' S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Mr. Ahmed Saleem, Ex Inspector of Police has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Act, 1974 whereby he has impleaded Government through lnspector-General of Police, Punjab, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Sargodha Range, Sargodha, and Chief Secretary, Punjab, Lahore, as respondents. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the impugned order dated 9th January, 1980 retiring him from service under section 12
(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 be set aside and he be re-instated in service with all the consequential benefits.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner joined service as A.S.I. On 1st April, 1951. He was promoted as Sub-Inspector in 1955 and as Inspector in 1975. On 9th January, 1980 D.I.G. Sargodha Range, Sargodha, passed an order under section 12 (ii) Of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 retiring the appellant from service. This order was communicated through a letter dated 14th February, 1980. The appellant filed Departmental appeal to the I.-G. Police, Punjab on 8th March, 1980 which remained undecided and hence this appeal has been filed before this Tribunal.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned District Attorney and have perused the record of this case carefully with their assistance. The learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned order on legal plane by submitting that a period of 5 years of the appellant's approved service permanently forfeited by S.P. Faisalabad, on 10th February, 1967 and confirmed by LG. Police, west Pakistan, order dated 28th March, 1968 was liable to be excluded from the length of his service. Therefore, the period of service of the appellant came to 23 years and 9 months and not 25 years as given in the impugned order. On the other hand, the learned District Attorney has controverted this legal objection by submitting that the forfeiture of approved service in the Police Department would not take away the period of service as contended by the appellant and, therefore, the appellant had duly completed his 25 years of service qualifying for pension benefits, etc. In support of these two contentions both the parties have addressed lengthy arguments before us taking us into the realm of legal implications of the word 'forfeiture' to support their point of view.
4. We have given or anxious thought to the arguments so placed before us and would first of all deal with the meaning of word 'forfeiture' and later on its implications vis-a-vis the case of the appellant before us. Forfeiture of service is a concept which only applies to the Police and the Army.
In no other service is forfeiture of service provided as a penalty. We have taken pains to find whether this concept is explained under any law in Pakistan but we find that no such explanation is available under any such law. While finding that the case law in Pakistan did not afford any guidance for the interpretation of this term we advert to the Dictionary meaning as given in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., 1979, at pp. 584-585 which is as under :- "Something to which the right is lost by the commission of a crime or fault or the losing of something by way of penalty. A deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence of the non- performance of some obligation or condition. Loss of some right or property as a penalty for some illegal act. Loss of property or money because of breach of a legal obligation."
' Similarly we have taken into consideration the interpretation of this term as given under paragraph 1603 of Volume 33 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edition) on pages 956 to 957. Out of the detailed discussions of the said jurist we reproduce a portion of the same which is relevant to the present case :- "If, in consequence of a conviction of desertion or a direction after a confession of desertion, the whole of a soldier's previous service is directed to be forfeited: he is unable to serve as if the date of conviction or of the direction were the date of his attestation and he had on that date, been duly enlisted to serve for a like term as that for which be was in fact serving on that date ; if part only of his previous service is forfeited the date of attestation on his current engagement is deemed to be a date earlier than the date of conviction or of the direction by the period of previous service not forfeited,"
' Taking these two authoritative interpretations we have no hesitation to hold that expression of forfeiture of approved service is legal fiction. Like deeming clause in a statute the forfeiture of approved service is also a situation which is deemed to have happened without its tangibly having happened. According to the settled law in Pakistan, the Court is required while interpreting the deeming clause to give full effect to the legal fiction and all necessary consequences and incidents which naturally flow as corollaries and to carry it to its logical conclusions. Reliance is placed on PLD 1973 Lah. 466 (at pages 471-472) PLD 1970 SC 29 (at page 35). In view of the above two interpretations the law laid down with regard to the interpretation of deeming clause, we are clear in or mind that the word 'forfeiture' means something which entails a complete loss of that which is forfeited. It also means the loss of forfeited things from whom the same is forfeited. It would be just to hold further that a person from whom something is forfeited cannot be said to be still possessing the same. In this view of the matter forfeiture of service would mean a complete loss, deprivation and destruction of the forfeited service, and a civil servant who has suffered forfeiture cannot be said to have any benefit of that forfeited service. At this juncture it would be proper to attend to the arguments of the learned District Attorney that rule 16.5 of the Police Rules, 1934 was capable of two constructions i,e, one in favour of the appellant and one in favour of the respondent. Even if we accept this contention which, on the face of it, is quite plausible, we would accept the one which favours the appellant and not the respondent. In this behalf reliance is placed on 1973 PTD 361. It has been held by the superior Courts of this country that when a provision in law is ambiguous a beneficent construction should be given because the Legislature is not intended to have enacted an oppressive law. Reference is made to PLD 1967 Dacca 113 (at page 121). With the above discussions we are of the considered opinion that by its forfeiture the approved service of a civil servant would not be counted towards total service for the purpose of pension and other retirement benefits. We also find support from a letter dated 28th April, 1981 placed on the record which was written by the District Accounts Officer in reply to an application by the appellant that the period of forfeited service was not to be counted towards the length of service for the purpose of pension or other retirement benefits. However, when a second query was made on this point by the Tribunal the said Officer while not controverting his earlier position has tried to be evasive in his reply. Similarly we are very clear in or mind while repelling the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that the number of years actually served by a civil servant will be counted as far as the application of section 12 (ii) was concerned. This argument is without force for the reasons that if we accept this position it would necessarily follow with the words qualifying for pension and other retirement benefits used in section 12 (ii), would become superfluous, redundant and nugatory. We cannot attribute such an intention to a statute.
It is a principle of interpretation of statutes that the law maker has presumed every word in a statute to have a meaning and effect and, that effect should be given to every part of every word of a statute. The Courts are under a duty to avoid a construction which renders any provision of a statute meaningless or inoperative and must lean in favour of a construction which will render every word operative rather than the one which may make some words idle and nugatory.
Reliance is placed on PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 499, PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 219, PLD 1968 Quetta 62, and PLD 1973 Lah. 164 (at pages 177-178). In the case of the appellant what was forfeited was his approved service, therefore we would like to look into the meaning of approved also. Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition) 1979 had defined the word 'approved' on page 94 as under "To be satisfied with ; to confirm, ratify, sanction, or consent to some act or thing done by other. To sanction officially ; to ratify ; to confirm, to pronounce good ; think or judge well of ; admit the propriety of excellence of ; be pleased with."
' In view of this interpretation of the word 'approved' we have no hesitation to hold that forfeited period of the approved service of the appellant could not be considered to have been approved.
Hence the forfeiture of this service shall fall outside the pale of approved service and cannot be counted for that put pose. Looking from this angle we are of the firm opinion that due to five years permanent forfeiture of approved service ,B and reduction in pay as a result, the pension or other retirement benefits for which the appellant qualifies will be less than that period of 25 years. In other words on the date he received the retirement order the appellant was actually receiving that pay and other benefits which he would obtain only after the service of 23 years and nine months.
Thus the condition of completion of 25 years of service qualifying for pension and other retirement benefits as envisaged in PCO 1981 would be lacking.
' In view of the above, we hold that due to forfeiture of five years approved service, the appellant did not fall within the ambit of section 12 (ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 and also did not attract the impact of PCO 1981 (Article 13, The result is we accept his appeal, set aside the impugned order as being without any legal effect and direct that he be reinstated in service from the date of his retirement with all the consequential benefits.