' RAJA MUHAMMAD SHAFQAT KHAN ABBASI, J.---The appellant, namely, Raja Ghulam Hassan Khan, Advocate son of Raja Jahandad Khan, by filing this appeal under section 417(2), Cr.P.C. Has called in question the order, dated 30-7-2005 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Lahore, whereby he while accepting application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Moved by Muhammad Abid son of Ghulam Hassan and Muhammad Waris son of Noor Muhammad (respondents Nos.1 and 2 herein) had acquitted them of the charge in complaint case filed by the petitioner under sections 419, 420, 648, 471, P.P.C.
2. Succinctly, the facts giving rise to the instant appeal are that the petitioner got registered case F.I.R. No,495 of 2004, under sections 419, 420, 468, 471, P.P.C. With Police Station Old Anarkali, Lahore against, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 alleging therein that they had prepared a forged list of the villagers and by affixing their fake thumb impressions/signatures thereon had filed a review petition before the Member Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore; investigation into the crime was carried out, however, during the course whereof the Investigating Officer found them innocent and prepared a cancellation report, whereupon the case was cancelled; being aggrieved of the said act of the Police, the appellant filed a private complaint before the learned Ilaqa Magistrate, Lahore, who after recording cursory evidence of the appellant and his witnesses summoned respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to face trial vide order, dated 25-2-2005; on 23-4- 2005, respondents No,2 preferred an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Seeking their acquittal from the case, which had been allowed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Lahore vide order, dated 30-7-2005.
Hence, the instant appeal.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned trial Magistrate has not applied his judicial mind; that the act of fraud and forgery was not committed in the Revenue Court, but it was committed outside the Court, hence, the learned trial Magistrate has wrongly assumed that he has no jurisdiction to entertain such complaint; that the learned trial Magistrate summoned the accused after examining the cursory evidence of the appellant and his witnesses and coming to the conclusion that prima-facie offence under sections 419, 420, 468, 471, P.P.C. Was made out; that through the impugned order, the learned Trial Magistrate has revised his own order, whereby he had summoned the respondents, which power does not lie with him under the law; that the learned trial Magistrate while passing the impugned order has been wrongly influenced by the fact that earlier case F.I.R. No,495 of 2004 was cancelled by the Police. Lastly it has been argued by the learned counsel that the Court can also take notice of the fact that the above said review titled "Muhammad Abid and others v. Raja Ghulam Hussain Khan and others", which was pending at the time of passing the impugned order has been dismissed by the Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue on 16-1-2008 on the ground that the power of attorney has neither been signed by the party nor by his pleader.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents while supporting the impugned order argues that the same is legal and correct; that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person under section 199 read with section 476, Cr.P.C. And only the Court where the list of the inhabitants was presented, can take notice of it, hence, the appeal is not competent; that double presumption lies in favour of the respondents.
5. The learned Deputy Prosecutor General Punjab argued that the learned trial Court Magistrate has not given any cogent reason to acquit the respondents and that the complaint was competently filed by the appellant and the learned trial Magistrate should have decided it on merits.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also gone through the record.
7. The question involved in this case is whether provisions of section 195(1)(c), Cr.P.C. As regards offence under sections 468, 475, 476, P.P.C. Would apply or not? It has been observed that the learned trial Magistrate has acquitted the respondents by holding that section 476, Cr.P.C. Provided that when any offence referred in clause (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of section 195, Cr.P.C. Has been committed or in relation to proceedings in any Civil or Revenue, or Criminal Court, the Court may take cognizance of the offence and try the same, in accordance with procedure described for summary trial in Chapter 12. The learned trial Magistrate further observed that the alleged offences have been committed before the Member, Board of Revenue, therefore, he has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The controversy involved in the case in hand has been answered by a Full Bench of this Court in case Muhammad Shafi v. Deputy Superintendent of Police (Malik Gul Nawaz), Narowal and 5 others (PLD 1992 Lahore 178), in which it has been held as under:-- "(5) The reasoning supporting the view contended for by the petitioner's counsel may best be stated in the words of Beaumont, Chief Justice in Emperor v. Rachaapa Yellappa (AIR 1936 Born.
221). He said: "Now reading that section apart from authority, I think the relevant date which has to be considered is the date at which a Court is invited to take cognizance of the complaint. At that moment the Court has to ask itself whether it is debarred from taking cognizance by reason of the provisions of section 195, and in cases falling under section 463 or 471, Penal Code, the Court has to see whether the offence in respect of which it is asked to take cognizance is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceedings in any Court and in respect of a document produced-or given in evidence in such proceedings. Now in this case the offence had been committed by a person who, at the date of the complaint, was a party to a proceeding in a Court and the document had been produced or given in evidence in such proceedings and therefore, the words of the section would seem to apply."
It has been held in Muhammad Shafi's case (supra) that the proper place' for the determination of a person's guilt or innocence is Criminal and not a Civil or Revenue Court. But section 195 read with section 476, Cr.P.C. Empowers the Courts, other than the Criminal Courts also to try the guilt or innocence of persons. This provision of law deprives the ordinary Criminal Courts of their ordinary jurisdiction and should be construed strictly in accordance with the principle illustrated by Anisminic Ltd. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 AC 147). Section 195 is an exception to the general rule that any person may set the criminal law in motion, its consequence being to take away the right of redress of persons. Thus the interpretation of clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 195, Cr.P.C., which does not deprive the ordinary Criminal Courts of their ordinary jurisdiction, must be adopted. Reliance is placed on the cases of Muhammad Akram v. The State (2004 YLR 830) and Muhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Azim and 9 others (1991 MLD 951).
8. Criminal prosecution can be launched in respect of any document, which is result of fraud and forgery and which is subject matter of the Revenue Court. It has been held by the superior Courts that if criminal act is committed prior to the initiation of civil proceedings, then criminal proceedings can be launched by a person, who has been defrauded or cheated or as a result whereof has suffered any injury or loss. Bar contained in section 195(1)(c), Cr.P.C. Only relates to such cases, which have close nexus between the offence and proceedings before the Civil Court.
Reliance can advantageously be placed on the cases of Abdul Wahab Khan v. Muhammad Nawaz and 7 others (2000 SCMR 1904) and Mahabat Khan and 5 others v. Senior Superintendent of Police and 5 others (1999 MLD 2243). It has been observed by the Full Bench of this Court in Muhammad Shafi' s case (supra) in the following way:-- "Now can it be said that the offence of forgery was against the administration of justice in a case in which the offence was committed. Say, ten or twenty years before the suit in which the forged document was produced or given in evidence? The answer must obviously be in the negative. The forger must have, before the suit, used the foreged document on a number of occasions in deceiving a number of persons and when his fraud and forgery came to light and the real owner or the person defrauded were preparing to take criminal proceedings, he hit upon the clever device of instituting a civil suit and producing the forged document in the civil suit. He would, then, on the view contended for by the petitioner, be able to say; 'Well, I have produced the document in the Civil Court, you have to wait till that Court has finally decided the genuineness or otherwise of the document, for unless that is done that Court will not be in a position to say whether an offence of forgery was committed or not and to lodge a complaint under section 195. `Unfortunately civil suits usually take very long time to decide and in practical terms, it may amount to completely defeating the ends of justice. On this view, therefore, the Civil Courts will become a place for the protection of criminals. This obviously could not have been the intention of the law. The cause of action of proceedings against the forger arose immediately when the offence of forgery as defined in section 463 of the P.P.C. Was committed. The commission of that offence was not only intended to deprive the real owner of his property but had also enabled the forger to deceive others and to deprive them of money. No proceedings were pending in any Court at that time. There was, therefore, no question of the offence, at the date of its commission. Being against the Court or the administration of justice, nor did it, then, in any way sully the proceedings of the Court, for none were pending."
The general rule is that any person irrespective of the fact whether he is aggrieved or not and his interest is at stake or otherwise having knowledge about the commission of any offence may set the law in motion but under the provision of section 195, Cr.PC. There are exceptions to the said general principle, where only public authority concerned and the Court concerned has a right to file a complaint, but clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 195, Cr.P.C. Applies only to those offenses that have "a close nexus between the offences and the proceedings". It contemplates cases of tampering with the documents on the record of a Court or cases of provisionally forged documents being used as genuine in certain proceedings. The conditions, necessary for the application of section 195(1)(c), Cr.P.C. Are offences mentioned should be committed by the party to the proceedings in Court and such offences should be in respect of the documents produced or given in evidence in such proceedings. Reliance is placed on Abdul Wahab Khan's case (supra).
' It is now well-settled that civil and criminal cases can be proceeded side by side. There is no bar on the initiation of criminal proceedings in presence of civil suit. I am guided by the Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in case of C Muhammad Shafi v. D.S.P. And others (PLD 1992 Lahore 178), Sheikh Ahmad v. Sh. Muhammad Younas (1971 PCr.LJ 331), Rehmat Ullah v. Abdul Aziz (1974 PCr.LJ 54) and Muhammad Naseem Awan v. Aleem Majid (PLD 2008 Lahore 358).
9. On the analogy of the Full Bench judgment, it is evident that the alleged act of forgery or presentation of a forged document has been committed not before the Member, Board of Revenue, but it was committed outside the Court and these alleged acts are prima-facie committed before filing of the review petition on behalf of the inhabitants of the village before the Member, Board of Revenue. In this view of the matter, the' learned trial Magistrate has not applied his judicial mind in its true perspective. The alleged acts were committed out of the Court of Member, Board of Revenue, so the Board of Revenue has no concern with the commission of the alleged acts, hence, sections 195 and section 476, Cr.P.C. Are not attracted in the present case.
10. I have noticed that the learned trial Magistrate on 25-2-2005 after considering the material available on the record in the shape of cursory statements of the appellant as well as his witnesses, on the one hand, had summoned the respondents to face trial and without having any fresh material brought before him had acquitted the respondents under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. On wrong assumptions, which is liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on the case of Muhammad Sadiq y. The State and others (1999 MLD 2549).
11. For what has been discussed above, I am of the view that the order of acquittal of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 passed by learned Trial Magistrate on 30-7-2005 being perverse is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The same is, therefore, set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned trial Magistrate for retrial of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in accordance, with law.
12. This appeal stands allowed in the above terms. However, the learned trial Magistrate is directed to conclude the trial preferably within six months on receipt of this judgment.
13. Before parting with this judgment, I may clear that the observations made hereinabove are tentative in nature and the learned trial Court will not be influenced thereof.