' ZUBDA-TUL-HUSSAIN, J.--- Mst. Aysha Mai alias Ashoo Mai/Respondent No,1 filed a suit for recovery of dower in the form of a house worth rupees ten lacs and gold ornaments of three Tolas. The claim for maintenance allowance at the rate of rupees ten thousand (Rs,10.000) per month. Both past and future, was also joined with the suit for recovery of dower. As trial of the suit started, respondent No,1 produced her evidence but the petitioner failed to do so and as such ultimately, learned trial Court was obliged to close evidence of the petitioner through the order, dated 26-3- 2008.
2. As the petitioner had pronounced divorce to respondent No,1, the claim for maintenance allowance was disallowed by the learned trial Court. The suit for recovery of dower amount was, however, decreed to the extent of rupees one lac and fifty thousand (Rs,1,50,000), as value of the house and rupees forty thousand (Rs,40,000) of the gold ornaments. Value of the house was determined tentatively in the absence of any substancial evidence regarding its value. Both the parties filed appeals against the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court.
3. Appeal of respondent No,1 was allowed for rupees nine thousand (Rs,9,000), as maintenance in lump sum while value of the house, for the purpose, was determined as rupees two lacs and fifty thousand (Rs,2.50.000). The suit was accordingly decreed in the said terms, resultantly, appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed.
4. Through the instant writ petition, the legality and validity of the findings and judgments and decrees of the learned lower Courts have been challenged.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, at the very outset, argued that by virtue of Second Proviso of subsection (2) of section 7 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, a plaint of dissolution of marriage may contain all claims relating to dower, maintenance, personal property belongings of a wife, custody of children and visitation rights of parents of meeting their children but where a suit was not for dissolution of marriage, the rest of the causes could not be joined in one sufit and, as such, it was bad for misjoinder of causes of actions.
6. This contention, I have least doubted my mind, is totally misconceived and runs counter to the very spirit of law on the point. The joinder of the causes, as envisaged by the aforesaid provisions of Second proviso of subsection (2) of section 7 ibid, it is in the interest of justice that claim for various causes of action relating to the matrimony of the spouses are allowed to be joined together. There is no doubt that the joinder is specifically mentioned with reference to the suit for dissolution of marriage but where a suit for dissolution of marriage is not filed there can be no bar in joining the rest of the causes in one suit.
7. The meanings and interpretation of a Statute are to be attributed in a manner, which would advance the cause of the provisions. An interpretation, which renders the provisions futile or makes it ridiculous, is liable to be set at naught. The only purpose of permitting the parties to join the impugned causes of matrimonial disputes in one suit, is avoiding multiplicity of the proceedings as well as advancement of the cause of convenience of the parties and the Courts.
8. It will simply be unreasonable, against the logic and rather ridiculous, to say that causes of matrimonial disputes cannot be joined together with a suit for dissolution of marriage but in other matters, the parties shall have to face the rigours of multiplicity of litigation, the treacherous inconvenience and agony of the multiple litigation. And if, that joinder is not to be permitted without a suit for dissolution of marriage, it will render the whole legislation on the point useless.
This, of course, can neither be the intention of law nor it is proper and reasonable interpretation.
This would rather frustrate the very purpose of the provision instead of advancing its cause. The objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, without any force rather baseless and frivolous.
9. It is true that evidence of the petitioner was closed but the record reveals that before closing his evidence a number of opportunities were provided to him and he not only failed to avail of those opportunities but his attitude and conduct in that behalf was also contumacious. The learned trial Court was, therefore, justified to close his evidence.
10. The next point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner was that after closing evidence of the petitioner, the learned trial Court did not make any effort to effect compromise or reconciliation between the parties and thereby violated the mandatory provisions of section 12 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. It is correct that reconciliation proceedings, both pre-trial and post trial, are requirements of the Family Courts Act, 1964 but the circumstances of the case clearly indicate that there was no chance of any reconciliation between the parties on the issues on which they were contesting the suits.
11. The learned trial Court did not record evidence about the failure of the reconciliation but such omission is only of technical nature when the Court after close of evidence of the defendant- petitioner did not make an effort for reconciliation, it was merely an irregularity not affecting the decision of the Court on merits, especially, as already stated, when it was apparent from the record of the case that such an effort had no chance of success. Regarding the issue that omission to make an effort for reconciliation after the close of evidence is mere an irregularity, the reliance can be placed upon the judgment in the case reported as Daulat Ali v. Shagufta Rani and another 1990 CLC 917. It was also held in the case of Muhammad Jalil v. Salma Rani and another 1999 M LD 2192 that, in case compromise or reconciliation was not possible the Family Court under section 12 of the ibid Act was authorized to announce the judgment. I am, accordingly, of the view that even this failure on the part of learned trial Court, in the peculiar circumstances of the present case, could not prejudice the merits of the judgments.
12. I have also given my anxious consideration to the findings of the learned lower appellate Court regarding enhancement in the value of dower amount as well as in granting the maintenance allowance of rupees nine thousand (Rs,9,000). There is no doubt that the petitioner had pronounced divorce to respondent No,1 but the suit was filed just after one month of this pronouncement and, as such, respondent No,1 was lawfully entitled to receive the alimony for the relevant Iddat period. The amount of dower was also enhanced by the learned lower appellate Court keeping in view the relevant circumstances including the price-hike and the market value of the property. These findings are, therefore, unexceptionable.
13. For what has been discussed above, I am of the view that the impugned judgments of the learned lower Courts do not suffer from any illegality or material irregularity warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.