' CH. IJAZ AHMED, J.--- Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the impugned judgment dated 27- 1-2009 wherein the appeal of the respondent No,1 against his conviction was accepted.
2. Detailed facts have already been mentioned in para.3 of the impugned judgment.. However, necessary facts out of which the present petition arises are that respondent No,1 along with his acquitted co-accused, namely, Muhammad Sarfraz, Mukhtar Ahmed, Khizar Hayat and Muhammad Iqbal were involved in case F.I.R. No,216 of 2001 which was registered at Police Station Haveli Koranga, Tehsil Kabirwala, District Khanewal dated 23-12-2001 under sections 302/ 337- F(iv)/337-L(ii), P.P.C. On the complaint of Muhammad Fazal P.W.4 (uncle of the deceased Rustam Ali) and causing injuries to Basara P.W. The motive, as set out in the F.I.R., reveals that the dogs of accused party and Nawaz P.W. (given up) brother of the deceased started fighting with each other.
Nawaz had given sugar cane blow to the dog of respondent No,1 due to which respondent No,1 and Nawaz abused each other. Respondent No,1 along with four acquitted co-accused in furtherance of their common intention committed murder of Rustam Ali and injured Basara. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kabirwala, vide its judgment dated 30-5-2003 convicted and sentenced respondent No,1 under section 302(b), P.P.C. To death and compensation amounting to Rs,1,00,000 under section 544-A, Cr.P.C. To the legal heirs of the deceased. In case of default of payment of compensation he shall have to undergo six months' S.I.
' It is pertinent to mention here that learned trial Court had acquitted the afore-said co-accused of the respondent No, 1 . The respondent No,1 being aggrieved filed Criminal Appeal No,388 of 2003 in the Lahore High Court, Lahore, whereas the trial Court had sent Murder Reference for confirmation under section 374, Cr.P.C. Hence the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits as under:--
(i) That the learned High Court had erred in law to acquit respondent No,1 without adverting to the evidence on record and the reasoning of the trial Court which had convicted respondent No,1 after appraisal of the evidence on record with cogent reasons.
(ii) That the learned High Court erred in law to disbelieve eye witnesses namely P.W.4 Muhammad Fazal, complainant (uncle of the deceased) and P.W.5 Liaqat Ali who had no previous enmity with respondent No, 1.
(iii) The deceased Rustam Ali and respondent No,1 fought with each other on a minor issue as the motive as alleged reveals that the dogs of respondent No,1 and deceased started fighting with each other. The deceased in order to save his dog gave sugar cane blow to the dog of respondent No,1 due to which they abused each other and consequently respondent No,1 and his acquitted co- accused in furtherance of their common intention committed murder of deceased Rustam Ali and injured Basara.
(iv) The learned High Court had also erred in law to acquit the respondent No,1 on minor contradictions and improvements in the statement of the eye witnesses by observing the injuries mentioned by Investigating Officer P.W. In the inquest report and the injuries mentioned by Doctor at the time of conducting the postmortem examination of the deceased by P.W.1 Doctor Muhammad Akhtar.
4. We have given our due consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel of the petitioner and perused the record. It is an admitted fact that the trial Court had acquitted four co-accused of respondent No,1 while, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death. The learned High Court has come, after re-appraisal of the evidence, to the conclusion of innocence of respondent No,1 while acquitting him. This Court has laid down parameters regarding the interference in the cases of acquittal in Ghulam Sikandar's case PLD 1985 SC 11. The relevant observation is as follows:- - "(1) In an appeal against acquittal the Supreme Court would not on principle ordinarily interfere and instead would give due weight and consideration to the findings of Court acquitting the accused. This approach is slightly different than that in an appeal against conviction when leave is granted only for the reappriasement of evidence which then is undertaken so as to see that benefit of every reasonable doubt should be extended to the accused. This difference of approach is mainly conditioned by the fact that the acquittal carries with it the two well-accepted presumptions: One initial, that, till found guilty, the accused is innocent: and two that again after the trial a Court below confirmed the assumption of innocence.
(2) The acquittal will not carry the second presumption and will also thus loose the first one if on points having conclusive effect on the end result the Court below; (a) disregarded material evidence (b) misread such evidence; (c) received such evidence illegally.
(3) In either case the well-known principle of re-appraisement of evidence will have to be kept in view when examining the strength of the views expressed by the Court below. They will not be brushed aside lightly on mere assumptions keeping always in view that a departure from the normal principle must be necessitated by obligatory observances of some higher principle as noted above and for no other reason.
(4) The Court would not interfere with acquittal merely because on re-appraisal of the evidence it comes to conclusion different from that of the Court acquitting the accused provided both the conclusions are reasonably possible. If, however, the conclusion reached by that Court was such that no reasonable person would conceivably reach the same and was impossible then this Court would interfere in exceptional cases on overwhelming proof resulting in conclusion and irresistible conclusion; and that too with a view only to avoid grave miscarriage of justice and for no other purpose. The important test visualised in these cases in this behalf was that the finding sought to be interfered with after scrutiny under the foregoing searching light should be found wholly as artificial, shocking and ridiculous."
' The afore-said judgment is upheld by this Court in various pronouncements. See Muhammad Iqbal's case 1994 SCM R 1928.
5. So keeping in view the afore-said principle, we have appreciated the arguments addressed by the learned counsel of the petitioner with care. It is an admitted fact that respondent No,1 allegedly had inflicted head injury by a Sota. According to Doctor Muhammad Akhtar who conducted the post-mortem examination of Rustam Ali, deceased, and observed the following injuries:- "(1) Abrasion 1/2 c.m. x 1/4 of right clavicle.
(2) Abrasion 1/4 c.m. On the dorsom of right hand.
(3) Red contusion 12 x 1.5 c.m. On the back of left chest 11 c.m. Below the angle of left scapula, horizontal slightly oblique.
(4) Redish contusion mark 5 c.m. x 1.5 c.m. On the inner part of left buttock 4 c.m. From mid-line."
' In case contents of F.I.R., statement of Dr. Muhammad Akhtar, P.W.1 and statement of Muhammad Fazal P.W.4 (uncle of the deceased) P.W.5 Liaqat Ali son of the deceased are put in juxta position, then it is crystal clear that the statements of the eye-witnesses are not in consonance with the contents of the F.I.R. As well as the statement of Doctor Muhammad Akhtar, P.W.1. The learned High Court had taken a lot of pain in paras.16 and 17 of the impugned judgment. The learned High Court after reappraisal of the evidence had come to the conclusion that eye-witnesses were not present at the spot. We have also examined the record. We do not find any infirmity qua the conclusion arrived at by the learned High Court in the aforesaid paragraphs of the impugned judgment. The learned trial Court had disbelieved the recovery of Sota Exh.P.4 recovered from respondent No,1 in para.32 as well as by the C learned High Court in the impugned judgment vide para.19. It is admitted fact that trial Court had acquitted 4 co-accused of respondent No,1 after appraisal of the evidence and on the basis of the same evidence respondent was convicted and sentenced to death without adverting to the well-known principle that the statements of such witnesses must be examined with great care and caution coupled with the fact that the eye-witnesses P.W.4 and P.W.5 were chance witnesses as observed by the learned High Court in the impugned judgment, therefore, testimony of such witnesses must be scrutinized with great care and caution.
Respondent No,1 was also entitled to acquittal, on the fact that four of his co-accused who had allegedly taken part in the attack, were found to have been falsely implicated by the same eye witnesses who deposed against him. It is settled principle of law that improvements of the witnesses to make the oral evidence in accordance with the medical evidence causes serious doubt about veracity of such witnesses as law laid down by this Court in Shahbaz Khan Jakhrani's case 1984 SCM R 42 and Muhammad Shafique Ahmed's case PLD 1981 SC 472. As ocular evidence contradicts by medical evidence as mentioned above, therefore, learned High Court was justified to acquit respondent No,1 which is in consonance with the law laid down in various pronouncements. See Bagh Ali's case PLD 1973 SC 321, Darey Khan's case 1972 SCM R 578 and Shah Bakhsh's case 1990 SCM R 158. Learned counsel for the petitioner had mainly raised the same contentions which were raised by him before the learned High Court. Learned High Court had discarded the same with cogent reasons in the impugned judgment.
6. In view of what has been discussed above we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgment. Therefore, the petition has no merit and the same is dismissed. . revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.