' SH. AZMAT SAEED, J.--- This civil revision directed against the appellate order, dated 4-12-2008 whereby the appeal filed by respondent against the order, dated 30-9-2008 was accepted and status quo directed to be maintained by the parties.
2. Litigation inter se the parties pertains to the property bearing No,S-19-R-72 situated on the Shahara-e-Quaid-e-Azam, Lahore. Said property was devastated by fire during the course of riots of 14th of February, 2006. In June, 2006 Messrs Pak International and Trading Corporation Limited through its Chief Executive Dr. Saleem Hameed Malik the present respondent filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the present petitioner. It was contended in the said suit that the plaintiff was a limited company and was filing the aforesaid suit through its Chief Executive. It was further contended that the plaintiff-Company was in possession of the basement of the property in dispute as a tenant under the present petitioner who is the owner of the property.
It was prayed in the said suit that the present petitioner i,e,, the defendant in the suit be restrained from interfering in the lawful possession of the plaintiff-Company. Said suit was resisted and contested by the present petitioner who inter alia took the plea that Messrs Pak Industrial and Trading Corporation Limited did not exist, and in support of his contentions inter alia relied upon a letter, dated 12-7-2007 purportedly issued by the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to the effect that no such company existed in their record.
3. In the above context, the said suit was withdrawn on 6-9-2006 without permission to refile it.
Subsequently, the respondent filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the present petitioner. Said suit is titled "Dr. Saeed Hameed Malik, Chief Executive Pak Industrial and Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Zameer Ahmed Khan". In the plaint the factum of the earlier litigation was mentioned, and it was claimed that the plaintiff in the suit viz., the present respondent was in possession of the property in dispute. It was prayed that the declaration be granted that the plaintiff therein i,e,, the present respondent was in possession of the basement of the property as a tenant and the respondent is estopped from denying the tenancy and occupying the premises without due process of law. Permanent injunction was also prayed for. Along with the plaint, an application for the grant of temporary injunction was also filed.
4. Present petitioner resisted the suit, filed written statement and reply to the application for the grant of temporary injunction. Trial Court seized of the matter, dismissed the said application vide order dated 30-9-2008. Being aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal which was accepted through the appellate order, dated 4-12-2008 directing that status quo be maintained. Said order is being impugned by way of the instant civil revision.
5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent is not a tenant under the petitioner and his alleged occupation of the premises was that of trespasser, hence, not entitled to the equitable relief of temporary injunction. It was further contended that at best the tenancy existed at one point of time in favour of Pak Industrial and Trading Corporation Limited, which has since become defunct resulting in cessation of the tenancy. 'Even otherwise, a limited company is an entity distinct from its share-holders and Directors. Adds that after the dismissal of the application for the grant of temporary injunction by the trial Court, the property was totally demolished, and is in the process of being rebuilt, therefore, there was no occasion for the grant of temporary injunction. It is contended that reliance upon the report of the Local Commission was misplaced, inasmuch as, proceedings thereof were conducted at the back of the petitioner and are subject to a challenge. It was next argued that during the course of proceedings, any offer exchanged for purposes of effecting a compromise did not constitute an admission as such offers are obviously without prejudice. Even otherwise, the petitioner did not in any manner admit the tenancy in favour of the present respondent. In support of his contentions learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Chand Muhammad Mondal v. Fayezuddin Ahmed and others PLD 1958 Dacca 435, Supercon Limited v. Eastern Construction Limited and 2 others 1987 CLC 1566, Raees Ghulam Sarwar v. Mansoor Sadiq Zedi and 4 others NLR 1993 Civil 388 (sic), Fazal Din v.
Rubina Aurangzaib 1983 CLC 1280, Sh. Muhammad Sharif Uppal v. Sh. Akbar Hussain and others PLD 1990 Lah. 229, Rai Bahadur Mohan Singh Oberoi v. Rai Bahadur Jodha Mal Kuthalia and 2 others PLD 1961 SC 6, Ikram Bus Service and others v. Board of Revenue West Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1963 SC 564 and Hashim Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 325.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent has controverted the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner by contending that respondent is in fact a tenant under the petitioner, and has been paying the rent of the premises in question regularly initially directly to the respondent, and thereafter, under the orders of the Rent Controller. And a tenant cannot be dispossessed except through due process of law i,e,, by an ejectment order of the Rent Controller. In the alternate, learned counsel contends that assuming without conceding that the respondent is a trespasser, even in such an eventuality, he could only be dispossessed through due process of law. Lastly, argued that sole object of the entire exercise is to deprive the respondent of his lawful rights. To supplement his submission, learned counsel placed reliance on Mach Mineral Enterprises and 2 others v. United Minerals Company and 2 others PLD 1994 SC 84, Sardar Muhammad v. Anaras Khan 1982 CLC 2158, Jevan and 7 other v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue, Islamabad and 2 other 1994 PSC 509, Jamil Ahmed Officer Assistant v. Provincial Government of West Pakistan and 4 others PLD 1982 Lah.
49."
7. In rebuttal, the learned counsel for the petitioner besides reiterating his earlier contentions stated that a notice had been served upon the petitioner by the Local Government to demolish/re- construct the property which was admittedly devastated by fire and is in a dangerous situation and that the grant of status quo order would amount to interference in such re-construction which would be detrimental not only the petitioner but others as well. Hence, it was contended that not only the respondent did not have a prima facie case, but also the balance of convenience rested in favour of the petitioner.
8. Heard. Record perused.
9. It appears to be an admitted fact between the parties as is evident from the pleadings of the instant suit as well as the previous litigation, copies whereof are on record, that at one point of time Messrs Pak Industrial and Trading Corporation Limited was a tenant under the present petitioner. It is not evident from the pleadings of the respondent or the documents relied upon by him as to when and if such tenancy of the company ended to be substituted by a tenancy in favour of respondent in his personal capacity. Neither date of such substitution nor prima facie the proof thereof is on the record. While it is the case of the present petitioner that the said company is now defunct. In this context, learned counsel relies on letter of the SECP. This fact is not admitted by the respondent. In fact, before the Appellate Court in replication to the reply to the application for the grant of temporary injunction, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the said company is not defunct or nonexistent (para.1 of the preliminary submissions). The validity and effect of the said letter of the SECP is yet to be determined. Be that as it may, it certainly does not have a legal effect of the devolution of tenancy in favour of the respondent-Company through its Chief Executive in his personal capacity. No legal basis in this behalf has been presented on behalf of the respondent. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the respondent has prima facie established that he in his personal capacity is the tenant in the premises in dispute. The fact that some sort of offer of compromise was made does not detract from the aforesaid; as such an offer is always deemed to be without prejudice and does not amount to any admission. Furthermore, the offer when examined closely does not amount to an admission that the respondent is a tenant under the petitioner.
10. In the reply filed by the present petitioner to the application for the grant of stay order before the Appellate Court, in para.2 it was specifically contended that since 5-10-2008, the demised premises did not exist at the site. The respondent filed a detailed replication thereto. However, this 'assertion of the petitioner was not denied in the corresponding paragraph. It is also an admitted fact between the parties that the building where the premises in question situate was devastated by fire; the extent of such devastation of course is disputed. However, it is evident from the record that the present petitioner had been served with a notice dated 21-7-2007 by the Town Municipal Administration Data Ganj Bakhsh Town, Lahore declaring the superstructure of the building to be dangerous and requiring its demolition/re-construction and renovation. And such directions are being complied with by the petitioner.
11. The upshot of the above discussion is that the respondent had failed to make out a prima facie case of is legal status as a tenant in respect of the premises in -dispute in his personal capacity and in the absence thereof, no prima facie case for the grant of temporary injunction could be made out. Furthermore, prima facie, there is no denial of the fact that the premises stand demolished and construction is in progress necessitated by a notice by the Local Government and any status quo order would amount to frustrating the action directed to be taken by the Local Government in the public interest. This Court finds itself unable to sustain a status quo order in respect of an admittedly dangerous building thereby putting the properties and lives at risk.
12. In view of above, this civil revision is accepted and consequently, the impugned appellate order, dated 4-12-2008 is set aside with no order as to costs.