1. ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.-Ahmad Din petitioner in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 362 of 1980, and Ghulam Mustafa peti--tioner in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 363 of 1980 seek special leave to appeal from a common judgment dated 5th February, 1980 of Lahore High Court whereby a joint appeal filed by them has been dismissed, and in result the orders of the Rent Controller and the District Judge, Jhelum have been upheld whereby the petitioners have been directed to hand over the possession of rented shop to their land--lord, Muhammad Aslam Hadi, respondent herein.
2. The Rent Controller, Jhelum by his order dated 25th February, 1978, accepted the plea of Muhammad Aslam Hadi that he bona fdely required the disputed shop for carrying on business, jointly with his unemployed son, as a Homoeopath Doctor. The District Judge, Jhelum and the High Court have upheld these findings.
3. The plea raised in support of both these petitions is that the premises comprise of two independent shops which were rented to the petitioners separately, and the claim set up by the landlord to both these shops for his own use is not bona fide.
4. This plea was not even raised by any of the petitioners before the Rent Controller. The case set up by Muhammad Aslam Hadi was that he bona fidely required the shop bearing No. B-IX-S-517, Chatai Bazar, Jhelum which has two portions ; portion 'A' rented to Ghulam Mustafa and portion 'B' to Ahmad Din. The plea that what the landlord des--cribed as portions ,'A' and `B' are really two separate shops was not even put forward in defence, the petitioners however raised this plea in appeal*against the order of the Rent Controller. Learned District Judge rejected it for the reason which may be stated in his own words "A perusal of the evidence of the respondents/appellants them--selves reveals that it is in fact one and the same shop consisting of two portions Ghulam Mustafa had in his cross-examination admitted not only that the applicant had no other house or shop but also that the shop (and not shops) in dispute fell to his share in private partition. He had earlier admitted in the very beginning of his cross-examination that he is in possession of the eastern portion of the shop in dispute and both these portions have a common staircase. According to him this staircase falls in the share in possession of Ahmad Din, but he also uses it. He further admitted that both the shops have common roof. Although he turned down the suggestion that Dat separates both the portions, but the tenants cannot avoid the admission having been made in this behalf by their witness Abdul Qayyum (R. W. 2), who had deposed in so many words that the shop in dispute has been partitioned by means of a Dat only. That part of his testimony belies the version of Qureshi Abdur Rehman (R. W. 3) also who in his cross-examination tried to turn down the suggestion that the two portions are separated by a Dat and asserted that they are separated by a wall. In fact a comparative consideration of all the evidence produced by the respondents leads me to one and the same conclusion that the premises in dispute to all intents and purposes are one unit separated into two portions", This view was confirmed by the High Court on the joint appeal filed by the petitioners, and the learned Single Judge in Chambers ha held that "the argument that the respondent (landlord) is seeking eviction of his tenants from two shops is thus ill-founded'".
5. The plea raised by the learned counsel relates to appreciation o evidence, and since the learned District Judge and the High Court have both reached a concurrent finding of facts based on cogent material 'I roved in evidence, there is no jurisdiction whatsoever for interference y this Court, particularly in view of the further observation of the learned Single Judge in the High Court that the landlord's case was that he bona fidely required both the portions of the shop for the purpose of carrying on business of Homoeopath Doctor, jointly with his son who has not been shown to be working anywhere and it was satisfactorily proved in evidence that his requirement is genuine, There is no merit in both the petitions and these are, therefore, dismissed in limine.