1. ' MALIK MUHAMMAD AQIL AWAN, J.--- The petitioner was appointed/selected as trainee Engineer in pursuance of Talent Pool Scheme with effect from 16-8-1995 under the order dated 17-7-1995 by respondent No,2. Under the appointment order dated 17-7-1995 in clause (1) it is stated "Kindly note that your employment may be terminated at any time without any notice, should your performance during training period be considered unsatisfactory by the Company."
2. ' Respondent No,2 terminated such training assignment vide order dated 20-8-1997 which order was challenged by the petitioner in Service Appeal No,2479-K of 1997 before Federal Service Tribunal Islamabad and such appeal waq filed on 20-9-1997. The said appeal was dismissed by the Service Tribunal for want of jurisdiction in limine vide judgment dated 23-12-1997 but the Honourable Supreme Court remanded the case by holding that Service Tribunal do possess the jurisdiction with the direction to decide the same on merits. The Service Tribunal came to conclusion that the status of trainee Engineer on job training never changed throughout during his two years working with respondent and that he was neither confirmed against any post nor he was absorbed/ appointed against permanent or any specific post by any order of the respondent in any grade, against any scale or post. It was further held that respondent No,2 being a company is neither statutory body nor has statutory rules governing terms and conditions of service of appellant meaning thereby that the service contract is to be regulated in terms of appointment order. Therefore, the termination from service having been made in pursuanc7 of the accepted terms and conditions contained in the appointment order does not suffer from any illegality and the same being Prmination simplicitor can be made by competent authorities without any show- cause notice and to that effect have also relied upon earlier judgment passed by the said Tribunal in respect of cases filed against respondent No,2. With the aforementioned observations the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 24-7-2000.
3. ' That petitioner did not challenge the aforementioned order reportedly because of his poor financial condition. Whereas some of the employees went in appeal by way of filing Special Leave to Appeal before Honourable Supreme Court. The Honourable Supreme Court in a case of Pakistan State Oil Company Limited v. Muhammad Tahir Khan and others, reported in PLD 2001 SC 980 came to the conclusion that in view of termination of such a large number of employees, it is to be determined whether it is a dismissal in the garb of termination simplicitor and the exercise of authority/power to terminate the employees is mala fide or not. The Honourable Supreme Court in the said case held that since such exercise to determine question of fact cannot be undertaken in appellate jurisdiction therefore, remanded the matter to Service Tribunal to decide them accordingly.
4. ' That consequently all the matters of alike nature which were disposed of and remanded to the Service Tribunal were decided afresh and under different judgments appeals were allowed and the appellants were reinstated in service with back-benefits. Such judgments were further challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court by respondent No,2 but such appeals were dismissed under the judgment dated 17-3-2004 with observation that if respondent No,2 wants to proceed against any of the employees then a meaningful show-cause notice is to be issued against them and an opportunity of defence and personal hearing be provided to them in accordance with law. The petitioner who was removed from service under order dated 28-8-1997 and the Federal Service Tribunal having dismissed his appeal on 24-7-2000, which order was not challenged before the Supreme Court and has attained finality has come up in this petition with the prayer that respondent No,2 be directed to extend the benefit of judgment of Supreme Court mentioned (supra) and he may be reinstated in service accordingly.
5. ' We have heard Mr. Mukhtar Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, learned counsel for the respondent No,2. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his prayer has relied upon a case of Mrs. Ageela Asghar Ali v. Miss Khalida Khatoon Malik, reported in PLD 1991 SC 1118 for the proposition that right of a civil servant to represent against any adverse order (in this case adverse remarks), for their expunction may be limited to making one representation, yet the power of competent authority to deal with the subsequent representations was not thereby limited, curtailed, or made co-extensive. We fail to understand as to how this judgment can help to the cause of petitioner inasmuch as the competent authority neither has passed any order in his favour on subsequent representations nor it was brought under challenge before any competent forum provided by law nor this Court has placed any embargo on the power of competent authority to pass appropriate order in his favour.
6. ' He has further relied upon the case of Tarachand v. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board reported in 2005 PLC (C.S.) 368. In this case relying upon the case of Hameed Akhtar Niazi, 1996 SCMR 1185 the judgment in personam and judgment in rem were distinguished and it was held that rule of good governance demands that the benefit of the judgment of Supreme Court be extended to other civil servants who may not be party to the litigation instead of compelling them to approach the Tribunal or any other legal forum. He has further relied upon a case of Chairman Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Latif, 1984 SCMR 286, to the effect that determination of rule of seniority by Punjab Service Tribunal in respect of certain civil servants, the benefit of such determination cannot be denied to a civil servant on ground that he was not a party to litigation before Tribunal or on ground that determination was declaratory of rule of seniority.
7. ' We are afraid, all these judgments relied upon by the learned counsel do not help him at all being distinguishable on facts and for the reason that in the aforementioned cases there was no order passed by a competent forum in respect of terms and conditions of service of persons who were not party to such judgments and such order/judgment had attained finality. Moreover, as it has been defined that judgment in rem is a judgment where under question of law is determined and such question of law may be extended to the case of those persons who were not party to such judgment and that too in the wake of good governance. Since a question of law is determined by the Supreme Court and cases of certain persons are covered by such question of law, the government functionaries/competent authorities are required to apply that question of law on the cases of those persons who may not be party to the judgment of Supreme Court instead of compelling them to approach the competent forum in law, in the shape of Courts and Service Tribunals for application of such judgments. Whereas if the rights of the parties inter se are determined, to that extent judgment will have a character of judgment in personam and the benefit of the same cannot be extended to any person who is not party to such judgment. The point in issue is that whether the termination from service of the petitioner under the order dated 20-8-1997 was legal or illegal, is a mix question of fact and law to be determined by the competent forum and in this case the same has been determined by the Federal Service Tribunal under judgment dated 27-7-2000 which has attained finality. Neither this judgment has been called in question by the petitioner in the above petition nor he has challenged his termination order before us. The judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by the petitioner may not have the effect to set aside both the orders automatically without bringing the same in challenge in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Moreover, the judgment of Federal Service Tribunal being a appealable under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 making of a prayer before this Court, which by implication set aside such judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, is not maintainable. It is further stated that what cannot be done directly it cannot be done indirectly.
8. In has been held in number of cases that constitution petition before High Court against judgment of Service Tribunal is not maintainable even if limitation to file civil petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) expires.
9. Under such circumstances, the present petition is misconceived and not maintainable. Moreover admittedly petitioner was terminated from service on 20-8-1997, his appeal before Federal Service Tribunal was dismissed on 24-7-2000 and the judgment he relied upon was delivered by the Division bench of Supreme Court in case of P.S.O. v. Muhammad Akram on 17-3-2004, whereas the present petition has been filed on 18-9-2006 without explaining laches on the part of petitioner.
10. Therefore, this petition is barred by laches as well and is accordingly dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.
11. ' On 4-3-2009 after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, by a short order this petition was dismissed. Above are the reasons for the said short order.