' SABIHUDDIN ,ARMED,. J.---This petition impugns the judgment of the learned Sindh High Court passed in L.R.A. No, 6 of 2006 whereby the same was allowed.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the matter are that an agreement dated 25.6.2005 was arrived at between Karachi Port Trust Labour Union (C.B.A.) and administration of the Trust in terms of which certain benefits were allowed to different categories of the Trust's employees. Such benefits were also given to those employees who "normally retired" upon superannuation after 1.4.2004. However in terms of the provision contained on page 1 and addendum to the agreement those employees who had availed of the Gold.
' Scheme (hereinafter GHS) were excluded from the ben, thereof. One of the labour unions as well as respondent Malik Haq Nawaz (who opted for the GHS). Tiled 1. R.A.No, 6 of 2006 under section 61 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 before the Honourable Sindh High Court seeking interpretation of the settlement and claiming that workmen (including respondent No, 2) who had opted for the GHS but were actually in service on 1.4.2004 were also entitled to all benefits under the settlement.
3. The Honourable Sindh High Court vide the impugned judgment allowed the said LRA and held that indeed those workers of KPT who were in service on 1.4.2004 were entitled to the benefits of the settlement even though they had opted for the GHS.
4. Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, learned counsel for the petitioner firstly contended that section 61 of the Industrial Relations. Ordinance, 2002 only related to interpretation of settlements which in the aforesaid case was executed by the petitioner and the CBA of the workers i.e, respondent No,
3. As such only the aforesaid parties could approach the Honourable High Court for seeking interpretation and neither the respondent No, 1 (which was merely a trade union worker had any locus standi of C.B.A.) nor the respondent No, 2 (who was only an individual worker) had any locus standi to prefer the application under section 61. He relied upon inter (ilia a judgment of a Division Bench of the Honourable High Court of Balochistan in the case of Muhammad Rasheed and 13 others v. Chairman, Baluchistan Labour Appellate Tribunal and 3 others, reported in 1995 PLC 242 where their Lordships, while interpreting the identical provisions existing in section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 held that the expression "parties" was only referable to the parties executed in the settlement i.e, the employer and the C.B.A. Of workmen. Moreover, learned counsel urged that the scope of section 61 was severely limited and confined to provisions in a settlement creating reasonable doubts as to their effect. He urged that in the instant case where terms of the settlement were precise and clear there was no occasion for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court. Indeed, if the respondent No, 2 felt that a right under the settlement had accrued to him which - was denied by the petitioner he could always seek recourse to a Labour Court by way of proceedings under section ,46 relating to redress of individual grievances.
5. Mr. Abdul Mujib Pirzada, learned counsel for the respondent No, I argued that a genuine doubt as to the interpretation of the settlement existed in the Act it was made available with retrospective effect from 1.4.1994 and purported to exclude, workers who had availed of the Golden Handshake Scheme. Certain workers including the petitioner No, 2 had opted for Golden Handshake Scheme prior to the aforesaid date but were in service on that date and were relieved much later. There was a genuine doubt as to the applicability of the terms of the settlement upon such employees.
Learned counsel placed reliance inter alia upon the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Khyber Zaman and others v. Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi and others, reported in 2005 SCM R 235 where a while interpreting a voluntary separation scheme their Lordships held that benefits payable to employees were to be calculated on the basis of the emoluments being received on the dates of their actual release from service and not the date when they had opted retirement. As such they were held to be entitled to the benefits accruing, from enhancement of pay scales taking place between the date of option and that of their being relieved from,employment upon having exercised such option.
6. We have heard learned counsel at length and gone through the case-law cited. With respect to Mr. Bajwa's, first contention regarding locus standi of the respondent No, 2 it may he worthwhile to reproduce section 61 of. The Industrial Relations Ordinance. 20(12 as follows:- "Interpretation of awards and settlements.---(1) If . Any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provisions of an award or settlement, it shall be referred to the High Court.
(2) The High Court to which a matter is referred under sub-section (1), after giving the parties an opportunity Of being' heard, decide the matter and its decision shall he final and binding on the parties "
7. 'Evidently the statutory provision does not provide as to how and by whom the jurisdiction of the High Court is to be invoked. Apparently even a Labour COurt adjudicating proceedings where a right arising out of a settlement is claimed, could also through a Reference seek interpretation of the terms of settlement in the event of genuine difficulty or , doubt. Sithilarly any affected party could also move the High Court. Such view appears to be consistent with the scheme of the special law, which is intended to provide for early settlement of disputes between workers and employers and for adjudication of disputes by the Labour Court within a limited time-frame. In such cases the High Court could, in the event of ambiguous provisions, undertake the process .Of interpretation to which the law attributes finality and thus, obviate the occasions of fruitless litigation before Labour Courts .Whose findings in any event would be amenable to the Appellate Jurisdiction of the High Court. It needs to be mentioned that under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 a similar power was conferred upon the Labour Appellate Court, which was otherwise an Appellate Forum against decisions of Labour Courts. Moreover a restricted scope of the expression "parties" appears to 'be inconsistent with the principles of natural justice which are required to be read in all statutory provisions as well as the overall scheme of the I.R.O. Which is required to be taken into consideration while interpreting a particular provision.
8. In the first place it needs to be kept in view that section 59(1)(h) requires that a settlement entered into by the C.B.A. Is binding on all workers employed in the establishment. It would be highly incongruous to assume that while the terms of a settlement bind any worker he has no right to present his view-point before a Court interpreting such terms. Indeed there may be cases when the C.B.A. Entering into the -settlement loses its status as such and is no longer , interested in pursuing the cause of the beneficiaries of settlement.
9. In such situations if one were to follow the literal and somewhat simplistic interpretation of the expressionparties Occurring in section 61(2) as was undertaken by the Honourable High Court of Balochistan in Muhammad Rashid v. Balochistan Labour Appellate Tribunal 1995 PLC 242 any interpretation could he effected without hearing the workers or their existing representative-Union at the time of hearing. This would be in complete denial of the principles of natural justice stated in a mandatory provision of law, and the employer and the unrepresentative Union could collusively obtain an interpretation violating the rights of workers. 'At the same time if workers are not treated as parties to the settlement for the purpose of section 61(2) it would folloW that binding effect cannot he given to the interpretation rendered by the High Court insofar as their rights are concerned. This would practically render the interpretation undertaken under statutory powers, for all practical purposes', an exercise in futility.
10. It also needs to he kept in view that the definition of Industrial dispute in section 2(xvi) is comprehensive and covers all dispute between Workers and employer. Section 43 explicitly speaks of a worker to be party to such dispute and be represented by C.B.A. Section 25(2) speaks of a settlement to be entered hi the course of an Industrial dispute, and obviously the 'C.B.A. Acts as representative of workers. It is entirely incomprehensible that while a , worker is a party to an industrial dispute (though represented by C.B.A.) he would he completely debarred from presenting his view-point in proceeding where the terms of such settlement are being interpreted by a Court. There seems no justification for assuming that a worker who is party to an industrial dispute and on whose behalf the C.B.A. (as his representative) has entered a settlement should be excluded from the purview of the expression "parties" occurring in section 61(2).
11.We are therefore, clearly of the view that section 61 is to be read together with section 59 and the expression "parties" occurring, in section 61(2) is referable to all parties hound by the terms thereof in terms of section 59. When a registered trade union (which is an entity itselt) enters into a settlement with the employer in the capacity of a collective bargaining agent, it does so only in its representative capacity duly acknowledged by law on behalf of workmen that it represents, who are parties to the dispute in terms of section 43. The position is further clarified, by section 59(2) which stipulates that any settlement between an employer and a trade union otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings, will only be binding on the parties thereto i.e, the employer and the union but not the workers. We are therefore, clearly of the view that every worker hound by the terms of the settlement is strictly speaking, a party to proceedings relating to interpretation of such settlement under section 61. Nevertheless it needs to be clarified that in case the employer approaches the High Court for such interpretation a notice to the C.B.A. Representing the workers at the time of hearing might be treated as sufficient notice to all workers. However, this would not preclude any individual worker to approach the High Court on his own in his capacity as a party to industrial dispute leading to the settlement or being otherwise bound by its terms. To the aforesaid extent we agree with the view taken' by the Honourable High Court and are constrained to observe that the view of the Honourable High Court Balochistan in the case of Muhammad Rasheed (supra) does not lay down correct law and ought to be overruled.
12. In view of the above, we would only agree with Mr: 'Bajwa to the extent that the respondent No, 1, being neither a party to the settlement nor enjoying the status of a C.B.A. To represent workers had no locus standi to move the High Court. However, the right of the. Respondent No, 2 to do so could not he questioned and the application on his behalf was clearly maintainable. Indeed when a worker, claimed a right arising out the terms of the settlement which is contested by the employer some process of interpretation of such terms would always be involved even while deciding the application under section 46 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 and the decision would be amenable to the Appellate Jurisdiction' of the High Court under. Section 48. Keeping in view the dominant intent of legislature requiring early settlement of disputes we are of the view that a worker could always approach the High Court under section 61 in cases of difficulty or doubts as to terms of a settlement to avoid fruitless litigation before a lower forum. Nevertheless Mr. Bajwa seems to be perfectly correct in contending that in such proceedings the High Court is only required to interpret ambiguous terms and could not import its own concept of fairness and equity.
13. Having held the application on behalf of respondent No, 2 maintainable it would be necessary to refer to terms of the settlement Mr. Abdul Mujib Pirzada urged that while the settlement was given retrospective effect to apply to permanent employees who had retired "normally" after 1.4,2004 and therefore, only those employees who had actually retired,. Prior to such date were excluded from its benefits. He contended that while the respondent No 2 alongwith others had indeed opted for retirement under the aforesaid scheme they were not relieved and were required to continue in service after 1.4.2004. As such they were also entitled to all benefits under the settlement. In support of his contention learned counsel referred to a number of pronouncements of this Court including in the case of Khyber Zaman and others (supra), wherein it was held that the financial benefits under such scheme were to be determined on the basis of the-employee's emolument on the date when he was actually relieved by the employer and not an earlier date when he had opted for voluntary retirement prima .Facie the judgments cited .Tends to support his contention.
14. Nevertheless having gone through the same -carefully we have noticed that in all those cases their Lordship were undertaking an examination of the relevant retirement scheme and rightly held that the date of relieving was relevant for the purpose of entitlements to benefits under the scheme. In the instant case however, the position appears to be different inasmuch as the High Court was not called upon to interpret the terms of a scheme but only those of an amicable settlement undertaken by the representative of employees with the employer. As such they are not relevant tor the purpose of the present controversy. It may well be that the respondent had not been actually relieved on 1.4.2004 and had not collected their dues prior to 1.4.2004. Under the scheme the benefits to the optees might he required to 'be calculated on the basis of the emoluments, which. They were normally receiving' on the day on which they were actually relieved by the. Employer. The question here however, is that of their entitlement under the settlement and not under the scheme.
15. In the settlement in question with reference to demand No, 1 it was expressly stipulated that the benefits under the settlement would be available to' those employees who had "normally" retired after 1.4.2004 and not those who had been relieved under the Golden Hand Shake Scheme. The settlement was entered into on 25.6.2005 and retrospective effect was given only for the benefit of those who had "normally" retired, The addendum extended the benefit to ad hoc and casual workers but once again those-having received golden handshake were excluded. It was made explicitly clear that' those retiring in normal course constituted a category . Separate from those relieved under the Golden Handshake Scheme.
16. Having -gone through the terms of the Golden Handshake Scheme, we have found that several additional financial benefits were granted to 'those having opted for voluntary retirement. Evidently, the settlement drew a clear distinction between those retired normally (without the benefit of the scheme) and those opting for retirement under the aforesaid scheme. The benefits under the settlement were only made available to the former category, because the latter had already-become entitled to additional financial benefits under the scheme.
17. We are unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Honourable High Court that such discrimination was invalid. It is settled law that reasonable classification is always permissible in terms of Article 25 of the Constitution which guarantees equality and equal protection of law. The classification made in the settlement appears to be perfectly rational inasmuch only those employees have been excluded from its benefit who became entitled to substantial benefits under the scheme. On the other hand a discrimination premised merely on the date of actual release of employee from service could have been less reasonable.
18. The Honourable High Court rightly observed, relying upon the principle laid down by this Court in Qayum N array v. N.-W.E.P. Small Industries Development Board 1999 SCM R 2331, that an agreement to deprive employees of their lawful rights contradictory to the mandatory provision of law wasp not valid. It was also justified in concluding that guaranteed rights of workers could not be taken away through a settlement. Nevertheless, what it failed to consider was that existing rights were not disturbed and merely some additional 'benefits were being conferred. The optees of voluntary retirement scheme were excluded for good and proper reasons, in view 'of their having availed substantial benefits under the scheme, which were not available to those retiring in normal course.
19. We are also unable to subscribe to the view of the Honourable High Court that each and every financial benefit under , a settlement must variably be extended to every workman employed in the establishment on the date of the execution of .The settlement. There is nothing in the law to suggest so and it is always permissible to C.B.A. To raise demands with respect to certain categories of workmen. Indeed some benefits could be claimed for a category of workers i.e, those undertaking work of hazardous nature or suffering some disadvantage but the settlement could not be set aside unless it was found to be contrary to law. Indeed a settlement causing invidious discrimination amongst workmen may offend Article 25 of the Constitution and hence unlawful, but as discussed above. When the classification is perfectly fair and rational, no illegality can he attributed.
20. For the foregoing reasons while we have found the application on behalf of the respondent No, 2 to he maintainable, there seems no reason to hold him entitled to financial benefits arising from the settlement. Other workers have neither claimed such benefits directly or through their authorized representative i.e, C.B.A. The petition is therefore, converted into an appeal and allowed to the above extent. The judgment of the Honourable High Court is set aside.