MUHAMMAD REAZ AKHTAR CHAUDHRY,common question is involved in the above captioned appeals that whether the learned Single Member of the Service Tribunal is competent to admit or dismiss the appeal in limine, therefore, these shall be disposed of through this single order. There is no need to mention here the facts of each case because we have to resolve the aforesaid point.
2. Under section 4 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal Act, 1975, (hereinafter to be referred as the Act of 1975) any civil servant aggrieved from any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority, in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service, may within ninety days of the communication of such order to him or within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later, prefer an appeal ' to the Tribunal.
The word "Tribunal" has been defined in section 3(3) of the Act of 1975. This provision of law contains that the Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman and one Member. For having proper perception, we would like to reproduce section 3(3) which reads as under:--- "A Tribunal shall consist of--
(a) a Chairman, being a person, who is or has been, or is qualified to be, Judge of the High Court; and
(b) one Member , who is a person, who possesses such qualifications as may be prescribed by rules."
3. Under section 6 of the Act of 1975 the Chairman of the Tribunal may constitute a single or a Division Bench of the Tribunal for hearing appeals under this Act. The aforesaid provision clearly reveals that an appeal can be heard by a single or a Division Bench. It is the discretion of the Chairman to constitute a single or a Division Bench for the hearing of the appeals.
4. It is pertinent to note that Rule 10 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal (Procedure)
Rules, 1976 (hereinafter to be referred as the Rules of 1976) contains that the Registrar shall scrutinize every memorandum of appeal received by post or presented to him and shall, if it be in order and drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Rule 7, cause it to be registered in the register of appeals to be maintained in Form 'A' appended to Schedule II of the Act and with the approval of the Chairman, shall fix a date for its preliminary hearing before a Bench or the Tribunal, as the case may be. Here the words "before a Bench or the Tribunal" have been used and under section 6 of the Act of 1975 the Chairman can constitute a single or Division Bench, therefore, it can safely be said that a Bench consisting of a single Member can hear appeals at preliminary stage.
Rule 11 of the Rules of 1976 contains that the Bench or the Tribunal, as the case may be, after hearing the appellant or his Advocate on the date fixed for preliminary hearing or on such subsequent dates to which such hearing may be adjourned, may dismiss the appeal in limine. It is clearly stated in rule 11 that the Bench or the Tribunal may dismiss the appeal in limine. As stated above the Bench can consist of a single Member, therefore, a Bench consisting of single Member can also dismiss the appeal in limine.
5. Interpretation of section 6 of the Act of 1975 and Rules 10 and 11 of the Rules of 1976 is required in the instant cases. While commenting on the principles of interpretation of statutes Mr. M. Mehmood in his book "Canon of Construction and Interpretation of Statutes" expressed that interpretation of statutes remained a moot point of debate among the Lawyers, Jurists and Judges down the ages.
No particular mode or method of interpretation of statutes has been provided or regulated by the Assembly or law-makers. It has to be evolved by the Judges and it varies for time to time. The jurists have termed such modes or methods as rules of statutory interpretation. These rules are as under:---
(i) Literal Rule.
(ii) Mischief Rule.
(iii) Golden Rule.
(iv) United Contextual Approach.
6. While adapting the Literal Rule the statute has to be read and looked into literally and simply grammatical meanings are to be given to the words used in the Statute. If the Court finds difficulty in literal interpretation then while applying the Mischief Rule the Court has to consider the historical background of the statute. As the Golden Rule is concerned, according to it a statute may be interpreted without following the literal interpretation so as to avoid absurdity. While adapting the Rule of United Contextual Approach the Court will examine every word of a statute in its context and use the same in widest sense by not only including other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, existing state of law, other statutes in pari materia and mischief. The Court can, by legitimate means, discern the statute intended to remedy.
7. The aforesaid view finds support from a case reported as Tahir Mehmood v. Khalid Sharif PLD 2007 SC (AJ&K) 119 wherein it has been held as under:--- ' The interpretation of statutes remained a subject of debate among the Lawyers, Jurists and Judges down the ages. The mode or method of interpretation of statutes has not generally been regulated by the Assembly or law-makers. It has to be evolved by the Judge and it varies from time to time. According to M. Mehmood in his book "Canon of Construction and Interpretation of Statutes" the Jurists have termed such modes or methods as "rules of statutory interpretation".
These rules are as under:---
(i) The Literal Rule.
(ii) The Mischief Rule.
(iii) The Golden Rule.
(iv) The United Contextual Approach.
(10) Under the Literal Rule, the statute is to be read literally by giving the words used ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. However, if such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adapt the same. If no such alternate construction is possible, the Court must adapt ordinary rule of literal interpretation. Under the Literal Rule, the words of a statute are sufficient to determine every question that arises under it, no matter how absurd and unjust are the consequences. Interpretation of a provision of law should be harmonious and it should not lead to contradictory or ridiculous consequences. Various provisions of Act have to be read together and not in isolation thereof. A provision of law has to be interpreted in a manner more conducive to the interest of justice and practically possible. This view finds support from a case reported as Asim Qureshi v. Farooq Ahmad Khan Laghari and another PLD 1999 Lah.
76.
(11) The Mischief Rule is a rule to guide the Judges when they find difficulty in Literal Interpretation.
Under this Rule, the Judge is allowed to consider the historical background of the statute. The rule allows the Judge to look into the common law before the Act and the mischief in the common law.
Where the statute as for the remedy, the same is to be construed in such a manner to suppress the mischief and provide the remedy. The judges must suppress mischief the mischief and provide remedy to suppress/stop the novel innovations and intentions for evasion and continuance of the mischief. The Mischief Rule is designed to let the Court to consider why the Act was passed and then to apply that knowledge giving the words under consideration whatever the meaning will be best according to the social purpose of legislation. The rule intends that the Court must advance legislative object and suppress the mischief sought to be cured.
(12) Now we come to the Golden Rule. The rule that a statute may be interpreted without following the literal interpretation so as to avoid absurdity is called Golden Rule. The literal legacy is conclusive evidence of the intention of legislature and we intention can be gathered from the words used in the statute. Therefore, a statute must normally be interpreted on the basis of its ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. According to this Rule, the Court is supposed to follow the literal approach unless it produces absurdity in which case only, the Court should give some other interpretation.
(13) Under the Rule of United Contextual Approach the Court has the 1:ght to examine every word of statute in its context and to use the same in widest sense by not only including order enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief. The Court can, by those and other legitimate means, discern the statute intended to remedy. No one can profess to understand any part of the statute or of any other document before he has read whole of it. Until one has done so, he is not entitled to say that it or any part of it is clear and unambiguous. All the statutes and enactments are to be given such interpretation as to make them operative and not to bypass them by advancing mere technical objections. This view finds support from a case reported as Syed Muddasar Shah v. Managing Director N.-W.F.P. Forest Development Corporation and others 1999 M LD 736. Natural and ordinary meaning must be ascribed to the words."
It further finds support from another case titled Asim Qureshi v. Farooq Ahmad Khan Laghari and another PLD 1999 Lah.
76.
8. The basis and fundamental rule of interpretation of statutes is that the Court should ascertain the intention and purpose of legislation because it is the essence of the statute. The legislative purpose is the basic reason that why a particular enactment was enacted by the legislature. This view finds support from the case reported as Tahir Mehmood v. Khalid Sharif PLD 2007 SC (AJ&K) 119 wherein it has been provided as under:--- "(14) The basic and fundamental rule of interpretation of statute is that the Court should ascertain the intention and the purpose of the legislature because it is the essence of the statute. The legislative purpose is the reason why a particular enactment was passed by the Legislature. As such has been provided by Crawford in his book "Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws" at pages 247 and 248 in the following words:- `Naturally, the legislative purpose is the reason why the particular enactment was passed by the legislature. Perhaps the reason was to remedy some existing evil or to correct some defect in existing law, or to create a new right or a new remedy. Consequently, in seeking to ascertain the legislative purpose, the Court will resort, among other things, to the circumstances existing at the time of the law's enactment, to the necessity for the law and the evil intended to be cured by it, to the intended remedy, to the law prior to the new enactment and to the consequences of the construction urged.'
(15) In the light of aforesaid principle, the Court while construing a statute has to ascertain the reasons for its enactment that why it was enacted."
9. Another principle of interpretation of statutes is that the Court should give simple meaning to the words used in the legislation. The Court can gather the intention of legislature from the simple meaning of the words in the legislation.
10. Now the question arises whether the words used in section 6 of the Act of 1975 and rules 10 and 11 of the Rules of, 1976 confer power on a single Member of the Service Tribunal to dismiss the appeal in limine or not?
' Section 6 of the Act of 1975 contains that the Chairman of the Tribunal may constitute a single or a Division Bench of the Tribunal for hearing appeals. If simple meanings are given to the words used in this provision of law, as provided under the literal rule, then it is crystal clear that a single or a Division Bench of the Tribunal can hear appeals. The aforesaid provision of law confers a power on single Bench for hearing appeals. Section 6(5) contains that the Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman and one Member but no proceedings of the Tribunal shall be rendered illegal and ineffective simply for the reason that such proceedings were taken by a single Member or Chairman of the Tribunal. This provision of law further clarifies the position that if the proceedings have been taken by the Chairman or one Member alone, then it shall not render such proceedings ineffective despite the fact that the Tribunal comprises of a Chairman and one Member . It lends support to the fact that proceedings can be conducted by single Member . The plain reading of section 6 of the Act of 1975 clearly reveals that single Bench can hear appeals and no proceedings conducted by single Member of the Tribunal shall be illegal despite the fact that the definition of the Tribunal is that it shall consist of a Chairman and one Member .
11. Rule 10 of the Rules of 1976 contains that the Registrar shall scrutinize every memorandum of appeal and if he finds that it is drawn up in accordance with the Rules, then with the approval of the Chairman, he shall fix a date for its preliminary hearing before a Bench or the Tribunal, as the case may be. It is pertinent to mention here that section 6 of the Act of 1975 provides that the Chairman of the Tribunal may constitute single or Division Bench for hearing of appeals. Thus under rule 10 of the Rules of 1975 an appeal can be fixed for hearing before a Bench, which also means a Bench consisting of a single Member , or a Tribunal. Rule 11 of the Rules of 1975 further clarifies the position. It provides that the Bench or the Tribunal may dismiss the appeal in limine. As stated in the earlier part of this judgment, the Bench means a Bench consisting of single Member as provided in section 6 of the Act of 1975 and Tribunal means Chairman and one Member . The aforesaid rule confers power to the extent of preliminary hearing of appeals because it contains that the Bench or the Tribunal, as the case may be, after heating the appellant or his Advocate on the date fixed for preliminary hearing or on such subsequent dates to which such hearing may be adjourned, may dismiss the appeal in limine. It clearly confers powers upon single Bench and the Tribunal for dismissal of appeal after preliminary hearing. In the instant case the words used in the statute are very clear. If the words used in the aforesaid provisions of law are read literally and natural and grammatical meanings are given to them, then they do not lead to any absurdity. The words used are not susceptible to any other meaning, but they clearly convey that the single Member can hold preliminary hearing of appeals and may admit the appeal for hearing or dismiss it in limine.
12. It would not be out of place to mention here that if the appeal is admitted for regular hearing by a single Member , after that it shall be heard by the Tribunal, not by single Member because Rule 11, sub-rule (2) of the Rules of 1976 contains that if the appeal is not dismissed in limine, notices of admission of appeal and of the day fixed for its regular hearing shall be served on the appellant, the respondents and such other persons as the Tribunal may deem proper. Here the word "Tribunal" has been used. The powers have been given to the Tribunal that if the Tribunal deems proper then it can issue notice to any other person. After the admission of appeal, the single Member of the Tribunal cannot issue a notice, but only the Tribunal can issue notice, which means that after the admission of appeal it shall be heard by the Tribunal only.
13. Item 5 of the second Schedule of the Act of 1975 also contains that if the appeal is not dismissed in limine, notices of admission of appeal and of the day fixed for its regular hearing shall be served on the appellant, the respondents and such other person as the Tribunal may deem proper. This Schedule also confers powers on the "Tribunal", not on the single Member or single Bench for issuance of notice after the admission of appeal.
14. The plain and literal reading of the aforesaid provisions of law clearly conveys that the single Member of the Tribunal is competent to admit or ditmiss the appeal in limine, however the appeal is to be finally disposed of by the Tribunal consisting of Chairman and one Member .
15. The legal point involved in these appeals stands answered. Copy of this order shall be attached with all the other files and the respective Benches hearing the cases shall decide the same in the light of this order.