' ZUBDA-TUL-HUSSAIN, J.--- The petitioner has applied for post-arrest bail in a case F.I.R. No,43 of 2008 dated 24-1-2008 under section 489-F, P.P.0 registered at Police Station Khiali Gujranwala, wherein the allegation against him is that he dishonestly issued a cheque worth Rs,11,50,000, which on presentation to the Bank was dishonoured.
2. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he is innocent and has no nexus with the commission of the alleged offence. According to the learned counsel the amount on the cheque has been tampered with which having been acknowledged by the learned Judicial Magistrate, gives rise to many doubts and rendered it a case of further inquiry against the petitioner. The learned counsel has pointed out that the F.I.R. Was lodged with a delay of 6 days, which is sufficient to show due deliberation and concoction on the part of the complainant. It has further been argued that the petitioner is behind the bars 'for the last about 6 months and is no more required for the purpose of investigation. With reference to the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned counsel maintained that the offence under section 489-F, P.P.0 is not made out against the petitioner.
3. The learned D.P.-G. Opposed the bail petition contending that the petitioner is a habitual offender of such cases who dishonestly issued the various other cheques which were also dishonoured on their presentation to the Bank.
4. While referring to his contention that the petitioner has issued a number of other cheques, which also were bounced when presented to the Bank, the learned D.P.-G. Has placed on record a copy of the agreement deed purportingly executed between the complainant and the petitioner. The description of the cheques given therein including the cheque involved in the present case also prima facie clarifies- the ambiguity in relation to the alleged tampering. The delay of 6 days pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in lodging the F.I.R. At the present stage cannot be sufficient to accept the bail petition because in the circumstances of the case delay would not be an unnatural element.
5. There is no cavil with the proposition that the alleged occurrence carries the liability for sentence, which may extend to imprisonment of three years and as such the prohibition of section 497, Cr.P.C. Is not attracted to it. It cannot be denied that in the cases which are not covered by the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. Grant of bail is a rule and refusal is an exception yet it also cannot be denied that the bona fide or mala fide of the parties to a litigation are never irrelevant.
The mala fide vitiates even the most sacred transaction.
6. No doubt the dishonesty carries an in-built element of mala fide and the dishonesty punishable the law has to be dealt with only to the extent to which law makes it an offence. Still I am of the view that an out and out mala fide which injures not only the valuable rights of a party but also causes severe mental and psychological agony to the affected persons in addition to any financial loss, has also to be given due consideration. If the people are simply allowed concession, such as the bail, on the mere ground of absence of prohibition of section 497, Cr.P.C. While the circumstances show the gravity of the matter not only for an individual but also spoiling the economic and social life of his whole family, this may tend to perpetuate the commission of offences of the same nature. The alleged receipt of valuable articles supplemented by dishonest issuance of unholy cheques renders it a case of grievous nature. The grant of bail being a discretionary concession would of course not be warranted in such situation. While considering this aspect of the case and the reasons for refusing the bail I do have in my mind the circumstances and the dictum of the judgments in the cases of Waseem Bari v. The State 2008 YLR 760 Lah. And Muhammad Tariq Javed v. The State 2008 YLR 947 (Lahore). I am conscious of the fact that the latter case dealt with the principle applicable to a petition for pre-arrest bail yet I am convinced that the ratio thereof is the same, which I had in my mind while relying upon this judgment.
8. So far as the delay in lodging the F.I.R. Is concerned their complainant has given necessary explanation. The circumstances detailed in the F.I.R. At the present stage are sufficient to ignore the delay in lodging the F.I.R.
9. As to the acclaimed ailment of the petitioner suffice would it be to say that the desired or proposed treatment can be obtained if necessary from an out side hospital also without being released on bail.
10. In the above circumstance, the bail petition is dismissed.