MR. HUMAYUN KHAN SIKANDARI, MEMBER (TECHNICAL).--(1). This appeal has been filed by M/s. Rollins Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Swabi (hereinafter called as the appellants) against the Order-in- Original No. 06 of 2005, dated 28.06.2005, passed by the Collector of Customs, Central Excise & Sales Tax (Adjudication), Peshawar.
2. Precisely, the stated facts of the case as recapitulated from the available case records are that during the course of audit of the appellants' unit, it was observed that the declared value of supply in sales tax record was far less than the declared value of supply in central excise record (ACL & RTI) for the period of 1st January, 2000 to December, 2000, which was Rs. 383615835/- and duty paid value as per supply register was Rs. 184518909/-. Hence, they were alleged to have manipulated/suppressed the value of supply in sales tax record to the tune of Rs. 199096926/- and made short payment of sales tax of Rs. 29864540/- and were liable to pay the short paid amount of Rs. 29864540/- alongwith the additional tax of Rs. 6796032.98 (calculated upto May 2001), details of which are as under:- Month DPV in ACL/CEDPV in Sales Reg.Difference Sales T ax Less PaidTotal Add: Tax Jan-00 33463457 19025444 14438013 21657001.95 105441 1.021 Feb-00 36809282 17835872 18973410 284601 1.5 1184125.152 Mar-00 44056410 22276525 21779885 3266982.75 1138978.405 Apr-00 37709237 19871740 21897497 3284624.55 733292.4308 May-00 38886045 18162299 20723746 3108561.9 693986.4442 Jun-00 42527765 20092339 22435426 3365313.9 555276.7935 July-00 36968780 16415287 20553493 3083023.95 462453.5925 Aug-00 27515934 12692873 14823061 222359.15 300166.9853 Sep-00 30384822 14317397 16067425 24101 13.75 289213.65 Oct-OO 22889374 11063540 11825834 1773875.1 186256.8855 Nov-00 20504064 10456800 10047264 1507089.6 135638,064 Dec-00 11840665 6308793 5531872 829780.8 62233.56 Total: 383615835 184518909 199096926 29864538.9 6796032.984
3. Accordingly, a show cause notice was issued to the appellants and after hearing the parties, the learned Collector of Customs, Central Excise & Sales Tax (Adjudication), Peshawar vide his Order- in-Original No. 06 of 2005, dated 28.06.2005, ordered as under:- "7.(i). I haver gone through the case records and considered the written as well as verbal submissions of the parties to the instant case. It is an admitted fact that the respondents have been providing vending services to its principal (CPPL) under an agreement which has undergone amendments as per requirements of the circumstances. In order to have a better understanding of the matter under review it is pertinent to have a glance on the respondents past when it was set up to avail area exemption under SRO. 580(I)/91 for a period of five years on certain products of its principal. Having exhausted the exemption, the respondents were required to follow the provisions of S.T.G.O. No. 1 of 1998 for its factual status of being a vendor. On the contrary, they started paying sales tax in the manner like they were themselves the Principals. The dispute of value for the purpose of sales tax arised when the products of the respondents were brought under ad valorem regime in terms of Section 3(1) from the Third Schedule as provided under Section 3(2) of the Act, though the products were still assessable to Central Excise Duty on the retail price basis. The table in para-1 above showing die value for central excise & sales tax reflects overall reduction in value for sales tax @ 107.90%. This is although very alarming but the respondents in this regard seek shelter under the provisions of law as aforesaid, while the prosecution insists that the duty paid value,, is in fact, the base for sales tax which is separately -printed on the containers as per provisions of the Central Excise Law.
(ii) The vendors and principal (in the instant case) qualify as manufactures within the meaning and scope of definition provided under Section 2(17)(a) of the Act. The expression "value of supply" as defined under Clause (a) of sub-section (46) of Section 2 of the Act, means the Consideration in money including all Federal and Provincial duties and taxes, which the supplier receives from the recipient for that supply but excluding the amount of tax. Similarly, the assessable value on the basis of retail price, as provided under Section 4(2) of the Central Excises Act, 1944 is as under:- "[Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (1), the Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare that in respect of any goods or class of goods, the duty shall be charged on the retail price fixed by the manufacturer, inclusive of all charges and taxes, other than sales tax levied and collected under Section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, -at which any particular brand or variety of such , article should be sold to the general body of consumers or, if more than one such price is so fixed for the same brand or variety, the highest of such price; provided that the retail price shall be legibly, prominently and indelibly (indicated) on each article, packet, container, package, cover or label, as the case may be; Provided further that the Central Board of Revenue, so far as it appears to be necessary or expedient, may by a notification, in the official Gazette, fix the minimum price of any goods or class of goods, for the purpose of charging of the duty, which shall include the product cost, incidence of duty of excise, trade margins and cost of manufacturing or any other component as determined by the costing of product.]"
(iii) Having gone through the above definition and keeping the very practice of assessment adopted by the respondents in view, it is construed that the respondents receive amount as shown in the central excise record and thus, amount of sales tax is to be determined on that documented value of supply. However, if there is any difficulty in this way of determination of value, then there is the solution in clause (c) of Section 2(46) which provides for open market price defined under subsection (19) of Section 2 of the Act as under: "["Open market price" means the consideration in money which that supply or a similar supply would generally fetch in an open market.]''
(iv) The respondents could not prove that the entire amount of sales tax as printed on the containers was credited to the Government account although they have access to their principal for seeking documentary support (demanded during the course of hearing) to their stance as contained in para (VIII) above of their written arguments. The logic behind value addition of more than 107% being the difference between the printed retail price and value ascertained for sales tax at the manufacturing stage is not understandable in the were of limited distribution network between the principal upto the retail stage. The prosecution could have dug out the entire mechanism, had there been concerted efforts during the initial investigation. So keeping the above discussion in view. I am inclined to conclude that the respondents in collusion with their principal have very technically evaded the differential amount of sales tax as mentioned in the show cause notice. They are, therefore, directed to deposit the aforesaid amount of Rs. 29864539/- alongwith additional tax (to be calculated till the actual date of payment). A penalty of 3% of the amount of tax involved is also imposed under Section 33(2)(cc) of the Act."
4. Being aggrieved by the impugned Order-in-Original, the appellants have filed the instant appeal to this Tribunal, inter alia, on the following grounds:-
(a) that the impugned order is opposed to the facts of the case and is contrary to law. It ignores the relevant and material considerations and is based on irrelevant and immaterial considerations;
(b) that the Order-in-Original is time barred under the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Under the proviso to subsection (3) of Section 36, the learned respondent was bound to issue the Order-in-Original within 45 days of the date of issuance of the show cause notice or within such extended period as an officer of sales tax or the Collector (Adjudication) may, for reasons recorded in writing fix. Sub-section (3) of Section 36 further provides that the period extended by an officer of Sales Tax or the Collector (Adjudication) shall in no case exceed 90 days.
It is submitted that the show cause notice under reference was issued on 07.09.2001. The impugned Order-in-Original No. 6 of 2005 was passed on 28.06.2005, four years after the date of issuance of the show cause notice. It is submitted that no extension for extending the mandatory time period prescribed under Section 36(3) was recorded by the learned respondent. Further, Section 36(3) makes it clear that even if the mandatory period of 90 days stipulated for passing an order is extended, this mandatory prescribed period cannot, in any event and for any reasons, whatsoever, be extended beyond a period of 90 days from the date the order was to be passed. The Order-in- Original is, therefore, time barred under sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990;
(c) that the Order-in-Original being time barred under sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the same is illegal, unlawful and void. It is stated that Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, is a mandatory provision. Failure of the learned respondent to act within the prescribed period limitation renders the Order-in-Original completely void and without jurisdiction;
(d) that the learned respondent No. 1 erred in law by transcending beyond the parameters of the show cause notice by ruling on issues that were not a part of the show cause notice. That the respondent No. 1 has held in para 7(1) of the Order-in-Original that the appellants were "paying sales tax in the maimer that they were themselves the Principals". It is submitted that the appellant manufactures goods for CPPL and supplies finished goods to CPPL and that sales tax liability is discharged by the appellants on the ex-factory price (the consideration received by the appellants from CPPL) alongwith the element of central excise duty and that the appellants, therefore, discharge it sales tax liability by calculating the value of supply in accordance with Section 2(46)
(a) of the Sales Tax Act. 1990;
(e) that the respondent erred in law in holding at para 7(iii) of the Order-in-Original that the appellant "receive amount as shown in the central excise record and thus, amount of sales tax is to be determined on that documented value of supply." It is submitted that there is no allegation in the show cause notice that the appellants have "received the amount as shown in the central excise record." It is . Submitted that the respondent No. 1 has given contradictory reasons to support his erroneous conclusion. On the one hand, the respondent No.1 has held at para 7(ii) that the value of supply is to be determined in accordance with Section 2(46)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, that is the consideration the supplier receives-from the recipient including all duties and taxes but excluding the amount of sales tax. On the other hand, the respondent No.1 is relying on Section 4(2) of the Central Excises Act, 1944, in arriving at the conclusion that the value of supply for the goods supplied by the appellants ought to have been the retail price of the goods. It is most respectfully submitted that the learned respondent No.1 erred in law by relying upon provisions of the Central Excises Act, 1944, in determining the value of supply for the purposes of sales tax. It is submitted that before the Finance Act, 3 998, the appellants were liable to pay sales tax on the retail price under sub-section (2) of Section 3 read with the Third Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. That through the Finance Act, 1998, the goods manufactured by the appellants were deleted from the Third Schedule and thereafter, the appellants were liable to pay sales tax under Section 3 read with Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as per the "value of supply",?Which is defined as "the consideration in money including, all Federal and Provincial duties and taxes if any, which the supplier received from the recipient for that supply but excluding the amount of tax." It is not the case of the department that the appellants have received more money and declared less for the purposes of sales tax. The only case of the department is that sales tax ought to have been paid on the retail price as opposed to on the consideration that the appellants (supplier) received from CPPL (the recipient) for the supply of taxable goods. That this interpretation is contrary to law and the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990;
(f) It is submitted that the respondent No.1 has wrongly ... Held that "if there is any difficulty in this way of determination of value then there is the solution in clause (c) of Section 2(46) which provides for open market price.. ." It is submitted that clause (c) of Section 2(46) only comes into play "in case where for any special nature of the transaction it is difficult to ascertain the value of a supply." In such cases, the value of supply is taken to be "the open market price". It is submitted that in the case under reference, the transaction is not of a "special nature" and neither it is "difficult" to ascertain the value of supply. This provision, therefore, has no application to the case of the appellants;
(g) That the learned respondent No.1 erred in law by ignoring the order dated 03.11.2001 passed by this Honourable Tribunal in identical cases relating to different tax periods, which was binding on him and the same was also upheld by the Honourable Peshawar High Court. Peshawar by its order dated 15.06.2005:
(h) That the respondent No.1 has erred in law in enforcing the demand for additional tax against the appellants without determining as to whether the alleged non-payment was intentional and deliberate. That the learned respondent No.1 has enforced the levy of additional tax without giving any ruling as to why the same should be enforced against the appellants. This is contrary to Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990;
(i) That the learned respondent No.1 has erred in law by imposing a penalty of 3% of the amount of tax involved purportedly under Section 33(2)(cc) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. It is submitted that no such allegation for payment of penalty under Section 33(2)(cc) has been made in the show cause notice. That the learned respondent cannot impose a penalty in the absence of a specific allegation in the show cause notice. Further, no penalty can be imposed unless it is proved that the appellants acted deliberately with the intention to evade tax; and
(j) That the appellants reserves the right to urge further grounds at the time of hearing.
5. On the last hearing fixed for 26.05.2009, the learned counsel for the appellants appeared and almost reiterated the same arguments on the factual and legal issues as raised in the memo, of appeal, as reproduced in para 4 above. Thereafter, the learned counsel for the appellants mainly argued the appeal on the legal ground and vociferously advocated that the adjudication order has been passed beyond the limitation provided by law. In this regard, it was pointed out that the show cause notice was issued on 07.09.2001, whereas the date of order is 28.06.2005. According to law at the relevant time, the adjudication proceedings were to be completed within 45 days but the adjudication proceedings in the instant case culminated with an inordinate delay and no justification for the same is apparent from the face of it. To support his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the case, reported in 2008 PTD 578, 2008 (97 Tax.) 156, (SC) Lhr.
Contrary to this, this contention is rebutted by the respondents and in support of their view point, they have also placed reliance on certain citations (placed on record).
6. We have anxiously heard the learned counsel for the appellants and representative of the department/respondent at some length and observe that in the instant case, the pivotal issue of limitation is involved which in our opinion is pure question of law as the case was not decided by the adjudicating authority within stipulated period of 45 days as provided under Section 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, Thus, before adverting to other legal and factual issues involved in this case, it would be appropriate to deliberate first upon the issue of limitation as under:--
(a) At the very outset, the learned counsel for the appellants raised this contentious issue. He asserted that the Order-in-Original is time barred under the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Under the proviso to subsection (3) of Section 36, the learned respondent was bound to issue the Order-in-Original within 45 (forty-five) days of the date of issuance of the show cause notice or within such extended period as an officer of sales tax or the Collector (Adjudication) may, for reasons recorded in writing fix. Subsection (3) of Section 36 further provides that the period extended by an officer of Sales Tax or the Collector (Adjudication) shall in no case exceed 90 (ninety) days. He further asserted that the show cause notice under reference was issued on 07.09.2001, whereas the impugned Order-in- Original No. 6 of 2005 was passed on 28.06.2005, four years after the date of issuance of the show cause notice. He emphasized that no extension for extending the mandatory time period prescribed under Section 36(3) was recorded by the learned respondent. Further, Section 36(3) makes it clear that even if the mandatory period of 90 (ninety) days stipulated for passing an order is extended, this mandatory prescribed period cannot, in any event and for any reasons, whatsoever, be extended beyond a period of 90 (ninety) days from the date the order was to be passed. He asserted that the impugned Order-in-Original is, therefore, time barred under sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. In support of his contention, he also placed his reliance on the judgement of the Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad Bench in Sales Tax Appeal No. 79/ST/IB/20Q5, in the case of M/s. Al- Qasim Textiles Mills Ltd. ;
(b) On the other hand, the representative of the department controverted the arguments of learned counsel for the appellants by stating that the instant issue* was not raised before the original adjudicating authority, therefore, the appellant has got no locus standi to raise this issue before this forum and they are estopped by their conduct. He further asserted that time limit under Section 36(3) of the Act is directory and not mandatory. He also contended that the subject matter is sub-judice before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan as the department has filed CPLA No. 25-L, 121-L and 122-L of 2008 in the case of M/s. Super Asia Mohammad Din & Sons and M/s. Hanif Straw Board Factory etc., and the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has already granted leave to appeal in the instant CPLA's.
(c) The legal point urged by the appellants is that as per law, within 45 days of the show cause notice, the adjudication proceedings were to be completed. In the present case, the show cause notice was issued on 07.09.2001 and the impugned Order-in-Original was passed on 28.06.2005 and dispatched on 15.09.2005, which is beyond limitation provided under the law. It has candidly been admitted on behalf of the respondent that no extension in this regard was either prayed of issued by the Central Board of Revenue. .In the case of Super Asia Muhammad Din & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd.
Vs. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others, reported in (PTCL 2008 CL. 1) (HC Lhr.), the Honourable Mr. Justice Nasim Sikandar has held therein that: "The claim of the revenue that the prescribed limitation of 45 days for completion of adjudication proceedings as provided through Finance Ordinance, 2000 and enhanced to 90 days by Finance Act, 2003 is merely directory cannot be accepted. It is settled law that where inaction on the part of a public functionary within the prescribed time is likely to affect the rights of a citizen, the prescription of time is deemed directory. However, where a public functionary is empowered to create liability against a citizen only within the prescribed time, it is mandatory. The acceptance of contention of the revenue in that regard will make a provision of law redundant and nugatory.
Redundancy or superfluity of an act of Parliament and a provision of law cannot be readily accepted. All the more so when the prescribed limit is beneficial for the citizen and restricts the executive power to touch the pocket of a taxpayer thereby creating certainty that after its expiry even if there was a good case for creation of liability he will not be dragged in." (d) Thereafter, in the case reported in 2008 PTD 578, the Division Bench of the Lahore-High Court, comprising of Honourable Mr. Justice Fazal-e- Miran Chauhan and Mr. Justice Khawaja Faruq Saeed, has held as under:- "Be that as it may in this case, the illegalities are so apparent that one cannot agree with the learned counsel for the respondents with respect to the status of show cause notice viz- a-viz subsequent proceedings continued on the basis of the same. In this case, the important factor is that the proceedings were continued and finalized beyond prescribed limit of 45 days which alone is enough to decide the issue. In this regard we are supported by the Writ Petition No. 13331 of 2006 which among other things hold that the above provision regarding limitation is mandatory and not directory, hence, its application on the subject case is without any doubt.
The notice was issued on 19.06.2000, while limitation to complete an assessment on the basis of a show cause notice under Section 36 and Section 11 for (Recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded) and for assessment was 45 days. In this case the date of notice was 19.06.2000 and order was finalized on 30.10.2000, hence we have no hesitation in holding that the decision was time barred and the same is set aside. As a result the assessee's four questions are answered in the following manners:--
(a) Positive.
(b) Negative.
(c) Negative.
(d) The question does not arise out of the order before us and it is more a question of fact and is not a question of law hence needs no reply."
(e) We would like to advert to judgement of Division Bench in STA No. 16/2004 by Honourable Justice Ali Akbar Qureshi and Mr. Justice Maulvi Anwar- ul-Haq. We find that in the aforesaid judgement, no verdict about the limitation has been given by their Lordships. It was observed by their Lordships only that "we find that while inserting proviso to Section 36 of the Act ibid, the legislature did not provide the penal consequences in the event of non-compliance of the aforesaid proviso. Even otherwise, the question does not arise from the impugned judgement." The respondent-department has however, also relied on the admitting note in CPL 25-L, 121-L & 122-L of 2008. In this note, we find that the august Supreme Court of Pakistan has not issued any injunctive order.
(f) After having given anxious consideration to the arguments of both sides, we are of the considered opinion that though the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has granted leave to appeal in the cases referred to in the preceding para to determine whether the limitation of 45 days for completion of adjudicating proceedings under the Finance Ordinance, 2000, enhanced to 90 days by the Finance Act, 2003, was mandatory or directory, however, the Judgement of the Honourable Lahore High Court, Lahore is still in the field as the Apex Court has not suspended the operation of the judgement of the Honourable Lahore High Court, Lahore. In view of this logical reason, we are inclined to be convinced by the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants that the impugned order is barred by time as the same has not been passed by the learned Collector (Adjudication) within the stipulated period of 45 days, extendable by further period of 90 days, as required under Section 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.
From the judgements quoted above, it is clear that the Single as well as Division Bench of the Lahore High Court have categorically held that under Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the adjudication proceedings are to be completed within the stipulated time and any order passed beyond the period of limitation, the entire proceedings would be barred by time. In the instant case, the adjudication proceedings were completed much beyond 45 days of limitation provided under the law and admittedly no extension in this regard was obtained from the Federal Board of Revenue thus, therefore, on the face of it, the adjudication proceedings are barred by time. We are thus, inclined to observe that even on this score alone, the case of the department does not stand on the legal footing. In this behalf, we also gain strength from the judgement passed by Mr. Abdus Salam Khawar, the then Member (Judicial)/ Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal in the case of M/s. Al-Qaim Textile Mills Ltd., Tallagang Road, Chakwal.
7. So far as the other legal and factual issues involved in this case are concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants has placed his reliance on the judgement of the Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad Bench in Appeal No. S.T.936/200 in the identical case of the appellants. On the other hand, the representative of the department has almost reiterated the same arguments as advanced in parawise comments (placed on record). We are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that both the central excise & sales tax levies provide different regimes for determination of value and assessment of duty and taxes. The Sales Tax Law provides for assessm ent under Section 2(46) whereas the Central Excise Law provides for assessment of duty under Section 4(2) of the Central Excises Act, 1944. The law has apparently been misconceived by the D.R. For the respondent department. We also agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned adjudicating authority should have resolved the succeeding issues, before giving his findings, as to (i) whether levy of Central Excise Duty can be administered in accordance with the provisions of Sales Tax Law or vice versa or each levy shall be applied according to its own provisions; (ii) whether the products of the appellants were excluded from the Third Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (retail price regime) and if so, value of supply should have been in accordance with Section 2(46) thereof or Sales Tax was to be calculated in accordance with Section 4(2) of the Central Excises Act, 1944; (i.e) whether Section 2(33) defines "supply" which includes putting to private, business or non-business use of goods produced or manufactured in the course of taxable activities for the purposes other than those of making a taxable supply. If so, the appellant (a) produced or manufactured goods in course of taxable activity for its principal M/s. Colgate Palmolive Pakistan Ltd., and (b) paid Sales Tax on the consideration in money (conversion charges) received from the recipient of the supply in accordance with Section 2(46) of the Act; (iv) whether the appellant was liable to pay Central Excise Duty in accordance with Section 4(2) of the Central Excises Act, 1944 and if so, whether the event of taxation in Central Excise Law is production and manufacture; and (v) whether Sales Tax can be collected on the retail price determined under Section 4(2) of the Central Excises Act, 1944, where Sales Tax Law itself provides for determination of value in accordance with Section 2(46) of the Act.
8. We also find that the adjudicating authority has not given due consideration to the fact that prior to the substitution of the Third Schedule to the said Act, the products manufactured by M/s. Rollins Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., were liable to pay sales tax on the retail price vide item 10 of the said Schedule.
The Finance Act, 1998, thus, amended and transferred the products of the appellants from "retail price regime" to '"ad volerum regime" of the sales tax and the appellants were governed by sub- section (46) of Section 2 for the purpose of valuation and assessment of sales tax and thereafter, the appellants are admittedly calculating and paying sales tax on the "value of supply" as defined in clause (a) of subsection (46) of Section 2 of the Act. The value of supply in this case happens to be the "consideration of money" received by the appellants from their suppliers. The adjudicating authority has also not appreciated the fact that the respondent-department could not prove, through documents or any other evidence on record, that the appellants received higher consideration of money from the suppliers than declared in their sales tax records on which they have been paying sales tax. Therefore, the finding by the adjudicating authority that the appellants had to pay sales tax on the open market price is not backed by any legal stipulation or any statutory provisions of the Finance Act, 1998. It appears that the adjudicating authority has altogether ignored this fundamental and legal stance of the appellants. In fact, he has based his findings on the highest price prevailing in the open market which is neither rational nor backed by any legislation or Sales Tax Law. Moreover, he has not been able to prove with reference to any statutory provisions of Sales Tax Law as to how he arrived at the finding in his impugned order to the effect that, "if there are two or more different values of same supplies, than the maximum value of supply will be considered for tax purposes." This presumption has no backing in the Central Excises Act, 1944, or the Sales Tax Act, 1990. We are, however, inclined to observe that the allegations mentioned in the show cause notice are correct as the appellants have been paying sales tax on retail price inclusive of excise duty.
9. In view of the above stated factual and legal position, we are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the adjudicating authority has erred by misinterpreting the provisions of law and by also giving his findings without material evidence on record-The issues raised by the respondent- department and accepted by the adjudicating authority are presumptive in nature, which are neither sustainable nor maintainable in the eyes of law. We are, therefore, inclined to accept the instant appeal and set aside the impugned order being devoid of material evidence.
10. This judgement consists of twelve (l2) pages, and each page bears our seals, signatures and corrections where found necessary.
11. Announced.
12. Attested copy of this judgement be dispatched to the concerned parties within ten (10) days of passing of the same.