' RAJA SAEED AKRAM KHAN, J.--- The facts forming background of this writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed as Registrar of Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, on 28-8-2006 by the Syndicate on regular basis according to the prescribed procedure, after selection made by the High Powered Board, but on 15-2-2008 the services of the petitioner were terminated by respondent No,2, while exercising the power under section 13(3) of the University Act, 1973. The petitioner challenged the said order through writ petition No,23 of 2008, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 14-3-2008, declaring impugned order dated 15-2-2008 as illegal and without lawful authority and a direction was issued to the respondent No,2 to place the matter before Syndicate within two months. In compliance of the order, a meeting of Syndicate was convened and case of the petitioner was put up in agenda of the meeting, wherein the Syndicate has given approval of termination of the petitioner. In this regard a notification bearing No,Esst/2008-404, dated 29-3-2008 was issued.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that that order dated 29-3-2008, passed by respondent No,3 is in violation of rules 7 and 18 of the Statutes and is patently illegal, which amounts to jumping and overstepping the defined power of Syndicate, as contained in clause (T), subsection (2) of section 22 of the Quaid-i-Azam University Act, 1973. He further adds that once a person appointed on regular basis, his services cannot be terminated without following the prescribed procedure. He argued that mala fide of respondent No,2 is apparent from the record, which was one to accommodate a person namely Aurangzaib, whereas, there was no complaint against the petitioner and he was working smoothly with entire satisfaction of the department: There was no adverse remarks against him. The selection of the petitioner was made by High Power Selection Committee and on its recommendation his appointment was made. No notice whatsoever was issued before passing the impugned order nor any opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend him, which is clear violation of the statute. He further argues that Syndicate was not having un-limited power, but all the powers are subject to law and could only be exercised under the prescribed procedure. He further stressed that as per section 33 of the Act (ibid), no permanent employee can be removed from his services, without issuance of show-cause notice and reasonable opportunity of hearing. He argued that appointment of the petitioner was on regular basis although he was not confirmed and was on probation period of two years, therefore, services of the petitioner could not be terminated before the period of two years. He points out that there is procedure laid down under section 37 (ibid), for filling the vacancy, whereby vacancy can only be filled after consultation with the Chancellor, which has not been done in this case. He states that just to promote personal likings, one Aurangzaib has been appointed in place of the petitioner, who otherwise js not eligible for that post. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that there are only two kinds of appointments i,e, (i) on regular basis and (ii) on ad hoc basis, whereas, there is no other kind of appointment. He has drawn attention of this Court towards the definition clause of the Statute, in which definition of regular and ad hoc employees has been provided/mentioned. He stresses that the petitioner was regular employee and his termination from service has been made in clear violation of law. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argues that order passed by the Syndicate is excess of its jurisdiction and under the law nobody can be removed from the service without prescribed manners. He adds that clause-C of appointment letter is against Article 8, Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan; that the petitioner was appointed on regular basis by the High Powered Selection Board after short listing the number of candidates, who was performing his duties with his best and there was no complaint against him, while he has completed more than one year of his probation period, during which period his case was never placed before the syndicate in respect of his inefficiency. He says that order passed by respondent No,1, which he placed before the syndicate, is based on misinformation and has been passed just to promote his personal vendetta, to appoint one Aurangzaib and as the services of petitioner were on regular basis, therefore, it was not amenable, without giving the proper show-cause notice along with reasonable opportunity of hearing, as provided in the University Act. In this regard he relies upon the case-law, reported as Khuda Bakhsh v. Khushi Muhammad and 3 others PLD 1976 SC 208. He further argues that the appointment order is against the principle "Audi Alteram Partem" and relies upon the dictums reported as Commission of Income Tax, East Pakistan v. Fazlur Rehman PLD 1964 SC 410, The University of Dacca through its Vice Chancellor and another v. Zakir Ahmed PLD 1965 SC 90 and 1994 SCMR 2232 and Mst. Zahida Sattar and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2002 SC 408. He further stresses that the order passed by respondent No,1 is non-speaking order, which has been passed without applying legal mind, therefore, the same is void in the eye of law, as reasons must be given while passing such order. No complaint was ever brought before the Syndicate in earlier meetings. On this point, he relies on the case laws reports as Aslam Warraich and others v. Secretary, Planning and Development Division and 2 others 1991 SCMR 2330 and Federation of Pakistan and others v. Tahir Latif 2007 SCMR 152. Lastly he while relying on the case-law reported as Zaman Cement Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue and others 2002 SCMR 312 says that wisdom of Legislature cannot be questioned, therefore, any letter issued against the wisdom of legislature has no value in the eye of law.
3. On the other hand, Sheikh Riaz-ul-Haq Advocate, appearing on behalf of respondents, submits that the instant writ petition is not maintainable, as efficacious remedy under section 34 of University Act, is provided to the petitioner, but he has not availed the same, hence, it is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. He further argues that the appointment of petitioner was subject to some terms and conditions of service, therefore, while terminating his service there was no need to issue show-cause notice or giving him opportunity of hearing, as the petitioner himself accepted the terms and conditions of appointment letter and remained serving under the said appointment letter for more than one year. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that service of petitioner was on probation, although he was appointed against the permanent post, but his service was yet to be confirmed on the basis of his performance. He says that in compliance of order of this Court, which was passed in Writ Petition No,23 of 2008, the matter was placed before the syndicate, which was comprised of High placing persons. All members of syndicate have unanimously passed the termination order after due deliberation. The case of the petitioner was not the only agenda in the meeting, but there were also other items along with this, therefore, it cannot be said that meeting was called only to pass an order against the petitioner. He relies on section 8 of the University Act, whereby show-cause notice is only required in case of confirmed employees. He argues that there is no mala fide on the part of department and no document has been placed on record in support of alleged mala fide. He lastly concludes that there is difference between employee and post. Post was permanent, while appointment of petitioner was regular, but it was yet to be confirmed. In support of his arguments, he relies on the case laws reported as University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others v. Ch. Sardar Ali, 1992 SCMR 1093, Sindh Road Transport Corporation v. Muhammad Ali, 1990 SCMR 1404, Syed Match Company Ltd. v. Authority under Payment of Wages Act and others, 2003 SCMR 1493, Pakistan Railways v. Abdul Bari Kan and others, PLD 2001 SC 127, Muhammad Iqbal Khan Niazi v. Lahore High Court, Lahore through Registrar 2003 PLC (C.S.) 285.
4. I have heard arguments advanced by both sides.
5. The petitioner was appointed as Registrar vide appointment letter dated 28-8-2006. His services were on probation for the period of A two years. Clause (b), of the appointment letter, is reproduced hereunder:-- "The appointment will be terminable at three months' notice on either side or on payment of last pay in lieu of notice period."
6. It is categorically mentioned in the above noted clause of appointment letter that services of the petitioner were terminable and only requirement for the purpose was three months notice or payment of last pay in lieu of notice period. The petitioner was yet to be confirmed. Object of probation seems to assess the performance of employee. As services of the petitioner were not found satisfactory, therefore, his services were terminated by Vice-Chancellor while exercising powers under section 13(2) University Act. His order was challenged by the petitioner before this Court vide Writ No,23 of 2008, which was declared illegal, without lawful authority and a direction was issued to the Vice-Chancellor of the University, to place the matter before Syndicate within two months. In compliance of the said order, the matter was placed before the Syndicate in meeting held on 29-3-2008, in which all members of Syndicate unanimously passed the termination order.
7. The word 'probation' has been interpreted in the case-law reported as Punjab Road Transport Board v. Muhammad Fazil Hussain and another PLD 1983 Lah. 531, as under:-- "probationer is an employee, who remains on trial, until within specified period his employer considers him fit to be kept on job. During period of probation his services remain at pleasure of employer and if latter does not feel satisfied with his work, his services can be terminated."
8. On this point, I have also been guided by the case-law cited as Pakistan (Punjab Province) v. Riaz All Khan 1982 SCMR 770, wherein it has been held that service of probationer terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory work and not on account of misconduct, does not amount to dismissal or removal from service, hence, not amenable. To protection of constitutional provision.
9. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed on probation for 2 years and his services were subject to the terms and conditions mentioned in appointment letter. Before completion of probation period, his services were terminated in view of clause (b) of the appointment letter, on the ground that his work was not satisfactory, after due deliberation and consultation, by the members of Syndicate/competent authority.
10. The petitioner was governed by the terms and conditions, mentioned in the appointment letter, therefore, issuance of show-cause notice to him or production of opportunity of hearing was not required in his case.
11. Even otherwise, the petitioner was having remedy under section 34 of By-laws of the University, in the shape of filing of review against the order passed by the Syndicate. From bare reading of section 34 (ibid), it is clear that no order shall be passed without opportunity of hearing and notice to the person, who file the review petition.
12. Petitioner while joining the service, accepted the terms and conditions of appointment letter, therefore, at this stage when he got benefit of the said letter for more than one year, he cannot take stand that some clauses of the letter were against the law,
13. Under the University Act, the notice is only required to be issued to the employees, those have been appointed on permanent basis. Whereas, the petitioner was appointed on probation, whose services were subject to terms and conditions, mentioned in the appointment letter and the competent authority/syndicate found his work unsatisfactory, therefore, while invoking its powers, under clause (b) of the appointment letter, terminated his services. Hence, the petitioner was not having vested right of issuance of notice or production of opportunity of hearing, before termination order. Reliance is placed on the case-law reported as Amjad Ali and others v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and others, 2001 SCMR 125.
14. The case laws referred by learned counsel for the petitioner, are distinguishable from the case of petitioner, on facts and merits.
15. For what has been discussed above, this writ petition has no force and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.