' DOST MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.--- The respondents-plaintiffs had purchased land from the petitioners, however, after receiving the sale consideration, the petitioners refused to transfer the area of 300 Kanals and 8 Marlas in favour of the respondents. The respondents brought two Suits bearing Nos.195/01 and 196/01 on 17-6-1984 and on 24-7-1984 wherein decrees for specific performance of agreement were granted on the basis of compromise, however, the petitioners fraudulently transferred substantial portion of the decreed land in favour of other party, therefore, the suit under discussion was instituted seeking decree of declaration for cancellation of the subsequent sale by the petitioners to 3rd party and for the recovery of possession of the suit-land which after two rounds of litigation was finally decreed by the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 26-7-2004.
The judgment and decree of the trial Court were upheld in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge, Charsadda vide impugned judgment, dated 18-4-2005.
' Arguments heard and record perused.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners did not controvert the facts on record i,e, the sale in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs and the earlier decree granted for specific performance of an agreement. His arguments remained confined to the legal proposition that a consent decree was executable under the provisions of the C.P.C., therefore, fresh suit was barred and this aspect of vital nature was ignored by the two learned Courts below. In this regard he relied on certain case- law of Indian jurisdiction.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, defended the impugned judgments on the same reasons given therein.
4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is absolutely unsustainable in law on two-fold grounds. Firstly, the decree for specific performance was granted on the basis of admission and with the consent of the petitioners, therefore, for all legal and practical purposes it stood executed there and then and the subsequent formality of execution had become redundant.
The execution of decree or preliminary decree in some category of cases is essential under the provisions of C.P.C. Because the trial Court has to take further step to give the decree a practical shape taking it to its logical conclusion, however, consent decree is an exception to such rule because as soon as such decree is passed, it ipso facto stands executed there and then.
5. Secondly, after' the passing of consent decree for specific performance the petitioners fraudulently and collusively made transactions with 3rd party of the same land decreed in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs, therefore, a fresh cause of action had accrued to them and because decree for declaration was sought for the reversal of the transactions impugned in the suit, therefore, the earlier decree for specific performance was no more executable because by that time the vendors/petitioners had divested themselves of the ownership of the land decreed earlier, therefore, the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioners is baseless and is entirely not tenable in law.
6. The petitioners have got no case on merits, therefore, they have taken shelter behind technicalities. It is cardinal principle of justice which has assumed the status of rule of law that no one shall be allowed to retain ill-gotten gain. The vendees/defendants too have indulged in facilitating the collusive transfer of the land or to explain in other words they did not take a little care to ascertain as to whether the vendors were by then the owners of land or not.
7. As both the learned Courts below have recorded concurrent findings on questions of facts and on questions of law both after proper appraisal of evidence and correct application of law to the facts of the case, therefore, in view of the principle of law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Kanwal Nain's case PLD 1983 SC 53 this Court in limited revisional jurisdiction is neither required nor supposed to interfere with these findings which are well-founded.
' Accordingly, this petition is dismissed with costs.
2009 C C 771 [Election Tribunal Sindh] Before Justice Nadeem Azhar Siddiqi, Election Tribunal IMAM ALI SAMEJO---Petitioner versus GHULAM HYDER SAMEJO and 11 others----Respondents C.M.A. No,91 of 2008 and Election Petition No,51 of 2008, decided on 21st February, 2009.
(a) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 54, 55 & 63---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VI, R.15---Election petition---Dismissal of petition during trial---Non-compliance of mandatory provisions of law---Verification of annexure- --Procedure--- Officials party to election petition---Respondent sought dismissal of election petition during its pendency on the ground that petitioner did not comply with the provisions of Ss.54 & 55 of Representation of the People Act, 1976, which were mandatory in nature---Validity--- In view of O.VI, R.15, C.P.C. Read with S.55(3) of Representation of the People Act, 1976, petitioner should have signed each and every document annexed by him with his petition on oath or solemn affirmation at the foot and also have stated the date and place at which it was signed---Duty had been cast upon Election Tribunal under S.63 of Representation of the People Act, 1976, to dismiss an election petition if provisions of Ss.54 & 55 of Representation of the People Act, 1976, had not been complied with---Law had nowhere mandated that officials against whom allegation of corruption was made would also be joined as respondent to election petition---Such officials were rightly not made party to election petition---Petitioner having failed to comply with provisions of law his petition was rightly dismissed. [p. 774] A & B Muhammad Ibrahim v.
Muhammad Asif Sardar 1986 CLC 2050; Mian Nazir Ahmed v. Haji Irfan Ahmed and others 1993 CLC 1096; Mahr Zafar Ahmad. Haraj v. Dr. Khawar Ali Shah 1988 CLC 1289; Mrs. Syeda Zahida Zaidi v. Hafiz Muhammad Taqi and others 1986 CLC 2066 and Sardar Khalid Nawaz v. Mian Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo 1987 CLC 1167 ref.
(b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Nothing can be read into a statute. [p. 775] C Raza Hashmi and Hassan Sabir for Petitioner.
Suresh Kumar for Respondent No, 1.
Nemo for other Respondents.
' JUSTICE NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI (ELECTION TRIBUNAL).--- Through C.M.A. No,91 of 2008, the respondent No,1 prays that since the petitioner has failed to comply with sections 54(b) and 55(1)
(b) and (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 ("the Act"), this petition may be dismissed.
' Learned counsel for the respondent No,1 submitted that verification of the documents annexed to the petition is not in accordance with law and that the officials against whom allegations of corruption have been made have not been arrayed as respondents by the petitioner. He submits that the documents in this petition have been endorsed "T.C." which abbreviation stands for "True Copy" and has been initialed by an unknown person. He submits that it appears that the documents in this petition as well as in Election Petition No,50 of 2008 appear to have been signed by one and the same person. He also submits that those officials against whom allegations of corruption have been levelled should have been made a party to this petition which has not been done. He submits that non-compliance with the provisions of sections 54 and 55 of Representation of the People Act, 1976 is fatal and this petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground. He has relied on the following, reported cases:---
(1) Muhammad Ibrahim v. Muhammad Asif Sardar 1986 CLC 2050, (2) Mian Nazir Ahmed v. Haji Irfan Ahmed and others 1993 CLC 1096, (3) Mahr Zafar Ahmad Haraj v. Dr. Khawar Ali Shah 1988 CLC 1289,
(4) Mrs. Syeda Zahida Zaidi v. Hafiz Muhammad Taqi and others 1986 CLC 2066 and (5) Sardar Khalid Nawaz v. Mian Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo 1987 CLC 1167.
' Mr. Raza Hashmi, learned counsel for the petitioner, denies that any such official is to be made a party to this petition. He also submits that the said officials were made party to this petition but were subsequently deleted from the array of the defendants on the instructions of the Election Commission of Pakistan. He submits that the documents annexed to the petition were not verified by him and that the same were verified by the petitioner himself.
' As per provisions of subsection (3) of section 55 of the Act, every Annexure to a petition is to be signed and verified by the petitioner in the manner as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of the pleadings.
' A perusal of the Annexures to this petition shows that only "T.C." has been written on each and every document with initials underneath the name of some unidentifiable person. The requirement of the law is that every Annexure to a petition "shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), for the verification of pleadings". The relevant provision for verification of pleadings is contained in Order VI, Rule 15, C.P.C., which reads as under:-- "15. Verification of pleadings.--- (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleadings shall be verified on oath or solemn affirmation at the foot by the, party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.
(2) The person verifying shall specify by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true.
(3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed."
'Thus, if rule 15 of Order VI, C.P.C. And subsection (3) of section 55 of the Act are seen in juxtaposition, it would emerge that a petitioner should sign each and every document annexed by him with his A petition on oath or solemn affirmation at the foot and also state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. None of these requirements have been fulfilled by the petitioner.
' So far as non-joinder of officials, against whom allegations of corruption have been made, as respondents to this petition is concerned, section 54 of the Act narrates as to who shall be joined as party to an election petition, which reads as under:--- "54 parties to the petition.--- The petitioner shall join as respondents to his election petition---
(a) all contesting candidates; and
(b) any other candidate against whom any allegation of any corrupt or illegal practice is made and shall serve personally or by registered post on each such respondent a copy of the petition.
' Explanation. Not relevant...."
' Section 63 of the Act states the consequences for noncompliance of the provisions of sections 54 and 55 of the Act, which reads as under:--- "63 Dismissal of petition during trial.--- The Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition, if:---
(a) the provisions of section 54 or section 55 have not been complied with; or
(b) if the petitioner fails to make the further deposit required under subsection (4) of section 62."
'In view of the above quoted section 63 of the Act, a duty has been cast upon the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition if provisions of section 54 or section 55 have not been complied with.
' However, it may be pertinent to mention here that the law nowhere mandates that officials against whom any allegation of corruption has been made shall also be joined as respondents to a petition. Therefore, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant in relation to non-joiner of the officials against whom allegations of corruption have been made, has no force and is accordingly repelled.
' In view of the above discussion, C.M.A. No,91 of 2008 is allowed for the reason that the petitioner failed to comply with the provisions of section and this petition is dismissed.
' Before parting with the order it may be mentioned that there exists some ambiguity in clause (b) of section 54 of the Act. When it has been made mandatory to join "all contesting candidates" as envisaged under clause (a) of section 54 of the Act, the words "any other candidate" in clause (b) of section 54 of the Act seem to be superfluous.
' When all the contesting candidates are already required to be made party to an election petition there remains nobody to whom the words "any other candidate" may refer. Although the argument of Mr. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent No,1, has some force and common sense demands that any official against whom some allegation of corruption has been levelled in the petition has to be made party to defend himself, but since there is nothing to this effect in the law, no finding in the affirmative can be given on this point as it is a well-settled principle of law that nothing can be read into a statute.