' ZAKAULLAH LODHI, J.-The petitioner has challenged the order of Member, Board of Revenue dated 2nd January, 1976 whereby he vacated the order of Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Quetta dated 5th February, 1962 directing transfer of the shop bearing No, 6-1/42-A situate on Mission Road, Quetta on the strength of C. S. Forms filed by him, and further ordered that the same be disposed of through an auction.
2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner occupied the said shop, which is a portion of a fairly big Shop No, 6-1/42, since before 1958 and also filed C. S. Forms to seek its transfer in his favour which were duly accepted by the then Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Quetta after the scrutiny. He passed an order on 5th February, 1962 directing that the disputed shop be transferred to the petitioner while the other two portions of the shop ; one in possession of Jan Muhammad be transferred to him against his N. C. S. Forms and the other then occupied by Haji Ghulam Hussain be auctioned. This order was not challenged untill 5th October, 1971 when the first respondent filed an appeal belated by 9 years and 8 months without any supporting application under section 5 of Limitation Act to seek condonation of this inordinate delay on the ground that the transfer in favour of the petitioner being irregular may be cancelled and he being in occupation thereof be considered for transfer in his favour. The appeal remained pending until the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 was promulgated on 30th July, 1973 where under, among others, section 2, clause (6) of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1958 which defined term "possession" on the basis of which transfers of evacuee properties to claimants and non-claimants were hitherto effected was deleted. It further provided that pending appeals to be treated as Revision Petitions and decided in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1958. Here it would not be out of place to mention that under the Act of 1958 a period of 15 days has been provided for the filing of appeals as well as revision petition and for belated actions condonation of delay in accordance with section 5 of the Limitation Act was necessary. However, another development which appeared on the scene of evacuee laws was their total repeal in 1974 by means of Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal)
Ordinance, 1974, which was promulgated on 30th September, 1974. Subsequently this Ordinance was converted into an Act of the same nomenclature in the year 1975. By virtue of section 2(3) thereof pending cases were to be disposed of in accordance with the laws prevalent at the time of their initiation ; hence as far as the question of limitation and locus standi to file appeals and revision petitions was concerned the Act of 1958 occupied the field in full force. The only visible change was with regard to "possession" which was not to be insisted upon any more in terms of section 2 (6) of the Act of 1958 in case the properties were sought to be transferred on the basis of occupation. Anyway, the second respondent vide a miserably short order allowed the appeal of the first respondent and directed that since the petitioner was not in possession of the shop on 20th December, 1958, namely the date mentioned by repealed section 2 (6) of the Act of 1958, he was wrongly held to be entitled to its transfer by the then Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the same should now be disposed of through open public auction. It may be mentioned here with emphasis that this finding has not been supported by any factual or legal argument.
3. Mr. Azizullah Memon, appearing for the petitioner contended that the first respondent was not an aggrieved person as he never contested for the transfer of this shop at any previous stage and appeared on the scene as a contestant as late as 5th October, 1971 when he filed said appeal in the capacity of only an informer contending that the transfer in favour of the petitioner was irregular ; hence he had no locus standi, whatsoever, to maintain the same. This position is not disputed by Mr. Iftikhar Muhammad Khan appearing for the first respondent. Decidedly in these circumstance no appeal lay as he was not a person who could feel himself aggrieved by the said order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. If at all the firs respondent desired to point out any irregularity in the process of adjudication of petitioner's entitlement to the transfer of the disputed premises, he could do so through a miscellaneous application without offering himself for the transfer of this shop ; because an informer had no such entitlement under law ; and in case he had not done so, his appeal should have been treated as such by the second respondent. But on the other hand he treated it to be a full fledged appeal filed by a rightful party and thus ignored the requirement of law both with regard to locus standi therefor and the limitation governing appeals which was clearly in contravention to section 19 of the Act of 1958. Over and above this he completely omitted to point out the irregularity or illegality which persuaded him to upset the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and respond the case by partially allowing the appeal. We accordingly find his order patently illegal.
4. A word on the point of limitation may also be added here. The law on the point requires, both appeals and revision petitions to be filed within 15 days of the accrual of the cause of action which fact is not in dispute; hence if at all it was genuinely considered by the second respondent that the appeal in question lay before him he should not have closed his eyes to the question of limitation; irrespective of the fact whether it was pleaded before him or not. Law requires its strict application as no word used therein is redundant. On the point of limitation in particular it is the duty of every Court to see whether or not an action in law cognizable by him was initiated within the prescribed time limit; if not, whether condonation of delay was sought? Again in the event of considering condonation of delay, he was bound to consider each and every fact on the basis of B which such condonation was sought and then pass an order manifesting by itself the reasons which persuaded him to form a particular opinion. Precisely this is what law expects from a decision- making body. Unfortunately in the instant case the approach has been different which fact can be seen from the perfunctory nature of the order that we have before us. It was attempted to argue that since the appeal was not dismissed as time-barred, therefore, it should be presumed that delay had been condoned. The process of law does not recognize automation and reject any scope for mere supposition. It stands to be wisely considered and properly applied. In the instant case there is even otherwise no scope for such presumptions and suppositions, as the appeal was not even accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. In a similar situation in Ahsan Ali and another v. District Judge and another (1), it was held that whether the plea of limitation was raised or not, it was duty of the Court to have noticed this point and decided it, in accordance with law. It was further held that the argument of the party benefiting by such omission that since the case was not dismissed on the point of limitation, therefore it should be presumed that the delay stood condoned automatically had no meanings at all. Earlier in Syed Azmat Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (2), dealing with the same point it was held that while hearing the revision petition it was the duty of the Settlement Commissioner to have seen whether at the appellate stage the concerned authority had correctly applied the law on the point or not. This exposition of law on the point of limitation needs no further elaboration and suffice it to say that this question should never be taken lightly. Every Judge of a cause of action is bound to carefully examine the question C of limitation first and deal with it as law demands. This glaring rule of law having been conveniently ignored, the impugned order is bad on this score as well.
5. Mr. Memon, next contended that the impugned order was an unspeaking order and such orders have never found favour with the superior Courts. He supported his contention by Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others (3) and Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan (4). In both these cases the principle that a Court finally disposing of an issue raised before it should pass a suitable order discussing facts and law and his opinions, with reasons therefor. It is undisputed principle of or legal system that orders passed by any Court or authority D should be capable of speaking for themselves as to what were the issues involved in a case and how they were tackled and resolved. The contention of the learned counsel is not without substance, and normally the case should have been remanded back for fresh decision but in the instant case such a course would tantamount to an exercise in futility as the case can be effectively disposed of on the consideration of two basic questions heretofore discussed.
' For the foregoing reasons we allow the petition with costs set aside the impugned order being illegal and without jurisdiction and direct that the transfer of the disputed property should be effected in the light of the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated 5th February, 1962. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1969 SC 167 (2) PLD 1964 SC 260
(3) PLD 1970 SC 173 (4) PLD 1959 SC 272 {{FOOT NOTE}}