on a criminal charge of a civil servant and departmental proceedings against him are entirely different as one relates to the enforcement of criminal liability whereas the other is concerned with the service discipline, as such, acquittal from criminal charge has no bearing on disciplinary proceedings."
16. In view of reasons listed above, this writ petition is hereby dismissed. The case-law presented by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not helpful in this case.