' SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---The petitioners have called in question a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore setting aside the order of the President dated 3-1-2003 under Article 32 of the Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order 1 of 1983.
2. Briefly, the relevant facts which are not disputed appear to be that the petitioners had issued a life insurance policy in favour of the mother of respondent No,1 (the said respondent being described as the beneficiary under the policy) in 1995 for a period of 15 years. An amount of premium of Rs,5864 was required to be paid and the policy way subject to automatic paid up clause that in the event of non-payment of the premium only the paid up value of the policy would be payable. According to the petitioners the policy holders defaulted in the payment of premium due on 19-3-1999 but was not paid by that policy holders for almost a year. The said amount however was advanced only on 13-3-2000. The petitioners through their first reminder dated 18-3- 2000 informed the policy holder that the payment received had been kept in suspense account but a proper receipt. Could not be issued on account of the fact that the policy-holder would be required to get the policy renewed upon payment of late fee which could be effected only upon renewal of the policy and after payment of late fee of Rs,660 on account of delay of nine months (excluding the grace period of three months).
3. It is further contended that no response to the aforesaid reminder was received till the demise of the policyholder took place in December, 2000. A death claim was lodged by the respondent No,1 in March, 2001 which was resisted. Thereafter respondent No,1 moved the Wafaqi Mohtasib who found the non-payment of the death claim as an act of maladministration and advised the petitioner to pay full death claim together with liquidated damages under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance.
4. The findings of the Wafaqi Mohtasib were assailed by the petitioners through a representation before the President which was accepted in terms of order dated 3-1-2003 to the following effect:-- "It is an established law that insurance risk is covered only for the period for which premium has been paid to the insurer. Due to non-payment of the premium, the policy of the insurant lapsed (converted into paid up). A lapsed policy can be revived only if the insurance fulfils thq revival conditions. The insurant had not fulfilled the said conditions. Since the insurant failed to fulfil the revival conditions, the recommendations of Wafaqi Mohstasib cannot be sustained is quite apt.
2. Accordingly, the President has been pleased to accept the agency's representation and set aside the Mohtasib's findings dated 24-12-2001 of the Mohtasib in complaint No,1/3575/01/1993."
5. The aforesaid order was questioned before the Honourable High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, which vide its impugned order setting aside the order on representation and restored the findings of the Wafaqi Mohtasib. The aforesaid judgment has been impugned before us.
6. We have heard the argument of Mr. Sher Zaman Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. Liaquat Ali Butt, learned counsel for the respondent No,1 and gone through the record.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner may be correct to the extent that under Article 199 of the Constitution , the High Court is not entitled to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority whose decision is questioned or interfered with findings of facts arrived at upon a proper appreciation of the entire evidence or material available before such authority. Nevertheless it is equally well settled that the Court could always oversee whether discretion has been exercised upon sound A judicial principles or whether the findings of facts are not premised on misreading or non-reading of evidence. Admittedly no factual disputes were involved and the High Court correctly observed that the first reminder relating to non-payment of premium within the prescribed time was issued by the petitioner only on 18-3-2000 i,e, one day before the policy could lapse and after the amount due by way of premium had already been received by the petitioner.
The issuance of the first reminder by itself indicates that the petitioners themselves had intended to keep the policy alive upon collection of late payment fee and the contention that it stood lapsed was merely an afterthought to evade liability to settle the death claim. We are also in agreement with the observation of the High Court that repudiation of the claim merely on B account of non- payment of late fee of a paltry amount of Rs,660 was entirely unjustified. It may be pertinent to recall the dicta of this Court in the case of Independent Newspaper Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. And another v. Chairman, Fourth Wage Board and Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, Government of Pakistan Islamabad and 2 others reported in 1993 SCM R 1533 to the effect that excessive use of lawful power is also unlawful and could attract the judicial review jurisdiction C of superior courts. We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioners are required to disburse the entire claim arising to the policy including any bonuses that might have incurred thereupon.
8. With respect to the liquidated damages however we are inclined to take a somewhat different view. It may be observed that uncle) , section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, a claim for liquidated damages arises only when the person entitled to claim has applied with all requirements including the filing of complete papers. It cannot be denied that some fault, even of a technical nature was certainly attributable to the respondent No,1 in failing to disburse late fee and the required medical certificate for renewal of the policy which made it possible for the petitioners to contest the claim.
In the circumstances it cannot be asserted that all requirements including filing of complete papers were complied with by the respondent No, 1 . We would, therefore, hold that the claim of respondent No,1 for liquidated damages cannot be sustained.
9. For the foregoing facts and reasons, we convert this petition into an appeal and partly allow it in the above terms.